Office of the Historian

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State1

Rangoon, April 3, 1956—8 p.m.

1145. Pass Defense, … USIA. Deptel 982.2 In belief Department and perhaps Joint Chiefs might like Embassy’s views re long range extensive US military assistance Burma, following thoughts developed in meeting senior State, Defense, … USIS representatives this post. Embassy offers them not in expectation that arms aid will transform Burma into friendly force on our side but that it will assist Burma put down subversion, deter external aggression and generally help stiffen backbone of country to our advantage. Perhaps more important are grave consequences if we turn Ne Win down.3 For reasons outlined below Embassy earnestly recommends Ne Win request receive favorable consideration.

1.
Burma at present is military vacuum. It has little capability defend itself against invasion.
2.
Even without overt aggression, gravitational pull on weakly demanded country to come to terms with source of threat may become irresistible.
3.
Only an extensive long-range program would be effective from military standpoint. Burma armed forces have had no experience with modern arms, and long training would be necessary.
4.
Even long range extensive military aid from US could not be fully effective in making Burma strong against invasion from China, but it would reduce likelihood of aggression and slow down progress of invader. This factor might spell difference between having Burma as neutral or on our side in war or eventual negotiated general settlement East-West conflict and having Burma on Communist side.
5.
Strengthening Burma would be consistent with our military investment in rest of area. Loss of Burma would threaten security of all SEA.
6.
Decision having been taken Washington for offer economic assistance to keep Burma from domination by Soviet bloc (Deptel 9894), it would seem shortsighted not to provide military support necessary for achievement same purpose.
7.
Burma defense forces, particularly army, are strong stabilizing influence in country, with considerable political potential which it would be profitable to keep as far on our side as possible.
8.
Army’s capability to counter and defeat internal subversion would be greatly enhanced by proposed aid program.
9.
If we reject present request for military aid, we may not get another opportunity. Risk to Burma of Communist retaliation for taking military help from US is already great, and increasing ties with Soviet bloc may make it later too dangerous to accept risk. Risk, moreover, could be taken by GUB only if it were completely convinced that we would carry through on program.
10.
Cost of program to US would be diminished to extent by which Japan could supply American type arms to Burma, either as reparations or as sales to offset purchases of Burma rice.
11.
An offer to provide help of kind and magnitude requested by Ne Win may well be declined by GUB upon further reflection. Offer, however, even if unaccepted, will have important political psychological effect in our favor, whereas rejection of request will be taken as sign our disinterest in Burma’s security and will propel Burma in direction Communist bloc.
Braddock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/4–356. Secret; Priority.↩
  2. Telegram 982, March 28, informed the Embassy that the Operations Coordinating Board had referred the question of military aid to Burma to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. (Ibid., 790B.5–MSP/3–2856)↩
  3. General Ne Win had asked the Army Attaché in Rangoon on March 7 whether the United States would be willing to assist Burma to buildup its armed forces to as many as ten divisions over a 3- to 5-year period. (Telegram CX–18 from the Army Attaché in Rangoon, March 9; Ibid., 790B.551/3–956)↩
  4. Document 31.↩