Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, December 29, 1955—4 p.m.

1856. Department pass CINCPAC. Discussions between Department and British Embassy reference SEATO (Deptel 1764 and 2025²) appear confirm feeling we have had here for some time that there is considerable and puzzling gap between avowed British desire to build up SEATO and British approach to specific practical problems involved. British approach thus far been characterized by absence positive suggestions and consistent opposition U.S. projects, apparently deriving from implied premise SEATO should remain small, unobtrusive and cheap.

We are concerned British tactics at working level may cause projects Department has aboard to invigorate SEATO in coming year founder at start in Council Representatives and committees when they must be approved in January. Believe approach to British should soon be made at high level (perhaps during forthcoming Eden visit) in effort to obtain more positive British support for U.S. program for SEATO or at least reduction of obstructionism. Latter has increasingly made Council Representatives an arena for United States-United Kingdom contests with Asians as interested bystanders.

We do not believe necessary reconciliation of United States and United Kingdom approaches can take place here because despite excellent local relationship experience in Bangkok has convinced us it is unrealistic to attempt to win British over to our projects individually when their opposition stems from what appears to be almost complete lack sense of urgency and willingness to make even minimum commitments in London and Singapore. We detect also in accounts Department’s conversations with British Embassy similar reluctance to undertake commitment to expanded SEATO program and think it necessary to take matter to higher levels. If Australia and New Zealand, which appear share our views, could be induced make parallel representations it could have beneficial effect.

Brief recapitulation of principal issues handled by Council Representatives this year illustrates extent to which British approach on practical issues has plagued us thus far. It will be recalled that British opposition to United States proposals prevented issuance communiqué on Laos last summer, forced considerable reduction in size of functions we contemplated for public relations office and research and analysis center, and delayed decision on confidential and public reports³ to be prepared for Council for over half of the time available for drafting.

Opposition to these United States proposals might not have been so serious had not fact been that they were virtually only real proposals for action taken up by Council Representatives during current year and British themselves failed make any positive suggestions. Should British continue on this track through Committee and Council Representatives meetings next month, it will present serious dangers to our proposals, especially as most of them are related to the issues on which they have already shown their opposition. In that month, we will seek approval of our expanded information program, establishment of research and analysis center, and comprehensive report, all of which they opposed and to which we doubt they are entirely reconciled. Moreover, British caution about expansion SEATO (which we view as sound in concept, excessive in degree) likely to cause practical difficulties in establishment secretariat on sound basis, proposed cultural relations staffs and such reorganization of counter-subversive committees as may be agreed on in Department’s current consideration this problem.

Apart from these immediate practical problems, we are concerned with wider implications of apparent US–UK differences of approach to SEATO which affect not only our overall relations with British, but also contain danger that being exposed to constant US–UK differences in Council Representatives may weaken Asian members confidence in effectiveness of treaty. Confess that from this vantage point it is not entirely clear what weight to give various factors behind British reluctance to take more positive attitude in practice towards SEATO. Situation appears quite complex. Fears more emphasis on SEATO might be provocative to ChiComs and Viet Minh, fears it might widen gap between pro-Western and neutralist elements in Asia, and apprehensions it would tend restrict British freedom of action in Malaya and elsewhere each probably play some role in political element of British position. Another element would seem to be fundamental misestimate of extent to which Asian members will tolerate SEATO inactivity without becoming disillusioned (e.g., Scott’s remark to Durbrow he gained impression Thai somewhat apprehensive about efforts push SEATO too far too fast—Singapore’s despatch 265⁴—which runs counter evidence they in fact disappointed in progress thus far). We have also for some time felt another important element in British attitude is simply lack of attention to SEATO and find this confirmed in London’s 2278 to Department⁵ and Durbrow’s account his talk with Scott which reveals he still does not have issues clearly in mind. Doubtless, too, historic British position in SE Asia and contrasting lack British leadership in SEATO matters creates impulses at this level attempt amend our proposals if only to assert British seniority and experience in SE Asian affairs. Whatever story may be, however, we are satisfied that we can bring about no substantial improvement through purely local dealings on individual issues and are convinced that some understanding with British will have to be reached at higher level if we are to make sound preparations for March meeting.

In any discussion with British anticipate proposal may be made for prior US–UK consultation on proposals before raised in Council Representatives. While often useful to consult in general way with British re our views in advance, suggest great caution entering into anything like firm commitment to bilateral negotiation outside SEATO machinery in effort to iron out agreed positions prior submission to SEATO. Not only would this be offensive to Asian, French, and possibly other members, but as practical matter it has been principally pressure of US-Asian-Australian alignment in Council Representatives in favor of strengthening treaty which had led British to go far as they have to date on our projects and this asset should not be weakened by negotiations in forum where we lack this support.

Anschuetz⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/12–2955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Singapore, Wellington, and Canberra.
2. Document 75 and supra.
3. The public report, titled “First Annual Report of the Council Representatives”, was released in all the SEATO capitals on March 1, 1956. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 12, 1956, p. 403.
4. Despatch 265, dated December 13, transmitted the text of a memorandum of a conversation between Consul General Elbridge Durbrow and Scott on December 12 concerning SEATO matters. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/12–1355)
5. Dated December 2, not printed. (Ibid., 790.5/12–225)
6. Ambassador Peurifoy died in an automobile accident on August 12, 1955.