339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan1

1391. Your 1677,2 1693.3 Very difficult expand remarks you have already made to Fujiyama on US position re Indonesia. We [Page 574] view economic situation as potentially very serious with real danger Communists may move in to fill vacuum. FYI: US intervention or assistance in solving political and economic problems now under very careful consideration at highest levels Department. However situation very delicate and impossible determine what if any action US can take. End FYI.

You may pass substance following Fujiyama.

US position re Indonesia continues to be under intensive examination and study in Washington. US friendly relations with both Indonesia and the Netherlands plus extremely fluid internal political situation Indonesia (including impending Sukarno Asian trip) have placed US in difficult position in considering what course we might adopt attempt arrive solution this problem which would best promote Free World interests.

While US cannot and does not condone Indonesian actions against Dutch interests and does not wish move into position supporting Indonesians against Dutch in this dispute, US seriously concerned mounting economic paralysis Indonesia and possibility Communist bloc will eventually step into vacuum to the extent Free World nations do not. US fears present economic dislocations Indonesia may be prelude to increased internal Communist activities with enhancement position Communist party and possibility eventual Communist assumption of power.4

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D/12–2757. Confidential. Drafted in SPA, approved in FE, and cleared with NA and WE. Repeated to Djakarta, The Hague, and CINCPAC for the Political Adviser.
  2. Telegram 1677 from Tokyo, December 24, reported that Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama had asked Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II about U.S. views on the situation in Indonesia. The Foreign Minister had expressed the Japanese Government’s concern that “economic confusion and deterioration might cause Indonesia to fall into hands of Communists”. MacArthur had replied that “our position on West Irian was that of neutrality, of not taking sides with either party. At same time present situation was indeed disturbing. I said I recognized long-term importance of Indonesia to Japan, particularly in economic and trade fields, but I thought that it was important that Japan not take actions which could be interpreted as helping to dislodge Dutch.” (Ibid., 656.56D/12–2457)
  3. Telegram 1693 from Tokyo, December 27, reported that Fujiyama informed MacArthur that Indonesia had arranged to charter between 20 and 40 ships from Japanese shipping firms, which Fujiyama thought should help prevent Indonesia from turning to the Communists for ships, and that he intended to go to Djakarta in January to sign a formal reparations agreement, then near conclusion. He again expressed interest in U.S. views on the Indonesian situation. (Ibid., 656.56D/12–2757)
  4. Telegram 1707 from Tokyo, December 30, reported that MacArthur had orally given Fujiyama the substance of the last two paragraphs. Fujiyama reiterated “that Japanese wish to play constructive role in preventing Communists from filling vacuum in Indonesia, and to follow at same time generally parallel course of action to ours.” (Ibid., 656.56D/12–3057)