Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia¹

Washington, December 27, 1957—5:19 p.m.

258. Deptel 242.² Request following reply from Secretary be transmitted Prime Minister:

Begin verbatim text. I have studied carefully your message on events in Indonesia which Ambassador Spender handed to me a few minutes before my departure for Paris. I agree with you that the situation is most serious, and share your deep concern over remedial steps which we might take. I appreciate the straightforward way in which you have presented your views.

I am sure that you are aware of continuing U.S. efforts to bring home to the Indonesian Government the folly of its recent actions and to encourage moderation and restraint. I doubt that the further measures you suggest would produce the desired results. Specifically, U.S. grant aid to Indonesia in the current fiscal year is about $11 million in technical assistance, malaria control and police training—hardly a lever of major consequence. It has further been our experience in other areas that termination of aid, even of considerably greater magnitude, has not proved to be an effective political instrument. With regard to approaches at the highest level, our experience with Sukarno leads us to believe that he would not be responsive to any appeal to reason. He has admitted to us many times that he is a “fanatic” on the West New Guinea issue. Developments in past few days further raise the question of his continued ability to influence situation, and it is possible that a U.S. approach at the highest level at this time might tend to strengthen his position. This, I believe you would agree, would not be desirable.

You note our common resolve to keep Indonesia out of Communist control. It is in the interests of the entire Free World that we should not fail in this effort. We know that there are important elements in Indonesia arrayed against the growing Communist strength in that country. These same elements, while perhaps not in harmony with the timing and tactics of the present effort to gain West New Guinea, are no less emphatic on the basic validity of the Indonesian claim. Our ability to strengthen and encourage these elements would be seriously diminished by any overt action that would be regarded by all elements as outright and unconditional support of the Dutch position.

The rapid pace of developments in Indonesia and the uncertainty surrounding the internal political balance of power makes it difficult at this moment to determine the additional measures which might usefully be taken. I was happy to note the general tone of firmness coupled with moderation which characterized Mr. Casey’s December 12 press statement.³ I believe that we should for the time being continue to follow this line of approach, prepared at the same time for any further steps which in the light of emerging political developments show promise of restoring some measure of stability to this situation which concerns us both. I hope that you will keep me informed of your thinking on such measures as events progress. End verbatim text.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12–2757. Secret. Drafted in SPA and approved and signed by Dulles; cleared by Murphy and with FE, EUR,IO, and L.
2. Telegram 242 to Canberra, December 12, informed the Embassy of the Secretary’s conversation that day with Spender and summarized Menzies’ message of that date to Dulles. (Ibid., 656.56D13/12–1257) See Document 322 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. A copy of the press statement, headed “Cabinet Discussions on Indonesia”, is attached to Spender’s December 12 note to Dulles, along with Menzies’ message; see footnote 2, Document 322. Casey stated that the Cabinet had been giving close attention to events in Indonesia and was deeply concerned by certain aspects of them. In conclusion, he urged that the Indonesian Government “not do or permit anything which will impair the maintenance in its country of a true Parliamentary democracy or diminish the clear voice with which it should be able to speak in the councils of the nations.”
4. Telegram 348 from Canberra, December 31, reported that Ambassador Sebald had given Dulles’ message to Menzies and that “Menzies appeared pleased with response but commented briefly only upon statement referring to our ability strengthen Indonesian elements arrayed against growing Communist strength. He termed this ‘most important point’. Menzies referred to Washington committee as extremely useful”. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12–3157)