Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

73. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGuire) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson¹

Washington, November 18, 1955.

Dear Mr. Robertson: I refer to your letter of 23 September 1955² requesting information for use in discussions with the Australian Ambassador on the questions presented by the Australian Foreign Minister to the Acting Secretary of State on 13 September 1955.³

The attached comments, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in which I concur subject to the comments indicated below, are forwarded for such use as may be appropriate in your discussions with the Australian Ambassador on this subject. Comments on the inclosure are keyed to the JCS comment under the numbered question:

Question 3: Discussion of sub-paragraph d with the Australian Ambassador may not be desirable since he may request precise definition as to just what the U.S. is prepared to do in order to demonstrate its determination. As you are aware, certain aspects of this problem are under review in the NSC planning board at the present time. Other than as indicated under sub-paragraph b of the JCS comment on this question, this Department does not contemplate, at this time, stationing additional forces close to the area or materially increasing the scope of operations of such U.S. units which may from time to time be in the area. Conduct of major combined training exercises should be held in abeyance pending the completion of a study by the SEATO military advisers on problems involved. Further, it is present policy to avoid establishing a military organization for SEATO similar to that of NATO.

Question 6: The last sentence should be qualified as follows:

“The release of all classified military information to SEATO will be made in accordance with the provisions of U.S. Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments, dated 7 November 1955.⁴ Under this policy, only U.S. Military Intelligence items up to and including the classification Top Secret, may be made available to SEATO when such intelligence pertains to the SEATO area only. Release of classified material to individual SEATO countries must be in accordance with the U.S. Disclosure Policy referred to above.”

Question 7: Please note the comment includes two statements of U.S. policy with respect to Korea.

For security reasons you should paraphrase the proposed answer to this question before discussing it with the Australian Ambassador.

Sincerely yours,

E. Perkins McGuire

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)⁵

Washington, November 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Defense of Southeast Asia

In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 30 September 1955,⁶ subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit, in the Appendix hereto, comments on the questions presented by the Australian Foreign Minister on 13 September 1955 which may be used in discussions with the Australian Ambassador.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford⁷Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

COMMENTS ON QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDING DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Question 1: “What is the United States broad strategic concept for the defense of Southeast Asia and where should Australia’s contribution in the United States view fit into this concept?”

  Comment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the remarks on this subject made by the Secretary of State during the ANZUS Council Meeting on 24 September 1955.⁸ In addition, the manner in which Australia’s contribution can fit into this concept should be clearer after the conference of the Staff Planners to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT) at Pearl Harbor on 1 November 1955 and the Military Advisers Conference at Melbourne in January 1956.⁹

• Question 2: “What in the United States view is the relative importance of Malaya in limited and global war?”

  Comment: From a military standpoint Malaya is relatively more important to the free world in a global war because of her strategic location as a base for air and naval forces. In a limited war, before Malaya could be threatened by external aggression, Thailand, Laos, South Viet-Nam, and Cambodia must have been overrun and U.S. air and naval power in the area must have suffered a disastrous defeat. Against a military aggressor capable of accomplishing the foregoing it is doubtful that Malaya could be held. Therefore, in a limited war, the best defense of Malaya may be said to be the fullest possible support of the SEACDT with military planning carried out in accordance therewith. This may also turn out to be the best defense of Malaya in global war.

• Question 3: “How can the spread of Communism to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam be checked successfully?”

  Comment: This is an objective in which military considerations must support and be closely coordinated with political, economic and psychological courses of action. From the strictly military point of view, implementation of the following courses of actions would assist in achieving this objective:

  a. Creation of indigenous forces capable of maintaining internal security within their own countries and providing a delaying action to external aggression.

  b. The maintenance in the Far East of U.S. mobile striking forces and strategically placed reserves.

  c. The creation, by other SEACDT members, of mobile forces capable of being committed on short notice to a collective defense, and a manifestation of a determination to so employ these forces.

  d. Demonstration of U.S. determination to react promptly against aggression by attacks against the military power of the aggressor.

• Question 4: “If Laos, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam become Communist would the United States allow Communist control to spread to the Malayan border without taking military action?”

  Comment: What the United States would do under this hypothetical situation is dependent on many factors not stated. If we are to assume that the three countries were lost to Communism without the SEACDT having been invoked, whether or not U.S. military action would be taken in defense of Thailand would depend upon the nature of the threat to Thailand and Thailand’s reaction to it. From a military viewpoint, if Thailand were attacked and requested aid under SEACDT it could be expected that the U.S. would honor its SEACDT commitments and take retaliatory action against the aggressor.

• Question 5: “Does the United States think that Malaya can be successfully defended if Thailand and Indochina are under Communist control?”

  Comment: Like the previous question this one also involves a hypothetical situation not likely to obtain in the near future. It indicates, as do most of their questions, the Australian preoccupation with the defense of Malaya per se and their lack of faith in the effectiveness of SEACDT. As pointed out in the comment on the 2nd question, the military effort to stop Communism should be made farther to the north, and, if we are to assume the loss of Thailand and Indochina to the Communists, we must also assume a defeat of U.S. air and naval power. In this event perhaps Malaya could not be successfully defended.

• Question 6: “In view of Admiral Radford’s references to the use of SEATO to satisfy our planning needs, does the United States think that the security objections originally associated with SEATO planning have now been overcome?”

  Comment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that all the security objections originally associated with SEACDT planning have been overcome. However, it is believed that the first step in overcoming these security objections has been taken with the publication in July 1955 of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Security Policies and Procedures regulations. For the present, though, all releases of classified information to SEACDT must be handled on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the United States Disclosure Policy.

• Question 7: “How important is it to the United States that Australian troops be kept in Korea?”¹⁰

[Here follows discussion of the United States attitude toward the retention of Australian and other United Nations troops in Korea.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/11–1855. Top Secret.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. See footnote 3, Document 68.
4. Not printed.
5. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
6. Not printed.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. See Document 71.
9. Regarding the Staff Planners meeting, see infra. Regarding the Military Advisers meeting, see footnote 2, Document 81.
10. In a memorandum to Kenneth Young, January 20, 1956, John M. Kavanaugh, Officer in Charge of Australia and New Zealand Affairs, stated that although a formal reply to Casey’s questions had not been conveyed to the Australian Government, substantive answers to some of the questions had none the less been given to the Australians at the ANZUS meeting on September 24 and on several other occasions. He suggested therefore that no formal answer be given to the questions provided the Australian Government made no specific further inquiry in the matter. Young initialed the approval line of Kavanaugh’s memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–1255)