Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State¹

Rangoon, March 5, 1957—5 p.m.

1142. Pass Defense. Deputy Prime Minister for Defense U Ba Swe (he ceased being Prime Minister February 28) sent for me this morning to discuss subject General Erskine’s visit. Foreign Office Permanent Secretary Barrington was also present.

U Ba Swe said that from conversations held so far with General Erskine and his staff Burma had impression we were principally interested in helping them fight insurgents. While Burmese do not underestimate importance such assistance and would certainly hope use any equipment furnished by us for that purpose they feel they have adequate or nearly adequate military equipment for internal security. (Erskine’s report may bear this out.) What Burmese military establishment is primarily seeking, he said, is to increase its strength to two division level in order have sufficient strength to deter aggression from outside. They have turned to US in hope obtaining such aid. If they cannot get it from us they will have go to any other source they can find as they are determined build up their military strength to that level in belief it necessary to prevent external aggression….

Foregoing is essence of conversation lasting more than half hour in course which several points mentioned in Embtel 1123² were discussed, with emphasis on fact that GUB feels that in order defend its action in accepting American military assistance it must receive it in substantial amounts even though this be over long period of time. Ba Swe did not say that in doing so Burma would be aligning itself with west but did imply that if world situation became critical it would amount to that if Burma were receiving American military equipment and training.

I told U Ba Swe I was glad he had sent for me as I had been concerned that military assistance desired by Burma, as set forth by Burmese defense chiefs during Erskine’s first three days here, apparently envisaged amounts which seemed be considerably beyond modest assistance we had suggested. Furthermore amount aid desired seemed involve long term assurances of continued military aid, although our original terms of reference as given them last October made it clear we could give no such assurances at this time. We had indeed suggested keeping General Erskine’s visit as confidential as possible in order avoid any embarrassment to his government should we fail reach agreement.

In reply my questions Ba Swe confirmed (Embtel 1093)³ that it would be some months before Burma would send military mission to Soviet Union and they hoped very much that they would not find it necessary accept any military assistance from that source. I said I was sure they were fully aware of dangers involved in accepting arms from Soviet Government since Soviet Government would certainly insist on sending military mission or experts along with the arms and I could not believe that Burmese Army with Soviet equipment and technicians would serve as much of a military deterrent against attacks by Communist China for example.

In response to my observation that it was as he would understand more difficult for my government furnish arms to neutral nation than one committed to our side, Barrington raised subject of large amount military aid we had given admittedly Communist Government of Yugoslav. I said this was true but that of course circumstances of Yugoslav and Burma from military standpoint were very different.

In concluding conversation I suggested that wisest course was await return of General Erskine from his trip to North tomorrow afternoon, to have frank discussions during his last two days here (Ba Swe will be seeing him again March 8) and then await his return to Washington in order see what he can work out there. U Ba Swe agreed that this was good advice. He had said previously military equipment we furnished need not be of “first or even second category” meaning I assume in newness.

In reply his expressed hope decision could be reached soon I said I was sure we would do our best to reach early decision. I pointed out however that our original offer had been made several months ago and that in the meantime end of our fiscal year was getting closer.

Comment: My own guess but only a guess is that Burma will exert every possible pressure on us to obtain assistance of substantial amount but will settle for something less if necessary. In latter case we must envisage probability they will seek and perhaps also obtain military assistance from other governments including Soviet Union.

Satterthwaite

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.90B11/3–557. Top Secret; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. Telegram 1093 from Rangoon, February 23, reported that U Ba Swe had informed Satterthwaite of Zhukov’s invitation to him to send a Burmese military mission to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6190B/2–2357)