Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

333. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Indonesia (Collier) to the Department of the Army¹

Djakarta, December 23, 1957—2:51 p.m.

CX–140. Department also pass Army. State for information. From USARMA Djakarta to DA Washington. Department Army pass for action ACSI, AFCIN, ONI. Department Army pass for information CINCPAC for POLAD, USARISC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, USARMAs Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw. Reference: CX 138.² [Name deleted] informed ARMA 22 December following main points.

1. Regarding Sukarno. [Name deleted] said President real Javanese and will not make quick about face regarding policies (i.e., Communism). [Name deleted] claims answer to this will come from controlling influence around President… .

2. Present Cabinet will continue “have good life”, says [name deleted]. Reason for this is fact that now Nasution and Djuanda have the strength to operate. Cabinet is the “Army’s doll,” at moment. Fellow travelers in Cabinet will be used as buffer to prevent open strikes by Communists. Decisions are made by few, not all in Cabinet. After crisis Cabinet will be strengthened and fellow travelers gradually isolated and finally eliminated.

3. Military equipment situation covered quickly by [name deleted]. Stated reason for absolute necessity of obtaining military equipment now is based on following estimates:

a. From outside immediate danger is unknown factor, what will Dutch do?

b. From within most dangerous unknown factor, what will Communists do?

c. From within also, what will DI do? The Army feels that future Communist action within country may assume large Madiun type action. Also possibility DI may act with Communists in certain areas of Indo (Sulawesi). Do not feel DI and Communists will act together in Java.

[Name deleted] continued it is therefore very plain to us that for the Army to survive we will need arms and equipment immediately. Actually we have needed this equipment for long time, however now it is an emergency.

Comment: Tone of [name deleted] information indicates the present Nasution–Djuanda–Cabinet relationship will survive present crisis which is in variance with theory that composition present government will change in near future. Signed CollierARMA.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2357. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Sent through Department of State communications facilities.
2. Telegram CX–138 from the Army Attaché in Djakarta to the Department of the Army, December 23, reported that Colonel Jani had told the Assistant Army Attaché that he would lead the three armed forces teams which were to purchase military equipment and that they were to leave on December 27 for Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Djuanda told Jani that he would be called home if “the Americans came through with something in the meantime”, but that Djuanda did not expect this to happen. The telegram commented: “Notwithstanding the continued unfavorable atmosphere for Indonesia in reference to US aid—the door has been left open.” (Ibid.)