Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, October 18, 1957—9 p.m.

1135. Department pass Defense. For Secretary and Robertson. Re Embtel 1134.² Following are some of problems which I think should be studied at once looking to action on our part in reasonably near future. I believe they would contribute to strengthening Kishi’s hand. Sooner we can move in any of these or other fields the better since time in some cases would be required to produce positive results.

Recommendations:

1. Taking a more positive position with ROK on necessity for it to be more forthcoming in reaching ROK–Japan settlement. ROK actions are burning issue in certain parts of Japan, notably Kyushu which I recently visited. Japanese liken ROK actions in seizing and imprisoning Japanese fishermen and also in not releasing those who have served their sentences to action of Chinese Communists re US prisoners. They point out ROK holding fishermen as political hostages in violation of basic principles of humanity. A ROK–Japan settlement would be great feather in Kishi cap. But if this not possible, release of at least those Japanese fishermen who have served out their sentences (with suitable reciprocity by Japanese on ROK detainees) would certainly be welcomed as substantial achievement by Kishi.

2. Another achievement for Kishi would be to settle Vietnam and Indonesian reparations. Any discreet action which might be feasible for US to take with Vietnam and Indonesia to encourage a settlement would be most helpful.

3. Trade, particularly with US, is matter of life or death to Japan’s economy. I understand we will face very serious efforts early next year by certain interests in US to impose quotas or restrictions on Japanese trade. I do not believe we can wait until Congress reconvenes to counteract such efforts. I recommend that US Govt beginning now undertake a systematic campaign to enlighten American public as to vital importance, in terms our own enlightened self-interest, of US-Japan trade. Such campaign should include efforts by govt to enlist support US business interests in Japan. I have recently talked about this with number of prominent American businessmen visiting Japan who have interests here. Many seem sympathetic and well disposed. If US Govt officials could in public speeches and statements stress importance to US of Japan trade and at same time encourage American businessmen with interest here to do same, much good might be accomplished.³

4. Utilize every opportunity to strengthen Kishi in field of SEA economic development consistent, of course, with US policies and programs in region. Kishi and GOJ now fully understand that original Kishi development fund with US backing not feasible in foreseeable future, but they continue to look to US financial support for good projects that may be developed on case-by-case basis. We should be prepared to move quickly in evaluating projects that may be submitted for our consideration. It is of pressing importance that we make known as soon as possible the basic rules under which loans may be obtainable from the President’s fund and the new development loan fund. Our own resources in technical assistance might be geared to the search for and evaluation of development projects. Unless quick progress made in this general direction, opposition will certainly attack Kishi for ineptness in making futile proposals that were flatly rejected by US. Fuller views and suggestions on SEA development are being sent in a separate message.

5. In any statement or speeches made about Japan in Washington or here by visiting US officials (civilian or military), we should study content with utmost care to be sure they will be helpful rather than embarrassing to Kishi.

6. In recent months Japanese fishermen have in number of instances encroached on territorial waters in Bonins and Central Pacific. I fully understand Navy’s concern and Embassy has made representations to FonOff re this matter. I have no complaints about Navy’s action. However, in handling such cases in future we should bear in mind very important pre-electoral period in which we now find ourselves and handle them in way calculated to do least damage. It important to avoid impression that our actions are parallel to those of ROK and Soviets. In cases where there is doubt, I would hope we could give Japanese benefit of doubt.

7. We should start at once to prepare plans for compensation for Bonin Islanders (Deptel 72)⁴ which could be put into effect promptly if we decide such action is necessary. (Japanese note of 2 July 1956 [1957?], reported in despatch 317 July 11 remains,⁵ so far as we know, without substantive reply.) Bonins could become important election issue, and failure to have official US Govt position agreeing to compensation which could be made public at appropriate time before elections could place Kishi in very disadvantageous position. Important thing is that US demonstrate [that] humanitarian considerations not lost sight of in our handling of Bonins, despite need for strategic reasons to deny request for even partial repatriation.

8. We should of course continue to move ahead as rapidly as possible on war criminal problem. I conveyed substance Deptel 839⁶ to Fujiyama Oct 14 and Japanese reaction should be forthcoming shortly. I strongly hope Dept can find way to reduction of sentence to time served of all ten Class A parolees.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/10–1857. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and to COMUS Japan.
2. Supra.
3. MacArthur attached a memorandum dated November 12 to a letter to Secretary Dulles dated November 15; in this memorandum he enlarged upon the points made in numbered paragraph 3. MacArthur also sent copies to Herter and Dillon. (Attachments to letter of acknowledgment from Herter to MacArthur, December 4; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Chronological File)
4. Apparent misreference; telegram 72 to Tokyo, July 11, deals with a different subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 353/7–1157)
5. Apparent misreference; the fiscal year 1958 despatch series did not reach 317 by July 11.
6. Telegram 839 to Tokyo, October 8, concerned details involved in the transfer of deliberation on parole of war criminals from the Clemency and Parole Board in Washington to a Japanese board. (Department of State, Central Files, 694.0026/9–457) For the result of this process, see Document 247.