Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

68. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 12, 1955¹

Washington, September 12, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. Merchant
• Richard G. Casey, Australian Foreign Secretary
• Australian Ambassador
• Mr. John Quinn, Australian Division of External Affairs
• Mr. F.J. Blakeney

Mr. Casey called on Mr. Hoover by prior appointment.

Mr. Hoover opened the conversation by thanking Mr. Casey warmly for the contribution of the Australian Government of $50,000 for flood relief in this country.

Mr. Casey, at the invitation of Mr. Hoover, then turned to the substance of the meeting. He said that he realized the ANZUS meeting would be short.² They had, however, certain other questions to raise with us which they hoped might be settled bilaterally in the next few days. The first of these subjects related to how the Australian overseas forces might be most effectively employed if war came. In this connection he said that the correspondence with Admiral Radford bothered the Australian Cabinet. They did not know exactly in what direction now to go. In fact, they felt “set back on their haunches.” Mr. Casey then referred to the fact that Prime Minister Menzies had committed himself to the Australian Parliament on the matter of Malaya after his visit to Washington last spring. They had hoped to be made privy to our broad strategic plans in the Far East and in particular for Malaya. They did not expect nor want to be told all of our planning in intimate detail but they had expected to receive some fairly specific guidance. In this connection Mr. Evatt was busily searching for ammunition to overthrow the Government and Mr. Casey felt there was some reason to suppose that he might attach himself to the Malaya commitment as an issue. At this point Ambassador Spender read the passage in Menzies’ speech relating to his Washington visit which had been approved by the President. Mr. Casey again made the point that this general problem might have a major bearing on the next election which was not necessarily far distant.

The Acting Secretary responded by stating that we welcomed these talks with our friends the Australians. He felt that on major issues we saw eye to eye. He then said that he wished to make clear that Admiral Radford’s letter represented the considered views of the U.S. Government. We regarded it as entirely consistent with the Menzies statement which the Ambassador had read, and that it had therefore come as something of a shock to us that the Australians should be unhappy over it. He reminded the Foreign Secretary that we had consistently believed that all military planning in Southeast Asia should be within the framework of the Manila Pact. He added that when one came to Malaya we must realize that in the event of war a great deal of military action in the north within the Peninsula or up the entire length of the China coast would have occurred before Malaya became an active theater.

Mr. Casey suggested that in fact we regarded the defense of Malaya as a last-ditch affair, and Mr. Hoover agreed.

Mr. Casey then said that he felt completely ignorant of U.S. military planning except for our general views on the maintenance of mobility and the necessity of ascertaining where the initial action might break out in a hot war. He assumed that we had a dozen or more contingent plans but he did not know. In any event, the Australians had put up their Kra Plan as in effect a plan for a plan which represented a basis on which to obtain our views. The Ambassador asked if we could not at least agree that Malaya was an area to be defended. Mr. Casey interjected the question of how were plans to be made? In ANZUS? If so, how to add the UK?

At the Acting Secretary’s request Mr. MacArthur pointed out that Malaya represented merely a segment of the problem and that plans must necessarily be prepared across the board. We were concerned lest the organization set up at Bangkok should languish. We had had high hopes for its constructive utilization but to date these hopes have been disappointed. He raised the question of Laos, pointing out that the Manila organization had failed to act effectively. There was some discussion at this point of the details of that incident.

Mr. Casey then raised the question as to the feasibility on security grounds of top secret planning within the Manila Pact organization. Mr. MacArthur acknowledged that there were difficulties but pointed out that there was a great deal of basic planning still possible and desirable in that framework.

Mr. Casey then said that he realized that the matter of possible use of atomic weapons inhibited disclosures to other partners by the U.S. military. He said, however, that he had with him a half dozen questions on strategic and military matters which he wished to leave with the Acting Secretary with a view to later securing answers.³ He said that he had an engagement to see Admiral Radford⁴ and asked whether it would be embarrassing to the Admiral if he plunged into substance with him.

The Acting Secretary urged him to talk frankly with Admiral Radford and felt that he would find it very useful. Mr. Casey mentioned that he had seen Admiral Stump in Hawaii who had been very pleasant but obviously reluctant to talk substance. He mentioned that their Chief of Staff General Wells would arrive in Washington the following day and would be present at the ANZUS meeting as an adviser. He inquired whether it was our intention to have a senior military advisor present.

Mr. Hoover replied that we welcomed the presence of General Wells as an advisor and hoped to have Admiral Radford in a similar capacity.

The Ambassador then said that he wished to revert to the Menzies’ statement. He said that there was an obvious deficiency in the equipment which the Australians could produce but one had to agree on an appreciation of Malaya to ascertain the exact extent of the deficiency. Thereafter, it would be necessary to determine how the U.S. could contribute to meeting it.

Mr. Hoover in closing the meeting expressed his appreciation for the frankness of their talk.

Mr. Casey said that he was happy to have had the chance to air the central topic of their concern which he hoped to be able to discuss again with the Acting Secretary. He then added that there were certain other questions which they wished to raise. These were:

1. Possible reduction of Australian forces in Korea

2. Antarctic

3. ANZUS agenda

4. Location for ANZUS meeting

5. Netherlands New Guinea

6. Status of our talks in Geneva with the Chinese Communists

7. U.S. organization for the conduct of the cold war

8. The planned expansion of operations by the Australian radio.

On these points the Acting Secretary gave to Mr. Casey a brief summary of the situation listed as Item 6; confirmed our expectation that the ANZUS meeting should be held in Washington; and explained our ideas under Item 3 as being to avoid a formal agenda and to take up all subjects to be discussed under three general headings. He noted that we wished specifically to discuss Laos.

Mr. Hoover also suggested that in Mr. Allen Dulles’ absence Mr. Casey should discuss Item 7 with General Cabell of CIA and Item 8 with Mr. Streibert.⁵ He said that he would telephone both of them to alert them to Mr. Casey’s visits.⁶

It was further agreed that on the other items listed by Mr. Casey word would be sent to him at the Embassy as to the best method of covering them. (It was subsequently arranged for Mr. Murphy to meet with the Foreign Secretary on Wednesday⁷ to go over these items and that on the conclusion of that meeting⁸ Mr. Hoover would meet them to have a further discussion on the main topic.)

As Mr. Casey left the Acting Secretary told him that we were taking a hard look at the matter of the composition of the U.N. Commission on Atomic Radiation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–1255. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.
2. For minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting held on September 24, see Document 71.
3. Casey submitted the questions in an enclosure to a letter to Hoover, dated September 13, neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–1355) See also Document 73.
4. See the memorandum, infra.
5. Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
6. Memoranda of Casey’s conversations with Cabell and Streibert have not been found in Department of State files.
7. September 14.

8. Horsey’s memorandum of the conversation held September 14 among Hoover, Casey, Murphy, and other officials is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

   A general summary of Casey’s Washington conversations, prepared in EUR, reads in part: “It has been made clear to Casey by all concerned that we believe that planning for the defense of South East Asia should be carried on within the Manila Pact framework and that we will not participate in any inner-circle, all white planning for the area with UK, Australia and New Zealand.” (Undated summary is attachment to memorandum from Merchant to Hoover, September 16; ibid., Central Files, 790.5/9–1655)