241. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 21, 1957, 2:30 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Japanese-American Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Ichiro Kono, State Minister of the Economic Planning Agency
- Mr. Takizo Matsumoto, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Koichiro Asakai, Ambassador E. and P., Embassy of Japan
- The Secretary
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. William C. Ockey, Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
- Mr. James V. Martin, Jr., Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs
Mr. Ichiro Kono called on the Secretary at 2:30 p.m. October 21, in company with Vice Minister Takizo Matsumoto and Ambassador Asakai.
The Secretary, after greeting the visitors cordially, said that Mr. Robertson had already described to him the earlier conversation with Mr. Kono2 and, in order to make the best use of time, they might avoid [Page 525] repetition. Mr. Kono desired to discuss the political situation in Japan. He said the policies of the Kishi Government were unchanged except for the necessity to follow an austerity program temporarily. Responding to the Secretary’s query about the next elections, Mr. Kono said that it was his understanding with Mr. Kishi that they would be held in August or September of next year. Prior thereto, the Cabinet would tighten the budget and, with the resulting surplus of 50–70 billion yen, government popularity would be regained. A two-thirds majority in the lower house seemed assured. The Secretary asked if this was being sought in order to amend the constitution. Mr. Kono said that it would put things on a firm basis. The Cabinet also intended to change the election law for the upper house (eliminating the national constituency) to insure over two-thirds majority in elections next June. The political situation should be settled in a year and a half but formulating party plans would require an additional six months or so. This was the consensus at the latest Liberal-Democratic Party meeting. Consequently, Mr. Kono believed that Mr. Kishi should remain in control for at least that long.
Mr. Kono said that, as far as domestic politics were concerned, everything was pretty well under control. However, Mr. Kishi had been too hasty on the international front and had said too much, for instance, on Okinawa and the Bonins as a result of being pushed by the Socialists.
The Secretary asked if he meant that Mr. Kishi had held out hopes which could not be realized. Mr. Kono did not answer directly but said it was absolutely necessary to achieve concrete progress in the solution of problems in Japanese-United States relations. The Secretary replied that we had done quite a few things when Mr. Kishi was here. He mentioned the Japanese-American Committee on Security as lending a bilateral atmosphere to security arrangements. Mr. Kono said that the Committee had met twice but that it has not made any progress toward getting anything definite accomplished. Moreover, the withdrawal of United States forces was not a “plus” for Japan because it was not favorable to the foreign exchange position.
Secretary Dulles said that we would see what specific things could be done. However, the best relation between countries was one which did not rest on periodically making presents to each other. A bride and groom exchanged gifts before marriage but did not make a practice of it thereafter, though they lived happily together. The United States could not constantly search for something to give. It did not do so in the case of its best friends.
Mr. Kono insisted that concrete progress must be made on at least one or more of the deadlocked issues of which there were four main ones: ROK-Japanese negotiations, Okinawa, the Bonins and Southeast Asia economic development. Regarding the first, public sentiment in [Page 526] Japan believed that the United States could at any time step in and solve ROK-Japanese differences. Regarding the other three, the government of Japan understood the United States viewpoint but this did nothing to advance the Kishi Government. If it were not for these pending problems, Japan could follow the Secretary’s doctrine.
The Secretary said that the United Sates had exerted upon Syngman Rhee all the pressure that was possible between self-respecting governments, in order to resolve Korean-Japanese disputes. However, Mr. Rhee was immovable, a fact which his broken hands made understandable.
The Bonin Islands question was not deadlocked but finished, said the Secretary. He had studied every square mile on maps of the islands, searching for possible areas for repatriation. United States security requirements are such that we cannot bring anyone back. We would be better off now if those that were allowed to return had not been repatriated.
On the Southeast Asia development fund, the Secretary remarked that no country had the resources to put up $500 million as capital and then look for ways to put it to work. We had been looking for years to find good projects that might be capitalized jointly. Any worthy project would have our consideration. It was unreasonable, however, to create a new banking institution for every project which might come to mind. To create a regional fund in Southeast Asia would increase demands for the creation of similar regional funds elsewhere. One could not afford to segregate large batches of money. While we could not therefore participate in such a fund, we would welcome the opportunity to study any concrete projects in which Japanese backing needed supplementing by American capital.
On the Ryukyus, the Secretary recalled that when he started negotiating the Peace Treaty it was agreed that the Ryukyus should be detached from Japan. As he recollected, they had settled upon the 29th parallel instead of the 30th and the Japanese had regarded this as very generous. Later they had clamored to regain the Amami Islands. The United States had returned them. There was great rejoicing for a few days. Now the Japanese wanted more. The United States could not operate on these principles but must think in terms of the fundamentals of world security and the balance of world power. The basic thing was that Okinawa was strategically essential in the Far East, offering protection to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines in addition to Japan itself. The United States could not upset the power balance in Asia just to give a present which might be appreciated for a few days by Japan. While the job had to be done, the United States had to have Okinawa to do it. We were willing to retire when it could be done safely but not willing to retire just to give a Christmas present to Japan.
[Page 527]The Secretary said that we respect the Kishi Government, of which Mr. Kono was a part, and understood the reality of politics. We wished to do what was helpful. However, Japan should be satisfied, on the basis of our record, that her interests run parallel with ours and that we do help each other. He said that there was more ground for cooperation than was being utilized, probably for fear of criticism by the Communists in Japan. He wished to point out that Chancellor Adenauer had freely acknowledged the benefits of cooperation with the United States and had not suffered, but on the contrary had profited thereby. The United States wanted Japan to be prosperous, strong and able to carry the responsibilities a free nation must carry. The Secretary cautioned Mr. Kono that Japan should not try to force us out before Japan was ready to pick up the load it was asking us to lay down. The price of so doing could be the loss of Japan’s independence and the retreat of the United States to its own west coast. That would result in an unhappy world.
The Secretary said that he had spoken so frankly only because he considered that he was talking to a friend and that it was his earnest desire for Japan and the United States to find a basis for working together.
Mr. Kono said he wanted to use the brief remaining time to make two things clear: (1) Japan would take no neutralist stand like India but would bear its responsibility as a member of the free world. (2) With respect to relations with Soviet Russia and Red China, Japan was drawing a clear line between economic and political relations. There was a trade and navigation agreement presently under negotiation. Japan would not enter into a political agreement such as the Soviets desired. Just prior to leaving Japan, Mr. Kono had given orders to formulate the new organization through which Japan planned to channel all its relations with the Soviet Union. Favorable trade was more important to Japan than getting back Okinawa and it was most important that the United States help Japan to expand trade. The time was up but he would like to say that on the basis of the thoughts exchanged today with the Secretary, he would talk with other Cabinet ministers.
Leaving the Secretary’s office, Mr. Robertson asked about the Orissa project.4 Mr. Matsumoto replied that Prime Minister Nehru had been against a Southeast Asia fund at the start but, after visiting Japan, had expressed himself as more favorable to the concept. Mr. Robertson urged that the Japanese come to us whenever they had a concrete proposal.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/10–2157. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 25 and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.
In a memorandum to Dulles dated September 13, Robertson stated that Kono would be in Washington and New York October 18–24, while en route to the Twelfth Session of the GATT in Geneva. Robertson commented:
“Prime Minister Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama have asked the Ambassador personally to request that you receive Mr. Kono while he is here. Mr. Kono is very energetic and ambitious. It is alleged that he feels that because of his role in the negotiation of the Japanese-Soviet agreement restoring diplomatic relations he is regarded by our Government as being soft on Communism and someone who is willing to work both the Soviet and Western sides of the street. While supporting Mr. Kishi at the present, he unquestionably has ambitions some day to be Prime Minister. Mr. Kono wishes to assure you of his staunch pro-Western and anti-Soviet orientation, and the Prime Minister believes it would be particularly valuable for him so to commit himself in talking with you.
“Ambassador MacArthur strongly recommends that you receive Mr. Kono and FE concurs.” (Ibid., 033.9411/9–1357)
↩In a conversation held at noon that day, Robertson and Kono discussed some of the same topics treated in the discussion between Kono and the Secretary, as well as Japan’s desire for P.L. 480 commodities under the current Congressional authorization of $1 billion. Robertson told Kono that funds were insufficient to include Japan under that authorization. (Memorandum of conversation by Martin, October 25, and telegram 975 to Tokyo, October 23; ibid. 611.94/10–2157 and 411.9441/10–2357, respectively)
Kono also discussed economic matters the morning of October 23 with Under Secretary Dillon and Secretary Weeks; these two conversations are summarized in telegrams 988 to Tokyo, October 24, and 996 to Tokyo, October 25, respectively. (Ibid., 411.9441/10–2457 and 411.9441/10–2557) On October 22, Kono discussed P.L. 480 with Under Secretary of Agriculture Morse. The talk is summarized in telegram 982 to Tokyo, October 24. (Ibid., 411.9441/10–2457) U.S. and Japanese officials, at Japanese request, again discussed a P.L. 480 program for Japan under the available $1 billion authorization several times in 1957, but the Embassy in Tokyo gave a final negative answer on or about December 16. Documentation is ibid., 411.9441.
↩- Reference is to a Japanese project in furtherance of Indian economic development.↩