Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

233. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, May 31, 1957—1 p.m.

2921. Foreign Minister called me over this morning to discuss question of making available reimbursable military equipment and one or two other specific items, all of which are being reported separately.² One of these items referred to the Cabinet decision that in view of the fact that it is now believed that state of war and siege must be maintained for several more months, it will not be possible for Navy Chief of Staff to accept Admiral Burke’s invitation to visit US Navy installations. Using this as basis I asked Subandrio if he could give me his ideas on present situation and reasons back of Cabinet belief that SOB³ must be maintained. Foreign Minister then talked for nearly one hour most frankly. Following is substance of principal points.

Djuanda Cabinet and leaders of the provinces have generally agreed on three points: (1) More autonomy must be granted provinces, (2) Democracy must be preserved, (3) Corruption must be eliminated. However, there are differences between central government and provinces as to methods of implementing the above principles and Cabinet is now attempting to resolve these differences.

It is now realized that problem is much more difficult than at first believed. When Cabinet was first formed they hoped it would be possible to terminate state of war and siege shortly but have now concluded it must continue for at least several more months.

The situation in Sulawesi is more critical than that in Sumatra. While Sumatra leaders have taken political stand against central government they have in general not violated central government regulations, particularly economic ones, to anywhere near the same extent as has been true in Sulawesi. Subandrio pointed out that many of the military men presently leaders in the provinces have been taken advantage of by unscrupulous businessmen and have in actual fact been involved in corruption particularly with regard to smuggling. This has definitely been the case in Sulawesi and the commanders who are guilty of this corruption will be relieved. Sumual was specifically mentioned in this connection. However, here again problem is more difficult than originally anticipated and in order to avoid complete breakdown central government must move slowly and with discretion. However, it has every intention of going ahead and when the present commanders are finally replaced they will be prosecuted for corruption. The Cabinet realizes how risky this is but believes that by working gradually they will eventually succeed. Subandrio stated that this is in large part a process of education and that the central government will try by taking more practical steps to improve the lot of the local people in the provinces to win them over to support of the central government rather than their present local military leaders. The Foreign Minister said the situation in the provinces was to some degree comparable to that which existed in the American colonies prior to our revolution. In the American case there were business leaders who because of economic regulations of the mother country were losing money and therefore opposed the English Crown while the mass of the people also opposed the Crown but for entirely different reasons, namely, the desire for more freedom and independence. However, the two groups joined together and this is what has been happening in the provinces here. The present Cabinet is aware, as he implied previous Cabinets were not, of the necessity of central government doing more for the people outside of Java both in the economic and political fields.

One of the most encouraging parts of Subandrio’s discussion was his statement that Hatta is cooperating with the present Cabinet as he did not do with the previous one. While Hatta has so far refused to take over the Economic Planning Board, nevertheless, he has met with and given advice informally to various Cabinet ministers and he is giving informal lectures to members of the staff of the Foreign Office and other ministries. The Cabinet must face the reality, according to Subandrio, that at present Sukarno will not openly cooperate with Hatta but in view of Hatta’s present attitude the Cabinet is hopeful that it may eventually become the vehicle for bringing Hatta and Sukarno together again. This, too, must be done gradually without pressing the issue.

In spite of the impression given by the press Subandrio claims that the present Cabinet is also getting more cooperation from the political parties, including the Masjumi, than might be expected. This is due mainly to the realization by the party leaders that if this Cabinet fails the day of political parties in Indonesia will be gone at least for some time to come. Subandrio said most solemnly that should the Cabinet be forced out of office there would not again be a Cabinet “formateur” but that present Cabinet would be succeeded by at best a presidentially dictated government or at worst by a military junta. In the latter case Subandrio definitely implied, although he did not use the specific words, that civil war would result in view of the different factions among the military.

Subandrio stated that Sukarno attends Cabinet meetings and makes no attempt to dictate decisions. Rather, he listens to Cabinet arguments and he is talked to quite frankly by members of the Cabinet according to Foreign Minister. Subandrio gave as an example his own reply when Sukarno asked his opinion of bringing Communists into the government. Subandrio said that under present conditions it would be folly to bring members of the PKI into the cabinet because they were responsible to a foreign power and took orders from either or both the Soviet Union and Communist China. He said he did not attempt to argue against the Communist ideology but only against the fact that as of the present moment the PKI is not an independent indigenous Indonesian party.

In response to my statement that I was sure people in America were concerned at reading the number of Indonesian leaders in various fields who were being taken into custody by the military without specific charges being laid against them Subandrio admitted that this was a cause for concern. He said that former Prime Minister Ali had abdicated too much authority to Chief of Staff Nasution and that it was Djuanda’s purpose to redress the balance. He recalled that Djuanda had said before Parliament that as Minister of Defense he was the final authority under the state of war and siege. Here again progress can only be made gradually but Subandrio said that it was hoped to announce next week that all persons who had been taken into custody by the military were being released unless there was sufficient evidence of corruption or other specific crime against them for them to be brought to trial by the Ministry of Justice. Should this in fact take place it will obviously have a beneficial effect on public opinion here which has recently become jittery. …

Subandrio concluded by saying that while the situation was serious and full of risks he was not pessimistic. His lack of pessimism was obviously based on (1) belief stated above that the political parties realize that if this Cabinet goes the party system will go, too, and (2) the known reluctance of the Indonesians to initiate violence against each other and their ability to compromise.

I believe Subandrio was completely sincere and honest in what he was saying to me and if the present Cabinet can keep united in its program and push forward with it gradually, but not too gradually, I believe there is a fair chance it will pull through. My belief is also buttressed by the fact that while there remains considerable opposition to the central government this opposition is not united and there is as yet no obvious single leader under whom it could push forward against the central government. I do not look for any early change in the present situation and believe we will be faced for some time to come with backing and filling, numerous rumors of drastic action by the provinces and probably isolated cases of violence from time to time. As the situation looks today, while the present central government is by no means ideal I believe we should do what we can to help it for I am convinced that anything which follows it will be worse.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–3157. Secret.
2. Telegram 2933 from Djakarta, June 1, reported that Subandrio had asked if Allison could let him know informally and without commitment the amount of arms which the United States could supply and the general terms of payment it would expect. (Ibid., 756D.56/6–157)
3. State of war and siege.