Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

74. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump), to the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney)¹

Honolulu, November 24, 1955—12:49 a.m.

241049Z. Second meeting of ANZUS Staff Planners was held Pearl Harbor, 24–28 Oct 1955.² 15 copies complete report being forwarded separately.³ During conference, 3 agenda items were considered as follows:

Agenda item 1—Future trends in Southeast Asia including an assessment of the position subsequent to or in the absence of elections in South Vietnam.

Agenda item 2—A study of the military measures which should be undertaken for the defense of Southeast Asia under conditions short of overt Communist aggression.

Agenda item 3—Study of the probable course of operations in the event of overt Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and of the various major counter-measures which might be employed including an estimate of their likely effects. Brief highlights of conclusions reached follow.

Agenda item 1:

(A) In event of all Vietnam elections, Vietnam would pass under complete Communist domination within short period.

(B) If all Vietnam elections are not held, there is major chance of South Vietnam remaining anti-Communist during period under review.

(C) Burma unlikely to succumb to Communism by 1959 and is likely to maintain strict neutrality in cold war.

(D) Present indications in Indonesia are that Communists will find themselves in opposition and unlikely to gain control by constitutional means by end 1959.

(E) Indonesia Communist Party, however, is in strong position and in absence of development of effective counter-force their hold on country by end of 1959 could well be such as to make emergence of Communist Indonesia a short term probability thereafter.

Agenda Item 2:

(A) Military measures should be undertaken which fall into 3 general categories,

(1) Strengthening of military forces and facilities,

(2) Special measures and

(3) Evolving of coordinated and agreed military plans and policies.

(B) Military measures to be undertaken should be under aegis of SEACDT or through other recognized arrangements.

(C) There is need to consider measures required to combat spread of Communism involving use of Communists of quasi-overt military action, a technique not readily identifiable as overt aggression.

(D) Use of armed force by Communists including quasi-overt military action should be met in similar fashion by anti-Communist forces.

(E) Military measures to combat quasi-overt military action is responsibility of country concerned. However, it may be necessary to deploy other forces into threatened countries to aid in their defense.

(F) If planned objectives of existing military aid programs are achieved by 1960, it should be militarily possible to counter Communist expansion under conditions short of overt aggression. During intervening period however, there is distinct threat to security of Southeast Asia which could require other military measures. Preparations should be made accordingly.

(G) Foregoing conclusions under agenda item 2 not valid in respect to Indonesia. At present time and for some time to come, Indonesia would require substantial and successful conditioning by psychological, political and economic means before maximum benefit could be derived from military measures.

Agenda Item 3:

(A) Defense of Southeast Asia is collective effort requiring maximum participation of allies.

(B) Free territory of Southeast Asia should be considered an entity and allied strategy should be based on its defense as a whole.

(C) In event of overt Chinese Communist aggression, the course of action which will most effectively reduce threat is aerial attack by friendly air forces upon selected targets on Chinese mainland.

(D) Successful air attacks would reduce enemy threat to such proportions as to make successful defense of Southeast Asia possible.

(E) Provision of military support to South Vietnam forces in event of renewed overt Viet Minh aggression is necessary and feasible course of action essential to implement strategy for defense Southeast Asia outlined in this report.

General comments: Australian and New Zealand delegations came to meeting prepared to discuss defense of Southeast Asia based on defense of Malaya rather than on so-called forward strategy. At conclusion of meeting these delegations completely accepted principle of forward strategy in Southeast Asia and had a much greater appreciation of defensibility of this area. This change in attitude can be traced directly to 2 items of information provided these delegations by the US:

(1) Summary of US military aid programs for countries in Southeast Asia and

(2) Attack of selected targets on the Chinese mainland as a course of action in support of military operations in event of aggression by Communist China against Southeast Asia. It was necessary to provide this information in order to arrive at a mutual understanding of all the considerations and factors involved in a defense of this area. Consequently, as a result of information provided on military aid, the Australian and New Zealand delegations now understand force goals and force objectives for certain countries in Southeast Asia and have a clearer picture of their progressively increasing capabilities in connection with maintaining internal security and developing ability to defend against external attack. They also clearly recognized forces required in defending Southeast Asia would be less if attack of selected targets were employed as a course of action in military operations. Meeting was concluded with complete agreement and mutual understanding.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/11–2455. Secret. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. The first meeting of ANZUS Staff Planners had been held in Honolulu on November 6, 1952. For text of the report of that meeting, November 25, 1952, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 242.
3. Text of the report, undated, is attached to a January 19, 1956, letter to Walter Robertson from Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense, neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/1–1956)