Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 4, 1957—5 p.m.

1142. Embtel 1141.² Following is obviously sketchy outline of ingredients for solution to West Irian problem. It involves considerable initiative and responsibility being taken by US Government but, if we want to keep this important nation of 80 million out of hands of Communists and lay basis for eventual active participation with us in Southeast Asia security measures, I believe we must take that initiative and assume that responsibility.

Suggested plan involves obtaining through diplomatic channels the agreement of Dutch, Indonesians and Australians to action by stages along following lines:

1) Indonesians publicly renounce use of force or threat of force with reference to West Irian problem.

2) Dutch announce willingness to negotiate providing negotiations include consideration of repudiated Indonesian debt, North Sumatra oil and position of Dutch commerce and industry in Indonesia. I make no attempt at this time to indicate what debt settlement should be but certainly Dutch aide-mémoire given on September 27 to Assistant Secretary Wilcox³ could be taken as basis for discussion.

3) At end of negotiations (which would probably take at least six months) it would be announced that at end of stated period, say five years, sovereignty over West Irian would be turned over to Indonesia and that:

a) During those five years Dutch would undertake training at accelerated rate of Indonesian and native administrators, et cetera; Indonesians would provide, at their expense, such administrators as possible to work under Dutch for this period.

b) Upon transfer of sovereignty Dutch would agree to allow certain administrators and officials to remain for a further stated period, under nominal Indonesia control and at Indonesian expense.

4) Indonesia would agree that ANZUS pact might be extended to cover any hostile attempt to attack West Irian and might even agree to be associated with ANZUS powers in limited area of West Irian.

5) Indonesian Government would undertake to control strictly all Communist activity within Indonesia and would accept American assistance and guidance in anti-subversive activities.

6) United States would undertake expanded aid program in Indonesia with understanding that large part of it would be designed to aid regions and assist in solution regional problems.

There are obviously other elements that could and should be included in any over-all settlement but I believe above will indicate lines along which settlement might be possible. Five-year period prior transfer of sovereignty would give opportunity observe Indonesian action under 5) above. I urge that serious and urgent consideration be given to some such solution. Subandrio is leaving November 11 for New York to handle West Irian debate at UN and I believe he would be receptive to any suggestions.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–457. Secret.
2. Supra.
3. The aide-mémoire, given to Wilcox by Ambassador van Roijen on September 27, requested U.S. good offices in helping to initiate Netherlands-Indonesian discussions leading to a settlement of the question of Indonesia’s debts to the Netherlands and suggested that such a settlement might include reconsideration of the rate of interest, the scheme of amortization, and the total amount of the debts. The aide-mémoire is filed with a memorandum of conversation by Elizabeth Brown, September 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 856D.10/9–2757)