80. Minutes of a United States–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers Meeting, Department of State, Washington, January 31, 1956, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.1
[Here follow a list of persons present (19), a table of contents, and discussion on Vietnam (printed in volume I, page 628). In addition to Foreign Secretary Lloyd, British officials included Ambassador Roger Makins, Sir Hubert Graves, and Sir Harold Caccia. Accompanying Secretary Dulles were, among others, Hoover, Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich, Robertson, Bowie, and Young.]
Malaya
Mr. Lloyd asked the Secretary if he had anything he wished to ask the UK regarding the situation in Malaya. The Secretary replied affirmatively stating that the US has received disturbing reports about the degree of Communist subversion and penetration in Malaya and Singapore.2 The US is aware that the military phase of the struggle in Malaya has had considerable effect on the terrorists but the problem of Communist subversion although possibly exaggerated in our reports, seems to be a real problem. He stressed that Malaya and Singapore constitute an extremely important place with a close relationship to all of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia.
Mr. Lloyd summarized the two different situations in the Federation and Singapore. He said there were more favorable developments in the Federation than on the island. The feeling of its independence is running so strong that the UK must keep ahead of it, so long as the UK retains responsibility for defense, foreign affairs and over-all security. The preliminary talks with Federation leaders have been going well in London and it looks as if it would be possible for the UK to get along there. It is UK policy to encourage the Federation leaders to take on more and more responsibility so long as the function of defense is “completely reserved” to the UK. Mr. Lloyd did mention that Tengku Abdul Rahman had had a close call during the talks with the Chinese Communist leader Chin Peng because [Page 170] Rahman was almost completely taken in at the beginning by the Communists. It took quick and vigorous action to show him the trap he was getting into. From then on Rahman behaved very satisfactorily and countered the Communists effectively.
Mr. Lloyd said that Singapore presents a very difficult and much unhappier situation because of the Chinese preponderance. Chief Minister Marshall has many weaknesses, is a “mercurial personality” but is deeply anti-Communist. While his views change quickly, he seems to be extremely pessimistic about the possibility of working out a solution in Singapore owing to the Chinese problem. The trouble is Marshall does not have the experience to know how to play his hand. The Chinese have refused naturalization and therefore have no vote. Marshall is thinking of giving them votes. But, if they were to vote as he suggests, their loyalty would be all for the Chinese Communist regime and the consequences for Singapore are obvious. Apparently, in view of the dilemma, Marshall has decided to string along with the present situation. If worse comes to worse, he will propose “direct rule” by the UK as the only answer. Marshall has presented the UK with no difficulties regarding UK responsibility for the defense of Singapore.
With respect to both areas, Mr. Lloyd emphasized that the stakes for the UK are very high. They represent about 17 percent of the hard currency earnings of the UK. And the defense of Singapore and Malaya is extremely important from the point of view of the area as a whole. Regarding the question of the eventual SEATO tie-up of Malaya, Mr. Lloyd pointed out that the leaders in both Malaya and Singapore tend to look towards New Delhi somewhat. Marshall had made extravagant statements about Nehru in India when he passed through there recently. However, the Indian Government has played a very cautious, modest hand so far. The problem is whether this Indian influence will be for or against eventual SEATO association for Malaya. If Nehru throws his whole weight to encompass Malaya in the neutral bloc then there will be a real problem.
Sir Harold interjected the statement that the UK would do all it could from now on to try to bring Malaya into the SEATO framework bit by bit.
Neutralism
The Secretary then expressed his opinion that we must be more vigorous than we have been in combatting the idea of neutralism. He said that he is more than ever convinced that it will become difficult to prevent a Communist take-over of the neutral governments if they continue to adhere to their view that the world problem is merely a power struggle between two blocs which does not affect their countries. This kind of thinking fits right into the whole Communist [Page 171] conspiracy to take them over. It had been hoped that the Geneva Conference in the summer would lead to an easing of the situation which would have lessened the threat to the neutral governments. Unfortunately that had not occurred. These neutral governments do not seem to realize that the Communist intentions are so diabolical and so hostile to their freedom and independence. The Secretary said he was afraid that they would eventually succumb unless they could develop a crusading spirit against the evil forces of Communism. It is plain that the Communist intention is to squeeze everything they can use out of each country one by one and then move on. This is characteristic of an expanding despotism which needs conquest in order to survive. However, this is completely contrary to the basic principles of democracy. The Secretary said that he very much hoped that we could get some such crusading spirit into the next SEATO meeting.
Mr. Lloyd described the problem as a conundrum. We say to those who join us, you are good and you will get our help. To the others who do not join us we say you get nothing and that drives them into the Communist camp.
The Secretary said that we do favor countries that are lining up with us and that we should not treat neutrals better than these. But that is quite a different thing from doing nothing at all. India is a case in point. On the contrary the US showed that it was important to provide help to the neutral countries in order to help keep them from going over to the Communist side. The Secretary shared Mr. Lloyd’s view that the all-or-nothing approach would throw them into the Soviet arms unnecessarily while there is still some salvation possible. The Secretary also pointed out that it might be harder to continue to get Congressional support for aid to India. Mr. Lloyd commented that he had received a telegram last night from Baghdad that if the Baghdad powers do not do better than the Egyptians it would be bad for the US and the UK. Sir Harold suggested that the joint communiqué should make clear that the US and UK will back the Baghdad pact and SEATO.
[Here follows discussion on Laos printed as Document 338.]
SEATO
Mr. MacArthur outlined the US position. He noted the rumblings from our Asian allies regarding their dissatisfaction with the progress made in SEATO and their comparison with the faster development of METO. Therefore, the US hoped that there could be action taken at the Karachi meeting by the Ministers to invigorate the whole SEATO organization. The Asians feel strongly that more should be done on the psychological and information front. The US agrees and also feels that we should turn our attention to exploring [Page 172] the development of economic measures to give content to Article III. This could be done bilaterally as well as multilaterally. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that there was nothing inherently wrong in the SEATO organizational concept but that the problem has been the lack of personnel in Bangkok and elsewhere to operate the organization. To meet the need we are proposing a permanent working group, a secretariat, a public relations office, and a research center.
Mr. Lloyd said that the US and UK seemed to be in complete agreement on the general principle of improving SEATO but noted the difficulty is in keeping a balance between SEATO and other organizations such as the Colombo Plan. He also noted the UK opinion that it is psychologically wrong to over-emphasize the military aspects of SEATO. He felt we should not call it “anti-Communist”. The main problem, as he put it, is to give the feeling to all the members that the club is worth belonging to.
With reference to economic measures, Mr. Lloyd wanted to know how this would cut across the Colombo Plan and whether the US thinks this plan still has value. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that we envisage a combination of efforts through the Colombo Plan, ECAFE, and bilaterally in support of the objectives of Article III, as well as through SEATO. Economic problems of the Asian members of SEATO do not cut across membership. Among other things the US has in mind is the exploration of possible projects that might be undertaken under Article III, and given to SEATO label. Mr. Robertson mentioned the Mekong Valley Survey.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects. For text of the section on China, see volume III, page 286.]
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Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. The minutes were distributed on February 7. Other sections of these minutes are printed elsewhere as noted in the bracketed notes. The complete text is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd accompanied Prime Minister Eden for talks with President Eisenhower and other U.S. officials. The talks commenced with the arrival of the British party on January 30 and concluded on February 1. A “Joint Statement” issued on the latter date includes sections on Southeast Asia and East Asia. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1956, p. 232.
↩ - For documentation on U.S. concern with this subject, see vol. XXII, pp. 735 ff.↩