527. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

995. During call on Prime Minister September 30 made known informally continued serious concern with which I view provocative and irresponsible press campaign against SEATO and US.

I reviewed for him my talks this subject with Deputy Foreign Minister September 28, 1956 and Prince Wan May 13 this year [Page 937] (Embtels 8812 and 33953). Called attention especially to my earlier statement Foreign Minister impossible placate or mollify these subversive elements who undoubtedly present and responsible in large part for press campaign. Problem is really one eradicate subversion. Pointed out until September 16 coup there was explanation that campaign was tool in opposition attack on Phao and Pibul. I emphasized, however, that continued attacks after coup could in no sense be explained same basis. …

Prime Minister replied stating he fully aware and equally concerned over campaign, noting that he, personally, now under attack. He said wanted take action, but to arrest or close down offending journalists and papers would only cause entire remaining press to unite in defense colleagues. In particular case Sarnseri he said Sarit had “sworn to me” that he had no control over paper. He repeatedly asked my cooperation in furnishing “evidence” that would enable Thai Government take effective legal action. Finally he took refuge in old complaint that Thai, like US, press was free and there was little government could do when it disagreed with press line. This connection, he mentioned current Time and Newsweek articles that there were many other ways open to Thai Government of discouraging attacks.

Took occasion point out English-language Bangkok paper had carried article September 29 to effect Cabinet had met to examine US aid for any attached “strings.” Congressman Passman, then in Bangkok, saw article and immediately inquired as to text military and ICA agreements. Prime Minister made pleas for unemotional approach to problem, as otherwise we would only play into communist hands. To this I agreed and emphasized leftist desire drive wedge between US and Thailand.

Throughout conversation I had clear impression Prime Minister under some stress in attempting give picture he normal head of government but knowing that another (Sarit) held real power. I believe his intentions are of best in this matter, but progress will depend on extent to which he can convince Sarit of danger of allowing newspapers and some government officials to continue unwarranted attacks on US,SEATO and constituted Thai Government.

Bishop
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/10–15. Confidential. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Kuala Lumpur, Rangoon, Vientiane, Chiengmai, CINCPAC, and POLADCINCPAC.
  2. Dated September 28, 1956, not printed. (Ibid., 792,00/9–2856)
  3. Dated May 15, not printed. (Ibid., 711.5492/5–1557)