Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State¹

The Hague, November 8, 1957—6 p.m.

802. Reference Embtel 772² and Djakarta’s 1141 [1142].³ Non-Communist Netherlands press enthusiastically welcomes joint Netherlands-Australian communiqué re cooperative development New Guinea. Those few politicians whom Embassy has thus far queried likewise praise action and indicate it has widespread political support. Several interpret action as first step in new, positive policy toward development independent “Papuan nation”.

Although Embassy has not yet had adequate opportunity assess all shades influential opinion throughout country, initial estimates would indicate that, aside from Communist, only opponents new policy will be owners those business interests operating Indonesia, which will obviously continue suffer Indonesian reaction. Previous dissident government policy re New Guinea located leftwing of Labor Party and Reformed Church Synod will probably give wholehearted support new concept “Papuan nation”.

As for aforementioned business interests, it must be understood that: First, (as local Indonesian diplomat recently complained Embassy officer) their political influence is practically nil. Second, their motives of self-preservation are so suspect and so open attack from Socialists and religious groups that they do not dare mount open opposition. Finally, Netherlands Government concludes that importance business firms’position in Indonesian inter-island shipping, export trade and banking is so strong that these firms can and must protect themselves. Recent example this attitude demonstrated when Netherlands Chamber Commerce Djakarta forced make own representations Subandrio because Netherlands Government did not wish give credence Indo contention that West New Guinea issue is threat to peace.

Department, therefore, should appreciate that Netherlands-Australian announcement represents far-reaching decision which, in effect, converts former negative Netherlands holding position to new, positive program for action in New Guinea. From foregoing, it can be concluded that Netherlands Government has now drawn farther than ever away from any possibility ceding West New Guinea to Indonesians and moreover, has associated Australia with it in this attitude at considerable consciously calculated cost both countries in terms own political and economic investments Indonesia. No matter how deeply Embassy can sympathize with motives prompting proposals outlined Djakarta’s 1141 [1142], we can only conclude that it is totally unrealistic predicate any solution this problem on deal which would require cession West New Guinea to Indonesians in return protection Netherlands assets Indonesia. It might not be too rash to state that, in a philosophic sense, Netherlands has already written off those assets and will content itself with nothing more than rear guard actions to hold losses to minimum.

Nor would Netherlands be willing consider cession West New Guinea in exchange US-led campaign designed save Indonesia from Communism. Netherlands convinced New Guinea and colonialism have nothing to do with current Indonesian drift toward Communism. Instead (and they often quote Sukarno to prove it), they maintain that popular amenability to Communism derives from a confused domestic economic and political situation against which New Guinea is used entirely as a diversionary attraction. They are convinced that, if New Guinea were ceded to Indonesia, some other issue, such as Netherlands investments, Portuguese Timor, British Borneo, or US oil concessions would have to be found as a replacement diversion. After their recent experience with round table debts, and other matters this character, they would not give any credence Indonesian promises extracted in consequence any proposed deal.

Finally, it would be unrealistic presume that US after once having turned trick at round table conference, would have any ability convince Netherlands our logic these matters is more profound or lasting than theirs, particularly when essence our logic seems to be deal in which Netherlands territory would be traded to Indonesians in exchange for new foothold US influence in their former colony.

Young

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756C.00/11–857. Confidential. Repeated to Djakarta and Canberra. Received on November 11.
2. Telegram 772 to The Hague, November 5, reported that the Embassy had been given a copy that morning of the forthcoming Netherlands-Australian joint statement on New Guinea. (Ibid., 756C.00/11–557)
3. Document 280.