Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

334. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, December 23, 1957—6 p.m.

1757. Manila pass information COMNAVPHIL, 13th AF, COMNAVPHIL. Pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Department pass AFCIN–1A1. Manila for MLG. During 50-minute talk with Foreign Minister Subandrio this morning following points were raised:

1. I presented Subandrio with full text NATO communiqué² and pointed out reference therein to Indonesia. He had not seen this and seemed relieved at tone of statement. He referred in this connection to advance press reports that there would be 15-line statement on Indonesia in communiqué.

2. I also showed Foreign Minister press accounts of his statement to Parliament (Embassy’s 1749³) and called particular attention to that part referring to his call on Secretary Dulles which was said to be because I had given Subandrio reason to believe just before his departure for UN that the United States might take some constructive action with regard to Indo-Dutch dispute. He claimed this was slightly inaccurate translation of his thought as he recognized that in my talks with him about what might be done to help I had been expressing personal ideas. Subandrio said main purpose of this portion his speech was to make clear to Indo public that America had not offered any mediation or suggestions for settlement of problem as is continually being suggested in local press.

3. In connection with present situation vis-à-vis Dutch, Subandrio revealed, most confidentially, that Government of West Germany has been using its good offices. Whether or not as result of this (Subandrio was unclear on this point), Foreign Minister said he had reason to be cautiously optimistic about prospects for “summit” meeting of Drees and Djuanda. Such meeting would be purely exploratory and would be for purpose of determining whether there was any point in having detailed negotiations of any sort. Subandrio made clear there is no change in Indo position on West Irian and that negotiations on that point, which however do not have to be starting point of discussions, would be confined to timing and method of transfer of sovereignty. On economic matters there was much to discuss and considerable room for compromise. Here again he made it clear that there was no question of permitting Dutch to resume their privileged position of dominance in Indonesian economy but, aside from this, there should be large and profitable field for Dutch enterprise on terms equal to those granted any other foreign nation. Question of compensation for Dutch losses in present crisis was also legitimate subject for discussion according to Subandrio. Subandrio asked me if there was any indication that US Government, now that NATO meeting is over, would take any action to encourage talks between two countries. I told him I had received no such indication. He then referred to press report that US was considering proposing trusteeship for West Irian (Embtel 1724 and Deptel 1519⁴) and I told him Department had confirmed Embassy’s statement that it assumed these reports were merely press speculation. Subandrio expressed belief that trusteeship proposal would get nowhere. In effort to create better atmosphere wherein “summit” talks could be held, Subandrio stated Sukarno had called in Communist Party Secretary Aidit and told him to “call off the SOBSI extremists”. According to Subandrio, Aidit was told that if Communist extremists persisted in their action it would be against best interests of nation and that, if necessary Sukarno would publicly rebuke them. Truth of this remains to be seen.

4. In light of above claim I referred to Subandrio’s statement to me (Embtel 1598⁵) that Sukarno had informed Hatta he was willing to accept Cabinet without Communists and to [the?] report of parliamentary nine-man committee (Embtel 1637⁶) which seemed to contradict this. Subandrio then amplified his previous statement. He said that at beginning of discussions on Hatta’s return to government, Sukarno had agreed to accept Hatta as Vice President but only on condition that latter agree to Sukarno’s “conception” including the National Council and presence in government of PKI. This Hatta refused to do. After several meetings Sukarno agreed to accept Hatta without conditions. In response to Hatta’s questioning Sukarno had said question of National Council and inclusion of PKI in government could be left to the future and that he would not insist upon it being condition precedent to Hatta’s joining government. This also was apparently unsatisfactory to Hatta and thereupon negotiations broke down.

5. Subandrio then referred to forthcoming trip abroad of Sukarno and said this had been most difficult decision for both President and Cabinet to make. Neither had really wanted the trip to take place at this time but President’s health was such that it was believed necessary. Subandrio then referred to spate of rumors going rounds that President would not return from trip either from his own volition or as result of successful assassination attempt while abroad. He revealed that many Indo Embassies abroad had received threatening letters warning that Sukarno would never leave Europe alive. This was particularly true in Switzerland. Subandrio implied that these threats came from both Indo and foreign sources. Subandrio then said government realized there could be no 100 percent guarantee of safety but in effort to reduce risk as much as possible it was hoped that after arrival in India (journey to which would be by Garuda) it would be possible to get Pan American plane. Subandrio said this would also have merit of proving to world that Sukarno had no prejudice against American commercial enterprise. He asked my opinion of probable safety of President on trip and I could only reply in same terms he had previously used—namely there can be no 100 percent guarantee but, at least from point of view of physical maintenance and operation of PanAm plane I considered that as safe means of travel as humanly possible. As to other dangers no one could predict but in view of countries to be visited I thought danger would be slight as they all were on most friendly terms. These countries are India, Egypt, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, perhaps Thailand, and finally Japan. Trip is to begin January 6 as now planned and will last three to four weeks.

Comment:Subandrio gives impression of hoping that America will at last minute do something to help break present impasse in Indonesian-Dutch relations. I am certain any American suggestions would be most carefully listened to.

During discussion of Sukarno’s trip abroad I at moments received impression that Subandrio was, to some extent at least, inclined to believe “Blitz” stories and was asking me as “master mind” of anti-Sukarno plot, whether America was going to take any action against President during his absence. I am probably being over sensitive on this point but in present atmosphere here it is possible to believe almost anything.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12–2357. Secret. Repeated to The Hague, Manila, Canberra, Bangkok, and Singapore.
2. The communiqué was issued on December 19. For text, see AFP: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 415–420.
3. Telegram 1749 from Djakarta, December 23, reported a statement made by Subandrio before Parliament on December 21 concerning Indonesian policy with regard to West Irian and relations with the Netherlands. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12–2357)
4. Both dated December 21, neither printed. (Both ibid., 656.56D13/12–2157)
5. Telegram 1598 from Djakarta, December 14, reported on Allison’s conversation with Subandrio the previous evening (see telegram 1597, Document 324). (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–1457)
6. Telegram 1637 from Djakarta, December 17, reported that the chairman of a nine-man parliamentary committee established to find a means of restoring cooperation between Sukarno and Hatta had reported to Parliament the previous evening that it had failed to do so. The committee reported that Hatta had declined to resume the vice presidency (Sukarno’s proposal) and that Sukarno had stated that he would support the formation of a presidential cabinet (Hatta’s proposal) only if it included the PKI. (Ibid., 756D.00/12–1757)