Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

284. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Indonesian Ambassador (Moekarto) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones), Washington, November 12, 1957¹

Washington, November 12, 1957

SUBJECT

• Indonesia

Ambassador Moekarto asked me to have luncheon with him to discuss a number of matters.

1. West New Guinea

As soon as the social amenities had been observed, the Ambassador raised the question as to whether we had changed our position on West New Guinea. I informed him that there had been no change whatever in our positions. As he was aware, our position on this issue was one of strict neutrality as between our two friends, Indonesia and the Netherlands. I pointed out that we were meticulous in our neutrality even abstaining on the resolution to put the matter on the agenda of the United Nations. There had been considerable discussion of the problem in connection with the forthcoming introduction of the Indonesian resolution on West New Guinea in the United Nations and only recently our neutral position had been reaffirmed. I then inquired as to the type of resolution the Indonesians planned to introduce on West New Guinea. The Ambassador replied that it would be a strongly worded resolution calling for the United Nations to use its good offices.

2. PL–480 Rice

The Ambassador then turned to the subject of Indonesia’s request for rice under Public Law 480² and inquired whether his Government could count on receiving an allocation of rice within the current fiscal year. I informed him that the matter was under current review, prospects were favorable, although the amount would not be as large as their request, and I would advise him further within the week.

3. Sukarno’s Trip to the United States³

The Ambassador then said that he wished to give me advance informal notice of President Sukarno’s plans to visit the United States incognito. He said a formal note would be sent to the Department just as soon as the itinerary had been firmed up. Sukarno was planning to fly first to Rome to visit the Pope and then across the Atlantic to visit a number of Latin American countries after which he would fly to New York for a few days “rest.” He said that the President hoped to keep this visit on a strictly incognito basis although he, the Ambassador, realized how difficult this would be. According to very tentative plans President Sukarno’s arrival in New York would be January 24, 1958.

4. United Front Against the Communists

I asked the Ambassador whether he thought there was a real possibility of the three major non-Communist parties, the PNI, Masjumi and the NU getting together in a united effort against the PKI and, if so, what Sukarno’s attitude would be. The Ambassador said that in his view the chances were very good. The PNI had completely changed its policy vis-à-vis the PKI due to a number of factors: (1) the Communist gains in voting strength at the expense of the PNI; (2) the change in PNI leadership and (3) the new aggressive posture of the PKI which had now moved from its “national front tactics” to more typical Communist tactics reminiscent of the pre-Madiun days. As for Sukarno’s attitude, he said frankly that in his view Sukarno was playing politics and that he would disengage himself from the PKI just as soon as he saw the wind blowing the other way. He did not think that Sukarno was so committed to the PKI that it would be difficult if not impossible for him to disengage. The Ambassador himself was a member of the PNI and he felt that the trend in Indonesia was now in the right direction.

5. Settlement of Disputes with Dissidents

On this subject, the Ambassador was also optimistic. The key to the solution of the present difficulty, he observed, was the formation of a new government which would include Hatta. This accomplished, all the related difficulties could be worked out. He said that the foundation had been established for Sukarno and Hatta getting together at the National Conference held this year. Prime Minister Djuanda had already informed the PNI leadership of his willingness to resign whenever an agreement had been worked out between Sukarno and Hatta. He did not wish to predict when this development would take place but he thought something would happen fairly soon—perhaps within the next two months. Asked as to who might become Prime Minister, the Ambassador merely shrugged and observed that Prime Minister Djuanda, a non-party man, had the confidence of the leaders of all three major non-Communist parties.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/11–1257. Secret. Drafted by Jones who made two memoranda of this conversation; see infra.
2. An Indonesian request for 250,000 tons of rice was made in April and renewed in September; documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 411.56D41.
3. The possibility of an unofficial informal visit by Sukarno to New York or California, in connection with a proposed trip to Latin America, had been raised with the Embassy in Djakarta as early as February 1957; documentation on this subject is ibid., 756D.11.