Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

239. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, October 18, 1957—8 p.m.

1134. For Secretary and Robertson. Dept pass Defense. Re Embtel 699.² While I know how desperately busy you are with ME crisis, following situation in Japan is one such great importance to our long-term position here that I feel I must bring it to your attention.

In my judgment, forthcoming Japanese elections will influence strongly our future position and interests not only in Japan but in Far East and South Asia. I believe these elections as important to our position in this part of world as recent German elections were to our position in Europe. Outcome will most certainly affect long-term political orientation of Japan. Though timing elections remains uncertain there is possibility they will occur early next year. Hence it important review now Kishi’s position and prospects and particularly to consider implications in terms US policy during coming months.

1. In broad terms, Kishi has tried create atmosphere of forward movement in terms of Japan’s domestic and foreign problems designed to appeal to reviving national mood of self-confidence and purpose. He can stand on record of considerable accomplishments during short seven months in office: transition from Ishibashi regime was handled capably, budget passed on time, Cabinet eventually reshuffled without major setback; new phase in US–Japan relations inaugurated with Washington talks; Japan’s prestige enhanced by election to UNSC; Asian ties promoted by SEA trip and exchange of VIP visits, notably recent Nehru visit which GOJ considers unqualified success; conservative factionalism though active is no longer as rampant as in Hatoyama era; govt policy program substantially developed for fall political season; rather stringent measures adopted to cope with difficult economic situation seem to be having some success in redressing critical balance of payments situation. Kishi has tried to enhance atmosphere of action by modern public relations techniques, used for first time on extensive scale in presenting conservative policies to public.

2. However, there is another side to picture. As I reported in Embtel 2206 April 4³ (which was before extent of balance of payments deterioration clearly evident), Kishi’s two basic problems were to build up his personal popularity and to consolidate his party and reduce factionalism to manageable proportions.

a. Personal popularity. It is fact that contrary to his hopes and expectations Kishi has not as yet developed wide personal popularity. Reports on stumping speeches in Tokyo, Hokkaido, and Kanasai show at best only mild enthusiasm in most areas. To considerable extent this is because policies he has enunciated do not have emotional appeal. Also, while he has personality which appeals to Westerners, it has not as yet got across with Japanese public.

b. Factionalism. Though factional strife within LDP has on surface been mitigated, it is swirling below surface. Balance of power in LDP remains precarious and could easily be upset if Kishi’s strength shows signs of declining. Thus Kishi must keep wary eye on those waiting for chance to assume his mantle—notably Miki, Ikeda, and above all Kono, who has emerged already as strong man in Cabinet and is conceded to have great ambitions (Embtel 1052).⁴ Kono essentially soldier of fortune but has powerful sources financial support. Miki and Ikeda are strongly anti-Kono but at moment, due lack powerful positions in govt, must bide time, content selves with behind-scenes maneuvers aimed at holding Kono influence to minimum. To realize long tenure in office Kishi must for present continue play careful game restraining all three but incurring hostility none.

c. Kishi now also has economic problems. Recent rice price increase and threat of other increased living costs can affect adversely his position. Also domestic impact of measures used to restore balance of payments may also have serious political implications in coming months.

3. Kishi’s political platform:

a. Foreign affairs. Kishi has taken calculated domestic political risk in staking future his govt on central thesis of cooperation with free nations, notably US and Asian countries. He has come out openly against Communism and neutralism and in favor of free world cooperation. Moreover he has explained and defended this policy before public as even Yoshida never did. (While Yoshida, Hatoyama, and Ishibashi govts all considered relations with US as the basic factor in Japan’s international policies, Japanese people as whole wanted greater independence from America. This explains to considerable extent popularity Hatoyama’s position for restoring relations with Soviets and also enthusiasm for Ishibashi who first pushed policy of expanding trade with Communist China.) Position Kishi has taken has no such popular appeal and therefore leaves him open to attack from those elements, not only Socialists, neutralists, and Communists, but also some conservative circles who desire looser association with US and closer ties with Asia including Communist China. Concrete signs of greater advantage for Japan from “new era” in US relationship such as establishment new security committee, partial withdrawal US military forces, ability Japan to stand up to US on key issues such as suspension nuclear tests and greater trade with Communist China, have helped Kishi’s stand thus far. But any slippage from spirit of new era developed during Washington visit, in form of trade discriminations or impression that now Kishi’s visit is over we no longer interested in bringing about necessary readjustments in Japan–US relations, is sure to be used as powerful political ammunition against Kishi.

b. Domestic. Two of most dangerous developments in Japan in past few years have been increasing Communist and Marxian influence in labor and education. Kishi govt recognizes this and has adopted firm position to counter extreme left influence over labor and also to redress situation in vitally important field of education. (These are obviously controversial problems, with strong emotional overtones.) Because of Kishi’s background it leaves him open to charges of “authoritarianism” and “trying to set clock back to pre-war situation”, which his predecessors (who did nothing in these fields) did not have to face.

4. Date of elections, Kishi will of course tie [try?] elections for date of estimated maximum advantage. Broad alternatives are (a) dissolution of lower house late this year or early 1958, with elections following in month’s time; (b) dissolution after passage budget late March or early April; or (c) delay until fall 1958. While decision not yet made and will depend largely on evolution of situation in coming weeks, general feeling at this juncture is that early rather than late elections are a possibility.

5. Estimate of situation.

a. Complacency re outcome of next elections is not warranted. Few qualified observers here believe that if elections were held today LDP would make more than very slight gains at best. Some even think loss of a few seats more probable.

b. If LDP fails to achieve electoral gains, and thus fails to reverse trend toward left of past several years, Kishi’s position and future will be threatened. In particular, failure of Kishi to establish his own leadership by registering gains in elections almost certain to cause renewed outbreak of factionalism within LDP by individuals who will start maneuvering to succeed him. This would, probably lead to progressive erosion of Kishi’s position and general conservative position along with it.

c. If Kishi fails, his long-range constructive domestic program for Japan including strengthening of political, economic and military structure, and constitutional revision may go down drain.

d. While Kishi has his defects, he is at present by far best leader in sight in terms of US objectives. If he loses out, his successor likely be weaker or less cooperative, or both. Prospects in that case would be for deterioration of US position and interests in Japan and, correspondingly, in Far East.

e. Point I want to emphasize is that thus far lacking personal appeal to voters, Kishi must depend for success primarily on continuing to build record of substantial achievements in line with his program.

6. Summary and recommendation.

a. US has vital stake in outcome of next Japanese elections.

b. Since elections might occur early next year, it is strongly in US interest to do whatever we appropriately can in next several months discreetly to help Kishi build a further record of positive achievement. Strengthing Kishi position in pre-electoral period will not only help him in elections but also aid him in keeping factionalism (notably Kono) in hand in coming months. We should be thinking about things we might do which would strengthen Kishi just as we have done with Adenauer in last two elections.

c. I strongly recommend that as matter of urgency we begin at once an active study (possibly by high level group) to see where we might be helpful in strengthening Kishi. It is most important that wherever it possible to be helpful in pre-electoral period, we act so as to influence election outcome rather than delaying our action until after elections.

In immediately following telegram I will enumerate some problems where it seems to me there are possibilities of being helpful to Kishi.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/10–1857. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and to COMUS Japan.
2. Telegram 699, September 6, transmitted the Embassy’s analysis is of political trends in Japan. (Ibid., 794.00/9–657)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 794.00/4–457)
4. In telegram 1052. October 10, the Embassy gave its estimate of Kono’s probable goals during his forthcoming visit to Washington. (Ibid., 033.9411/10–1057) Regarding his visit, see Document 241.