83. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State 1

1179. After lunch today at my home I had long conversation with Djuanda, tenor of which generally confirmed contents mytel 1161.2

Djuanda said that never since Madiun3 had he felt so concerned over rise in PKI strength—not so much that he feared Communist revolt as he did general growth of their strength and influence. He confirmed my belief that many persons in PNI, including Prime Minister were deeply concerned over PNI association with PKI, but “their mouths are tightly closed by party discipline” which was as strict as that of PKI. I believe I can fairly infer from Djuanda’s oblique reference and significant omissions that he was trying to tell me the disciplines stemmed from Sukarno himself. Djuanda dismissed my suggestion that the country’s problems arose from economic and fiscal disorder, returning to the Communist danger and proceeding immediately to criticism of the opposition specially [especially?] Masjumi [Page 132]for refusing to cooperate with the government. I observed that it would be most unusual in a democratic country in a pre-election period for an opposition party to refrain from attacking party in power at every opportunity.

Djuanda said that due to failure of opposition cooperate with PNI, and to trouble NU was making within government (did not specify how), he thought there could be no solution of problems raised by PKI parliamentary support PNI until after elections. He said that government was, however, encouraged by recent signs of US understanding of their problems. I took advantage this opportunity to say (see mytel 1174)4 that while I was pleased see that UP story, which I emphasized was not official, expressed understanding of Indonesian problems, I felt it would be erroneous to read into it an expression of the intent of US Government support Ali Government [against?] any other Indonesian political group; that it rather expressed confidence of the writer which I felt was shared by other Americans in ability of Indonesian people and nation to work their way successfully through current difficulties. I said that in my personal opinion, despite friendly feeling of all Americans towards Indonesians, it would be difficult for them to understand complex reasoning and domestic consideration by which many Indonesians sought to justify acceptance by government of PKI support. I added that still speaking personally I felt confidence that my government was ready to do what it could to be of assistance anywhere in world to any government which sought its aid in establishing complete freedom from Communist influences.

As stated above, conversation confirmed my general impression reported in reference telegram that Djuanda, deeply troubled by growth PKI influence, has sought a solution in some form of cooperation between moderate elements of all parties, failing to accomplish which he has felt necessary lend his weight to PNI. Further confirmation of this rests in his statement to me that while keeping himself free from party affiliation, he has allowed his old party to put his name forth as a candidate in the election of both the parliamentary and constitutional assembly. Significantly he stated that this old party, while moderate in its policies, generally leaned towards the PNI.

Cumming
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/1–2055. Secret.
  2. Document 80.
  3. Reference is to a short-lived Communist uprising that began September 18, 1948, in Madiun, Java.
  4. Supra.