80. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1161. Djuanda conversation reported mytel 11602 points up a significant trend in PNI policy and a development in Ali Goverment’s position which has become manifest in recent weeks. My impression is that since boost given by Bogor Conference3 and success in defeating non-confidence motion,4 followed by curious neglect of opposition to take full advantage of those aspects of parliamentary vote which were favorable to opposition position, Ali Government has gained new lease on life, increased prestige and superficially at least shows greater confidence and initiative in approaching current problems.
President5 has been clever enough to continue dominance of Irian theme and cognate moves such as call for an all-Indonesian Congress which no opposition party or leader can directly oppose. Beating of drums of patriotism and national interest and prestige has effectively stilled any clamor which might have been raised on genuine domestic issues. Security questions such as declaration of state of siege in Moluccas, summoning of territorial commanders, provincial governors and other high officials to current national security conference, have been again brought into forefront of public attention all in a double contest of preparation for elections and rehabilitation of Indonesia’s good name before world. Thus theme is one of closing the national ranks; appeals gently directed towards government parties and forcefully directed towards opposition parties, to observe greater tolerance in advancing party interests these developments are accompanied by note suggesting that only by united action can Irian be regained and that he who breaks ranks, namely the opposition, betrays the country’s interests. Ali, in my opinion, has not the capability of working out and executing such a detailed plan; President Sukarno is the only man in Indonesia with the political skill and forcefulness to embark on such a program.
In addition to the foregoing there are other moves or rumors of moves, some of them disturbing, which suggest new strength in the Ali Government; changes in diplomatic representation abroad, rumors [Page 128] of splitting existing territorial commands to weaken the authority of the commanders, rumors of the creation of new provinces in Sumatra (a Moslem and Christian stronghold), transfer of General Bambang Sugeng to the Paris Embassy, removal of Colonel Akil from command of the Djakarta garrison, and other evidences of continuing Iwa’s influence.
Behind these evidences of new vigor and confidence in the government one can however detect signs of a dichotomy inside the PNI party organization, a dichotomy prevented from becoming a schism by party discipline and self interest. A small but important group of young right-wing PNI members, including Foreign Office Secretary General Ruslan Abdulgani, were I have reason to believe, disappointed that Siddik6 and not some more moderate man, was elected chairman of the party. Other leaders such as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are, I am almost certain, deeply troubled by the rise in PNI [PKI] strength and influence which PNI itself has fostered through its opportunistic association with the Communists. Such men are making every effort behind the scenes to pin responsibility on the opposition, and perhaps inferentially on US as well while simultaneously exploiting Communists alliance to the fullest extent. Despite the contrary impression which Djuanda evidently tried to make, I see no real change of PNI front involved but rather just an only [early?] endeavor to shift responsibility for current Communist gains to the opposition. Djuanda’s political observations show standard pattern of PNI alibies for their current entanglement with the Communists and their long professed fears of theocratic state under a Masjumi Government.
Of considerable significance is fact that Ali, or perhaps Sukarno, has been adroit enough to pull Djuanda into PNI toils through, I suspect, convincing him that only PNI with Djuanda’s help and that of moderates of other parties can pull nation out of present economic and fiscal plight, a subject close to Djuanda’s heart. Since Djuanda is known as man of high integrity and one possessing confidence of Americans, I feel that he has been selected as channel to bring views of Ali’s section of PNI to my attention. His references to economic assistance appear to me as effort to open door US aid commitment prior to Afro-Asian Conference to give greater prestige to Ali Government and prior to elections in order to neutralize US aid as a political factor in the elections. I may be unduly skeptical but I discount possibility that economic considerations are uppermost in minds of those who planted with Djuanda suggestion so obviously intended to reach the American Ambassador and his Government.
[Page 129]If PNI could be divorced from its Communist connections the strengthening of PNI leadership would not necessarily in itself be a bad thing for the country or for US interests. However I see no genuine indication of any move in this direction nor can I discern any real trend towards the establishment of constructive economic and fiscal policies, despite periodic lullabies. On the contrary, Djuanda’s observations, confirming to us determined efforts PNI consolidate its position and justify its association with PKI regardless of effect on the country, represent a dangerous trend from US standpoint and, in fact, for Indonesia if the growing influence of the Communists is to be cut off before the point of no return is reached.
On the economic side Djuanda’s comments strengthen my conviction that sound policy dictates proceeding cautiously with aid at present, with modest increase technical assistance as scheduled, opening door to surplus commodity program but reserving substantial increase in aid until such time after or before elections when a government assumes power firmly committed against direct or indirect Communist influence within Indonesia. At such a time I hope we would be prepared to fire aid out of both barrels. In this connection I am inclined to agree however, with Djuanda’s observation that the Ali Government will retain power until the elections at least.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/1–1955. Secret.↩
- Supra.↩
- The Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan met at Bogor, Indonesia, December 28–29, 1954, in preparation for the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955.↩
- A motion of no confidence in the cabinet was defeated in the Indonesian Parliament on December 14, 1954.↩
- President Sukarno.↩
- Sidik Djojosukarto, Chairman of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party).↩