243. Message From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
… Matters raised in your message2 are of such serious and far reaching importance that I wish to consider most carefully any final recommendations to Washington agencies. Also not clear from last sentence your message whether limitation in whom I am to consult applies only to possible courses of U.S. action or to whole situation here which might make some U.S. action desirable. If latter is meant I am afraid I must ask for reconsideration. I do not believe an Ambassador should be limited in seeking information from any source or in consultations he may deem advisable in process of reaching conclusions. I am leaving on 6 Aug for Surabaya to participate in opening of cement factory which ceremony will also be attended by President Sukarno, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, former Foreign Minister Abdulgani and several members of Cabinet as well as at least 10 members of diplomatic corps, including Russians and Yugoslavs. I shall submit more detailed comments after my return Aug. 8 but in meantime wish to make following observations. 1) While in general agree with seriousness of situation as outlined para 1 your message believe it important to point out that Indonesians distinguish between different kinds of Communists and that many of these considered by Washington agencies as Commie participants in Cabinet or National Council and thus presumably under Russian ultimate control are considered here to be more of Tito or modern Pole variety of Commie and thus to some extent independent of if not actively opposed to Russian domination. 2) Believe it also important to realize that recent actions of Sukarno are not, except perhaps in degree, different from or out of line with his previous statements or deeds. For example in June 1, 1945 speech3 Sukarno said: “Need is not for the democracy of West but for …4 politico-economic democracy [Page 405] able to bring social prosperity”. Again in December 1946 when he increased size of Central Indonesian National Committee (the forerunner of Parliament) he jumped PKI representation from 2 to 35 while keeping PNI to its original 45. He also appointed as new members representatives of the peasantry, labor and regions outside Java and Madura in addition to members of political parties thus forecasting in some degree composition of present National Council. 3) There is no information available here to confirm statement that National Council idea originated with PKI Politbureau. 4) I can think of nothing which would more certainly insure Indonesia falling to Communists than to terminate or slow up American aid. I believe it important to look at historical record for a time from Indonesian point of view in order to understand why it is so easy for the Communists and their Russian friends to gain popularity here and so difficult for the United States. Only by doing so can we have a sure basis for recommending action which might have some chance of reversing present trend. Let us look at record of USSR support in U.N. and elsewhere for Indonesians at time of Linggadjati and Renville Agreements5 and what to Indonesians still seems American pressure to get agreements favorable to Dutch. We should also look at Soviet support of Indonesian claims to West Irian and while I do not advocate United States doing same under present conditions, I believe we must recognize effect here of respective positions of U.S. and USSR. Abdulgani in recent friendly discussion of reasons for American difficulties in Indonesia pointed out that Indonesians had been greatly disillusioned by lack of American support to degree anticipated after the war and had not forgotten that it was American tanks and arms which Dutch used in effort to regain their control. Indonesians may be unfair in their attitude but we cannot ignore it if we hope to stem Commie tide here. I am having small stag dinner Aug. 9 with four Masjumi leaders, including Natsir and Roem, and would like to have benefit of their thoughts on present situation as well as possible further talks with Djuanda and President during Surabaya trip before submitting further comments.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/8–657. Top Secret.↩
- Reference is to Robertson’s message to Allison, Document 241.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 86.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- Both agreements between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia were made in the course of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The Linggadjati Agreement was initialed on November 15, 1946, and signed on March 25, 1947; the Renville Agreement was signed on January 17, 1948. The texts of both agreements are in Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, pp. 325–327 and 334–335, respectively.↩