35. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)1
Dear Mr. Gray: The Burmese Government again has approached the United States with an informal but official request for extensive long range military assistance. The substance of this request is embodied in the Army Attaché’s message CX–18, March 9, 19562 and is strongly recommended for favorable action by Ambassador Satterthwaite in Embassy cable No. 1016, March 8, 1956.3
The Department of State has been seriously concerned over the rapid successful moves in Burma by the Communist bloc. While the Department of State is consulting with other agencies in an effort to develop U.S. economic and developmental aid programs designed to check serious Communist bloc influence, there are limitations to the [Page 56] potential effectiveness of these programs in achieving our basic objectives in Burma.
Perhaps the best organized and, at this time, the most anti-Communist grouping of any size in Burma is the armed forces. It therefore is important that the orientation of the military leaders remains firmly anti-Communist and as friendly as possible to the West. It would appear in the interest of United States political objectives to give General Ne Win an indication of our willingness to explore his request and to meet the more realistic aspects of Burma’s military requirements. By such action we would encourage continuing anti-Communist orientation of the armed forces.
In considering this problem, the Department of State gives special emphasis to the real possibility that, failing to obtain satisfactory military assistance from the United States, the Burmese might well seek Soviet bloc military assistance. The monetary credit which Burma has built up within the Soviet bloc through rice barter deals together with Soviet bloc eagerness to supplant Western influence in Burma, make the possibility of Soviet military assistance likely and logical. Although Communist bloc military assistance to Burma in itself might not be cause for alarm, attendant training of Burmese by Communist technicians and dependence upon the Soviet bloc for replacement parts do forebode a situation which might undermine the anti-Communist orientation of Burma’s entire armed forces and seriously threaten the political stability of the entire country.
While recent discussions with the Burmese concerning military assistance have not been conducted in any detail, from previous intimations several assumptions can be made: 1) the Burmese will insist on some formula whereby they at least will appear to be paying for what they get; 2) they will not accept grant aid as such but will wish discount prices and may ask for a long term loan to finance purchases; 3) they are unwilling to enter into formal commitments which could be interpreted as derogations of their sovereignty or departure from their avowed posture of neutrality; 4) they may be satisfied with recently obsolescent equipment; 5) while it is unlikely they would permit U.S. supervision or training by a U.S. military mission in Burma, they are anxious to expand the training of Burmese military personnel in the U.S. or in third countries; 6) they wish to reorganize the military establishment along U.S. lines.
Although formal military assistance agreements with Burma would provide the safeguards which we desire, the Burmese Government has made it abundantly clear that for various reasons, primarily political, it can not enter into such agreements. It is our belief that the granting of military assistance to Burma even without formal agreements is highly desirable and will cause no significant adverse political reactions in the neighboring SEATO countries, Pakistan and [Page 57] Thailand. On the contrary, it is believed that if military assistance to Burma is relatively smaller than that made available to these countries and if it is supplied ostensibly on a reimbursement basis and to be composed essentially of technically obsolete equipment, Pakistan and especially Thailand probably would welcome the possibility of a militarily stronger Burma as an additional contribution to their own security.
While there are overriding political considerations which make U.S. military assistance to Burma highly desirable, there are obvious military considerations which require careful study. For this reason it would be most helpful to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the desirable size and mission of Burma’s armed forces and the type and extent of U.S. military assistance which would be required to develop such forces.
It is hoped we can begin discussions with the Burmese Government on the subject of U.S. military assistance in the near future in the hope of forestalling any possible Burmese military negotiations with a Russian aid group expected in Rangoon in early May. For this reason it would be most helpful to have the views of the Joint Chiefs as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/3–856. Secret.↩
- See footnote 3, Supra.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/3–856)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩