Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

529. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, October 22, 1957—2:28 p.m.

1074. Your 1026,² 1056,³ 1117,⁴ 1118.⁵

1. Examination Embassy telegrams and other reports from Bangkok leads Department believe there are two difficult interrelated problems involving political actions by us during and immediately after elections: (a) how encourage suitable political forces join in viable combination satisfactory US objectives Thailand and Southeast Asia and (b) how induce them take measures enhance SEATO and counter Communist subversion and neutralist pressures. Two problems should be handled simultaneously.

2. We regard problem (a) primary importance at this stage. Re specific moves, we recognize present confused situation is not yet sufficiently crystallized ascertain exactly what would be potentially effective political base which would be in US interests discreetly promote during and after elections. Indications still lacking where military coup group is throwing support and which party if any gaining ascendancy. Nevertheless we would hope some sort favorable interim arrangements might be worked out, which we could encourage, among King and advisers, military coup group, provisional government and moderate civilian politicians in order facilitate our objectives. King, Khuang,⁶ Sarit, possibly Praphat, Thanom and Sukhit⁷ currently seem chief sources political influence approachable by US in varying degrees directly or indirectly. While Sarasin not now power source, he is important asset our standpoint and should his continuance as Premier after elections appear serve US interests we would then appreciate your comments.

3. For meeting problem (a) Department concurs paragraphs 1 and 3, part 2, Embtel 1026⁸ as immediate constructive steps. Beyond that Department suggests Embassy and elements other Agencies you consider appropriate try bring to bear whatever capabilities US has in Thailand help create most satisfactory possible grouping of political forces. Department fully endorses your efforts continue develop informal friendly contact with above political figures and their associates receptive US approaches who likely be influenced during and after elections. As one means for encouraging favorable grouping, you are authorized in your discretion remind these political elements they should realize Congressional support American aid Thailand cannot be taken for granted if power grouping emerges antagonistic Free World objectives or blind Communist dangers. We can only work with suitable groups for mutually agreed objectives. (Some aspects problem (a) handled separate channel.)

4. Re anti-subversion program, we concur paragraphs A to C your 1118 and 2 and 4 your 1026.⁹ Gratified your efforts already having effect (Embtel 1181¹⁰). Agree development special USIS program aimed at such groups as second category assemblymen. We suggest program should be directed, in addition to Communist threat, toward positive objectives outlined in country plan especially relating US military and economic assistance and mutual security arrangements such as SEATO. Department is pouching you certain materials (such as ChiCom penetration Cambodia and rectification campaign) which we believe will help you with your tactical targets. See also A–97 and A–67.¹¹ We leave to your discretion manner and channels for persuading Thai officials and important Thai individuals themselves see subversion against their own interests and take steps counter internal dangers facing Thailand from international Communism and particularly ChiComs. We hope materials will speak for themselves and key Thai leaders will spread program via multiplying Thai sources in order minimize American hand.

5. Continued feasibility our primary objective maintain Thailand as hub US security efforts Southeast Asia will depend on results application our available resources to both problems, as suggested para. 6 Deptel 805,¹² within limits our capabilities. Unless some viable satisfactory political alignment can be constructed and subversive malignancy removed, will face increasingly grave situation in Thailand with inevitable adverse consequences throughout Southeast Asia. Therefore Department feels every feasible measure should be taken meet these two basic problems in Thailand and wishes do everything possible facilitate your efforts at this critical juncture. It should be possible with our resources and capabilities achieve some results in both regards. Unless major developments or important cumulative succession minor events take place, Department will continue for time being give Thailand important place in our scheme things for Southeast Asia. We will keep under review Thai developments and general situation in Far East affecting Thai picture.

6. Concerning future consideration possible deterioration internal situation, desire any additional comments key point para. 5, section 2, your 1026¹³ you wish to make now. Would also appreciate your specific recommendations re paragraphs 6 and 7 Embtel 1026¹⁴ for drafting contingency plan which might be made annex to current outline plan of operations if circumstances so require. Following elections we intend review NSC policies and OPO regarding Thailand.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.99/10–1157. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Young and initialed for Dulles by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 1026 from Bangkok, October 3, the Embassy offered a preliminary assessment of the situation in Thailand in the wake of the coup. (Ibid., 792.00/10–357)
3. Supra.
4. Telegram 1117 from Bangkok, October 11, contained a report of a conversation between Ambassador Bishop and Prime Minister Sarasin on October 9. Sarasin speculated on the outcome of the impending elections and indicated that he intended to withdraw from an active political role in Thailand as quickly as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/10–1157)
5. In telegram 1118 from Bangkok, October 11, the Embassy recommended that the United States use its aid program to encourage Thailand to resist Communist subversion. (Ibid., 792.00/10–1157)
6. Kuang Aphaiwong, leader of the Democratic Party.
7. Sukit Nimmanhemin, leader of the Unionist Party.
8. Paragraph 1, part 2, of telegram 1026 from Bangkok proposed that the United States should “continue give support Provisional Government unless some unforeseen and unfavorable event dictates otherwise.” Paragraph 3 stipulated that the Embassy should lay before the provisional government, the military coup group, and the King “in firm but friendly manner US desiderata for continuance and improvement Thai-US cooperation and good relations.”
9. In paragraph A of telegram 1118 from Bangkok, the Embassy suggested that in all contacts with the Thai leadership, Embassy personnel should strive to focus attention on the problem of subversive activities in Thailand. Paragraph C called for the establishment of a special information program by USIS to highlight the dangers of international communism. Paragraph 2 of telegram 1026 proposed that the Embassy should “continue emphasize to Provisional Government, military coup group and King need to eliminate communist subversion and inflation.” Paragraph 4 of that telegram added that the United States should “convince these elements that Thailand needs US far more than US needs Thailand.”
10. In telegram 1181 from Bangkok, October 16, Ambassador Bishop reported that Prime Minister Sarasin was taking action to curb the editorial policies of the Sarn Seri and Thai Raiwan newspapers. (Department of State, Central Files, 992.61/10–1657)
11. “Instructions A–67 and A–97 to Bangkok, September 17 and October 10, respectively, provided the Embassy with lists of research materials relating to communism in Asia. (Ibid., 790.5/8–1457)
12. See footnote 2, Document 526. Paragraph 6 of telegram 805 called for the establishment of a program to “mobilize all available resources to help head off adverse trends and put together constructive elements in order integrate and stabilize Thai situation favorable U.S. interests.”
13. Paragraph 5 of telegram 1026 reads: “Determine whether or not we have been and remain overly optimistic in military and political position and assignment given Thailand in our scheme things for this part of world.”
14. In paragraph 6 the Embassy suggested that the United States should frame policies to prevent a swing to neutralism on the part of Thailand, and added, in paragraph 7, that it was necessary to decide on proper courses of action in the event that an unfriendly or uncooperative government came to power in the impending elections.