Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, November 14, 1957—6 p.m.

1359. For Robertson. Please pass copy of this to Assistant Secretary Sprague (ISA) with whom we discussed Japanese problem in general terms on November 13.

In separate message which will be passed to State (C–116 Nov 15),² Air Attaché³ is reporting request by Air Self Defense Force for our cooperation in permitting Japanese to purchase air to air missiles from US. Chief Air Section MAAG is also requesting technical information from Air Force Chief of Staff.

I am sending this message because Japanese request raises major policy considerations with far-reaching consequences which we must have in mind in reaching decision on Japanese request.

In first place, while Kishi still believes in and is pushing for greater Japanese defense effort, Soviet success with ICBM and Sputnik has had serious unsettling effect on Japanese, particularly re their defense situation. Socialists and extreme left are using Soviet success to attack GOJ strongly pressing for major reappraisal of GOJ policy of close alignment with US in political and defense fields. Leftists take position Soviet scientific advances make existing GOJ policy obsolete. Kishi is firmly holding line against leftist attacks but there are disquieting signs that many LDP members are deeply concerned and feel Japan’s existing defense setup is inadequate and that it is useless to maintain or increase defense effort unless Japan promptly develops plans for modern weapons.

We are shortly going into NATO meeting where I assume we will among other things propose major steps for closer defense cooperation with our European allies.⁴ It is imperative that we also have constructive and realistic proposals to put forward to Japanese for closer bilateral cooperation with them on defense matters. If we do not have such proposals I fear it will be interpreted here to mean that we are inclined to write them off. This feeling will be compounded by necessity of our reducing existing US air strength in Japan before Japanese have developed corresponding capability for aid [air?] defense.

Japanese have in past asked MAAG for missiles to use as basis for developing their own modern weapons system but we understand chiefly because of lack of Japanese security legislation we have felt obliged to refuse. This explains their purchase of Oerlikon missile from Switzerland and JSDF efforts now to obtain missiles elsewhere reported in Air Attaché cable by approaching British for De Havilland “Firestreak” and sending JSDF mission to Europe. Let me emphasize, however, JSDF and GOJ want to cooperate with US rather than Europeans.

Situation re Japanese security legislation is as follows:

Kishi wants and is determined for his own reasons to have security legislation enacted. However, with certainty of elections next year and possibly in spring, he will not introduce legislation into Diet unless he is certain it will not give Socialists issue which they can exploit to weaken his position. In light present political situation here I doubt that he will introduce legislation before elections. If introduction of legislation before elections would work against him, I do not believe it would be in our own interest have him do so.

Purpose of this cable is to urge that entire missile situation as it affects Japan be reviewed in light of recent developments with objective of offering to sell appropriate air to air missiles, and perhaps also others for developmental purposes under MWDP, without entailing unacceptable security risks and without awaiting passage of new Japanese security legislation.⁵

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11–1457. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to COMUS Japan.
2. Not found.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Harrington.
4. For documentation on the NATO Heads of Government Meeting, held at the Palais Chaillot in Paris, December 16–19, see vol. IV, pp. 218 ff.
5. In telegram 1502 from Tokyo, December 4, MacArthur reiterated his endorsement of the Japanese request for air-to-air missiles and mentioned that CINCPAC was also in favor of the proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–457)

   Telegram 1253 to Tokyo, December 6, reads in part: “Government decision has been reached make available Sidewinder both to NATO allies and to Japanese. Since certain NATO countries requested Sidewinder earlier and were refused it is only fair make offer first to them. This now being done and expect be able authorize you make similar offer at Security Committee meeting December 18 or 19.” (Ibid., 794.5/12–657) See Document 252.