Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

322. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 12, 1957¹

Washington, December 12, 1957

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Spender—Australia
• Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.—INR
• Howard P. Jones—FE

Australian Ambassador Spender called on the Secretary just prior to the Secretary’s departure for Paris today to present a message from Prime Minister Menzies to the Secretary on the Indonesian situation.² The Secretary, who was just leaving for the airport, scanned the message hurriedly and made the following observations which he said were “off the cuff”.

There were two alternative courses of action which we could take with regard to Indonesia: one was to support the Dutch; the other was to support elements within the country opposed to Sukarno. Sir Percy interjected that these courses were not necessarily inconsistent with each other, and that both courses might be followed. The Secretary replied that this could not be done overtly, pointing out that overt support of the Dutch position would render it impossible for those elements within Indonesia that were opposed to Sukarno to work with us.

The Secretary emphasized that our basic purpose was to keep Indonesia out of the hands of the Communists and that we were confident Australia would agree with us that this objective was paramount. This was in the interest of the Dutch as well as other countries of the world. Whatever capability we had to work with Indonesian leaders against Sukarno would be vitiated, however, by our embracing the Dutch cause in this matter.

Sir Percy said that what the Indonesians were doing was nothing less than “international blackmail” and could not be condoned. The Secretary agreed that the current actions being taken in Indonesia were “indefensible”. The problem was to take action which would be effective. Taking the Dutch side in the dispute would seriously curtail if not eliminate our capacity to accomplish anything in the situation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–1257. Secret. Drafted by Jones.
2. The message from Menzies to Dulles, dated December 12, stated that the Australian Government believed that “only the most direct talks” between the United States and Indonesia could “avert unpleasant possibilities”. In concluding Menzies asked, “Is it not the time for the United States to use its influence at the highest level in Indonesia?” (Filed with a covering note from Spender to Dulles, December 12; ibid., 656.56D13/12–1257)