Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

528. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, October 5, 1957—10 a.m.

1056. Reference: Deptel 852.² After consultation with interested members of country team, offer following comments re numbered paragraph reftel:

Re paragraph 1: As provisional government has given all assurances that could be reasonably expected re continued alignment with SEATO, recognized all international obligations, and issued a fairly satisfactory foreign policy statement, there appears little current justification use aid programs as leverage obtain objectives with present provisional government. On other hand, feel strongly that US assistance can provide important leverage if needed in relations with TG after December elections or if some unforeseen event should make it desirable earlier.

Thus for present consider we should proceed with aid programs on basis good faith discharging our prior commitment in a normal manner under normal procedures. At same time we should give ourselves all possible freedom of action by making no new commitments and taking no actions that we could temporarily hold up without violating conspicuously good faith and normal rate implementation.

During interim period consider we must follow extremely narrow path imposed by need continue aid operation on unchanged daily basis while increasing to the maximum our possible leverage in event future need. We will lose no opportunity impress on Thais that while basic friendship US for Thailand unchanged by recent events and our planning of aid programs so far not affected, we are nevertheless observing with keen interest developments and actions of TG. Believe at this juncture this attitude more effective than any overt act which could be resented as undue political pressure re internal Thai affairs and consequently could be used against us effectively by unfriendly elements.

Aid to Thailand clearly based more on political than economic or military factors. Thus if political instability continues for substantial period or new government after elections unfriendly or neutralist, reappraisal policy basis assistance will become a necessity and we shall probably want to be in position to exert maximum pressure should our interests dictate such action.

Re paragraph 1–a, coup group attitude re economic aid undetermined but feel they and new government formed after elections very likely desire outside contribution Thai economic resources. Thus in order maintain normal program activities but maintain bargaining position, projects covered by signed PRO AG’s should be continued for present but projects in planning stage should be held up to extent feasible.

Re 1–b, as $4.7 million PA’s already issued against FY 1958 non-project assistance we should withhold further PA’s for possible future leverage.

Re 1–c, work on military construction contracts underway should proceed normally. However, to gain leverage no new contracts should be awarded for present except in cases overriding military necessity. Military consumables should be delivered normally except any which could conveniently be held up without showing bad faith or conspicuously slowing down normal operations.

Re 1–d, most military hardware under existing programs already delivered. Chief JUSMAG under impression that coup group feels they already possess their chief requirements in way military equipment and thus unlikely respond pressure possible reduced deliveries (incidentally fact coup group used US military aid equipment upset government thus creating present instability is not reassuring). There thus appears no reason postpone delivery any particular military hardware. JUSMAG states there are no items especially desired by Thai armed forces. However, this aspect should be kept under constant review.

Re paragraph 2, believe notification TG re FY 1958 DS level should be timed normally to coincide announcement to other governments. Should be made informally at USOM/TTEC level in routine manner and without publicity; should be emphasized that it is only “planning figure” and not a commitment. Any later signatures PROAG should be considered on ad hoc basis in light developments. This should not create much of problem, as appears only PROAG requiring urgent attention will be NE highway which consider must complete in any event. Reduced DS level will not come as any surprise to TG as have already informed King and PM re likely consequences congressional cuts.

Re paragraph 3, TC aid level should be announced in same manner as DS level, and, if appropriate, at same time.

Re paragraph 4 we are asking Foreign Office by note advise re TG plans ratify loan agreements. Have already made informal inquiry at Ministry Finance.

Will shortly present note to Foreign Office requesting TG action to step-up publicizing US military and economic aid as provided in aid agreements (Embtel 3815³).

Bishop

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/10–557. Secret.
2. Document 526.
3. In telegram 3815 from Bangkok, June 26, the Embassy reviewed local criticism of U.S. economic and military programs in Thailand, and urged that a particular effort be made to blunt Thai criticism of the JUSMAG program. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/6–2657)