332. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on December 23, Allen Dulles commented on Indonesia as follows:
“The Director of Central Intelligence stressed the significance of the decision that President Sukarno was to go on sick leave, a decision alleged to have been made by the Indonesian Cabinet. Mr. Dulles was not sure that Sukarno would actually go. He may yet doublecross them. Mr. Dulles thought that, to some extent at least, Sukarno seemed to have lost his nerve since the recent assassination attempt. The troublesome questions were whether he was plotting and whether he was actually working with the Communists.
“The President inquired whether the people who were trying to get Sukarno out of Indonesia were to be considered our friends or our enemies. Mr. Dulles replied that he thought they were our friends. It was the Communists who wanted Sukarno to stay at home, on grounds that if he left, a thoroughgoing non-Communist government might be organized in Indonesia. If such a government were organized, Mr. Dulles thought that Hatta might be induced to head it.
“Meanwhile, however, the local Communists were making hay in Java. Mr. Dulles expressed the belief that the Kremlin did not want an overt Communist take-over in Java today because such a development would mean the fragmentation of Indonesia.
“The President then asked whether we had achieved any success in getting the two big Moslem parties in Indonesia to work together. Mr. Dulles answered that we had enjoyed some measure of success in this enterprise, but the pace was slow. The Indonesians were a slow-moving people, living in a very hot country; they were not very vigorous.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, December 24; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)