Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

71. United States Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1955, 9:30 a.m.¹

TAN–MC–1

Washington, September 24, 1955, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Hoover
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Admiral Stump
  • Mr. Miner²
• Australia
  • The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Casey
  • The Australian Ambassador, Sir Percy Spender
  • The Australian Counselor, Mr. Blakeney
  • Head of Southeast Asian Affairs of Australian Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. John Quinn
  • The Australian Chief of Staff, General Wells
  • Principal Military Adviser to the Ambassador, Rear Admiral D.H. Herries
• New Zealand
  • The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Macdonald
  • The New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Leslie Munro
  • The New Zealand Minister, Mr. Laking Permanent, non-political head of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. Mcintosh
  • Armed Forces Attaché of New Zealand Embassy, Brigadier McKinnon
  • Second Secretary of the New Zealand Embassy, Mr. Hunter Wade

The Secretary opened the meeting by expressing his pleasure in participating in another meeting of the ANZUS Council. He said that events had shown the solid basis of the ANZUS relationship and its utility to all the partners.

Since the last meeting some new relationships had been formed but these did not detract from the significance, and in some ways the unique qualities, of ANZUS. He considered ANZUS an organization of continuing vitality and growth. He inquired the Australian and New Zealand views concerning procedure for the Council meeting.

Mr. Casey said that there was little time and there were many subjects to cover. In addition to the one overriding matter Australia wished to discuss, he would also appreciate learning the U.S. views on the situation in individual countries in S.E. Asia. Other matters of lesser import could be dealt with through the usual diplomatic channels. The overriding question for Australia was how to fit in her defense preparations with U.S. plans in event of war, Mr. Casey said. He referred to his recent conversation with Admiral Radford which he considered most helpful but which had resulted in no promise of any real insight into U.S. war plans in the event of large-scale conflict. It seemed to Mr. Casey that the kind of information Australia desired and needed could not be obtained through any Eight-Power planning under the Manila Pact. The difficulties of Four-Power (U.S.–U.K.–Australia–New Zealand) planning were well known and need not be reiterated. There thus remained only the ANZUS forum. Even this was not too satisfactory because the U.K. which had substantial interests and commitments in the Far East, was not a member of ANZUS. Mr. Casey suggested that there might be a more extended ANZUS Council Meeting at Honolulu within the next few months at which Australia could hope to secure the kind of insight into U.S. plans that it needed. This meeting could be held under whatever security safeguards and other conditions the U.S. desired. Mr. Casey mentioned that Australian commitments in the Far East and the dispatch of troops to Malaya were domestic political issues. He said, in confidence, that there might be general elections within the next few months and that in any electoral campaign the present government would need to be more certain than it now was that its defense preparations fitted in with U.S. plans.

Mr. Macdonald expressed his thanks to the Secretary for making an ANZUS meeting possible despite all the other numerous demands on his time. He wished only to support some of the points mentioned by Mr. Casey. New Zealand military planning, he said, would be helped materially if U.S. guidance were available. It would be of great assistance also to learn U.S. views on S.E. Asia.

The Secretary said that he appreciated the importance of Mr. Casey’s and Mr. Macdonald’s remarks but the U.S. was, as they would realize, not particularly prepared to discuss purely military questions in this meeting. Our basic military philosophy for the area was well known. The Secretary had explained it at Bangkok and had mentioned it in his recent U.N. speech. As the other Ministers knew, the U.S. had not contemplated a military organization of the Manila Pact similar to that of NATO. The conditions in the area covered by the Manila Pact did not lend themselves to defense by combined forces in place and in being as in the NATO area. The purpose of all our planning, the Secretary said, was not to fight a war but to deter a conflict which could never be anything except disastrous, particularly under conditions of modern warfare. It followed, therefore, that to maintain the deterrent potential it was necessary to maintain the strength to hit the enemy where it hurt. We do not believe in disposition of forces in the Far East in a way that would commit us to fight on the enemy’s terms as to place and time. Our strategy was based on concept of mobile power, primarily sea and air forces able to attack the aggressor where it would do the most damage. This retaliation would always of course bear a distinct relationship to the area of conflict. For example, no one would imagine that we would bomb Moscow if Vietminh should attack Vietnam. He believed that it was inadvisable to choose a particular area, such as Malaya, and make clear that this was the only place that could and would be defended. Such a policy would have most unfortunate consequences, particularly with regard to Asian members of the Manila Pact.

The Secretary said that our defense plans for the Far East must be flexible because, unlike Europe, there was no one point of concentrated power like the industrial complex of Western Europe which merits and requires to be defended by forces in being and in place. This European complex was so important that an aggressor would be willing to take great punishment in order to seize it quickly. But in Europe, as well, defense of a good deal of the area depended upon deterrents and mobile striking of forces. Norway was a case in point.

The Secretary said that the U.S. concentration on mobile forces in the Far East did not minimize the value of ground troops. Ground forces in being in the area made clear that there would be resistance to aggression and would slow up an attack, if it should come, pending the application of mobile striking forces. We therefore encourage the buildup of ground forces in Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and elsewhere. Any contribution that Australia and New Zealand can make to forces in the area would be useful and welcome. The Secretary said that he could not provide any answers about how a war would be fought if it came in the Far East. There were too many theatres and too many areas to make it feasible to prepare definitive plans. He trusted that this picture of our broad plans might be useful but any details would of course have to be forthcoming from our military.

Mr. Casey expressed his appreciation for the Secretary’s exposition. He returned to the question as to how the Australians could secure the information they needed concerning U.S. military plans and again mentioned a possible ANZUS meeting at Honolulu.

The Secretary replied that there might be an erroneous premise in Mr. Casey’s thinking. The Secretary was not at all sure that we had in hand the kind of plans Mr. Casey mentioned. It might well be that the Far Eastern theatre was too vast and the imponderables too many to permit the development of detailed plans for every contingency. He asked Admiral Stump for his comments.

Admiral Stump said that the Secretary’s exposition was an excellent generalization of our general plans. The U.S. military viewpoint was simply stated. It was to strike where needed and useful and not to tie our forces down to any points the enemy might choose.

Mr. Casey said he understood this viewpoint and appreciated the fact that there could not be plans for all eventualities. He did feel, however, that probably plans had been drawn up to meet certain more likely eventualities. He hoped that the U.S. did not get the impression that the Australians were being too inquisitive or persistent on this point.

The Secretary replied that we on our part did not wish to appear unduly reticent. The situation did not lend itself to the kind of planning usually envisaged. No doubt the U.S. had certain plans in the event the enemy should attack Korea or Formosa. It was much more difficult to make plans for S.E. Asian defense. The area covered such a wide expanse of territory, particularly if it were necessary to take into account defense measures necessary to prevent Indonesia from falling into enemy hands.

Ambassador Munro asked a specific question: If Vietnam went Communist would there be a plan for defending Thailand and the regions to the south.

Admiral Stump remarked that most of our military planning for S.E. Asia was based on the kind of eventualities the Ambassador mentioned. Requirement plans were drawn up for various situations by military agencies of SEACDT. Australian and New Zealand officers were very important members of the SEACDT military agencies. The Admiral said that U.S. felt that Australian and New Zealand forces were, and always would be, the most dependable troops of vital importance. His suggestion was that Australia build up her forces and reserves to the state of readiness so that in event of hostilities, they could be deployed where agreed and where needed. The Admiral admitted that this kind of advice would not be very helpful for ammunition in a political campaign.

Ambassador Spender said that the question for Australia was political in the highest sense: that Australia must determine the balance of its defense forces by branch, type and elements, its man power and matériel requirements in event of war. Australia had only a limited capacity and required U.S. assistance and guidance in making sure that its defense contribution would fit into the general U.S. plan. The Ambassador felt that this guidance and assistance could be provided through ANZUS machinery.

Mr. Macdonald said there was one real difficulty with this suggestion: U.K. had considerable forces, commitments and interest in the area but was not a member of ANZUS.

Mr. Casey returned to the possibility of another ANZUS meeting within the next few months to discuss military questions and added that he had talked with Admiral Radford regarding stationing a senior U.S. officer at Melbourne for liaison with Australia. Mr. Casey’s version of this conversation with Admiral Radford was that the Admiral had responded quite favorably to the latter suggestion, although pointing out the difficulties of finding the right man and keeping him up-to-date with Pentagon thinking. Mr. Casey said that he was encouraged by the Admiral’s fairly ready acceptance of this idea of a U.S. liaison officer at Melbourne. (Mr. Casey’s account does not agree with Admiral Radford’s memorandum of September 14.³)

The Secretary said that although the U.S. had many far-flung responsibilities, it was certainly not too preoccupied to give serious consideration to Australia and Australian desires. The U.S. attaches especial importance to ANZUS, which has qualities of firmness and dependence [dependability?] not duplicated elsewhere. He wished the Ministers to be assured that we were sincerely desirous of doing everything we could to meet their legitimate concerns as to the nature of our military thinking so that they might fit their planning into the coordinated whole.

Mr. Casey then turned to the subject of coordination in cold-war activities, stating that he was sorry that Mr. Allen Dulles had not been in Washington last week during Mr. Casey’s visit. The Secretary said that he would endeavor to put his brother in touch with Mr. Casey.

Mr. Casey then asked if it would be possible to have a meeting of the ANZUS Military either on the level of Military Representatives or on that of the Staff Planners. He mentioned that the SEATO Staff Planners meeting on November l⁴ might be followed by an ANZUS Military meeting. Discussion ensued as to the feasibility of whether such a meeting would provoke suspicion among the Asian Members of the Pact and whether it would meet the needs of the situation, as U.K. would not be represented. The latter point was stressed by the New Zealand Representative.

Admiral Stump expressed his opinion that any Four-Power planning would be resented by the Asian members and would provide our enemies with a useful propaganda weapon in S.E. Asia. He believed we should limit our multilateral meetings to those of organizations established by direct treaties. ANZUS was such an organization. ANZUS and its subordinate agencies had every right to meet when and where the members desired. In addition, he said, bilateral meetings among the members of the Manila Pact were customary and accepted; for example, the U.S. had bilateral consultations with Asian members that received MDAP equipment and these discussions are not limited to questions of matériel. He did not believe that the Australian suggestion, put forward by Mr. Casey, that the U.S. be the formal coordinator of all plans under the Manila Pact was desirable or necessary. The Admiral mentioned that SEATO Staff Planners were meeting on November 1 and that the Australian and New Zealand officers concerned were the same ones who would be involved in ANZUS Staff planning. He felt that it would be more convenient for a meeting of ANZUS Staff Planners to be held prior to the November 1 meeting rather than afterward.⁵

Ambassador Munro mentioned that there had been some very useful and confidential meetings last year on a Four-Power basis in Washington attended by the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors, Sir Robert Scott of the British Embassy and officers of the Department. He inquired as to the feasibility of a renewal of these meetings.

The Secretary remarked that he thought it would be appropriate for the ANZUS Council meeting to give some thought to the constructive aspect of the question. He had in mind discussion of ways and means of building up the Manila Pact rather than of circumventing it. He felt that anything that detracted from the value and prestige of SEACDT would be a very serious mistake. In his opinion, the Manila Pact served as a serious deterrent to aggression in S.E. Asia. The proof was that the situation in the area was much better now than it had been a year ago. He recalled that at the time of the Geneva Armistice discussions there was a fairly general feeling that all Indochina would be lost within a year’s time. This disaster had been avoided in part at least, because of the deterrent effect of the Manila Pact.

The Secretary emphasized that anything that tended to undermine the Pact or cause the Communists to think that SEACDT was purely a paper organization would have very unfortunate consequences. There were, he admitted, disadvantages and limitations in discussions on an Eight-Power basis. These disadvantages, however, must be balanced against the very real gains that had been made in the area. He was sure that Mr. Casey with his intimate knowledge of S.E. Asia, would agree that it was most important that we strengthen SEACDT rather than devote ourselves to discussion of ways and means of getting around the difficulties of an Eight-Power discussion. The Secretary said that we must keep pumping vitality into SEACDT as it was the greatest safeguard in the area.

The Australians and New Zealanders inquired if the Secretary had any specific suggestions to make in this regard. The Secretary replied that he had been thinking of the possibility of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers under the Manila Pact. The U.N. sessions provided an occasion, but, on the other hand, everyone was extremely busy. There were many meetings throughout the world and it was difficult for all concerned to plan on attending yet another. Perhaps there could be a Manila Pact meeting at the Undersecretary level.

At the Secretary’s request, Mr. MacArthur said that the Department had been giving some thought to this question. The Treaty envisaged an annual meeting at the ministerial level. The Asian partners put considerable store in this principle. The Department had been thinking of a Manila Pact meeting sometime during the first three months of 1956. There were many questions of substance to be settled before deciding upon a meeting, however. For example, what accomplishments could the Ministers point to in a year of the Manila Pact? What substantive proposals could be made? What new ideas could be brought forward? The Department was thinking about these questions but U.S. had no specific proposals to offer at this time.

Mr. Casey mentioned that he would shortly be traveling in most of the countries of S.E. Asia and would have opportunity for discussion with political leaders throughout the area and with Nehru as well. He would be most happy to raise with them any matters the U.S. might suggest. He understood from this morning’s discussions that one point that he should stress would be the U.S., like Australia, takes SEACDT most seriously and is anxious and willing to strengthen it in all feasible ways. He would also take the opportunity on his visits to inquire and ascertain views concerning a ministerial meeting and the questions that might be discussed.

At the Secretary’s request, Mr. Robertson outlined the situation in South East Asia. He referred to the continued retention by Pathet Laos of the two northern provinces of Laos and the failure of the I.C.C. to protest this violation of the Geneva Agreement. Mr. Robertson mentioned our objections to the plan drawn up by I.C.C. and submitted to their respective governments for the settlement of the Laos question: (1) that it would leave the administrative machinery in the two northern provinces under Pathet Laos uncontrolled before and during elections; (2) that it envisaged after elections integration of Pathet Laos and Pathet Laos forces with the Royal forces with the consequent serious danger of infiltration; and (3) that, in effect, this I.C.C. plan was a clear violation of Geneva Accords which had envisaged full control of all parts of Laos by the Royal Government.

Discussion ensued concerning details of the plans and the difficult position of Canada in the I.C.C, flanked as it was by Communist Poland and neutralist India. It was accepted that as the Canadian Government had not yet formally adopted the plan proposed by I.C.C, there was still time for each of the ANZUS countries to work against its acceptance.

Mr. Robertson then turned to discussion of Vietnam. He reported that Vietminh’s letter of complaint that no agreement had yet been reached on elections was being circulated by U.K. and U.S.S.R. to the Geneva Powers. India had asked for a September or October meeting in New York of the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The U.K. was trying to prevent such a meeting. Mr. Robertson explained that the American, French and British officials in Saigon agreed, however, that we should all press Diem for elections for a South Vietnam assembly. Mr. Robertson explained Diem’s internal political difficulties. He pointed out that people in South Vietnam were psychopathically opposed to the Geneva Agreement and hostile to the I.C.C. He believed that Diem should shortly announce a vote for elections for an assembly in the region under his control and let this assembly authorize consultations with Vietminh concerning nation-wide elections. This seemed the best way to answer criticism of failure to initiate discussions. Such consultations are important from the international standpoint. In discussions with Vietminh on this question, Diem would certainly have the support of the Free World in demanding iron-clad guarantees for the establishment of conditions for really free elections. Mr. Robertson mentioned the difficulties of Diem’s position and pointed out that he was nobody’s puppet; that he had gained stature by making clear that he was not going to follow blindly any foreign advice.

Mr. Casey pointed out that he had sent a rather stiff personal message to Diem at the time of the recent anti-I.C.C. incidents in South Vietnam. Somewhat to Mr. Casey’s surprise this message had been well received by Diem. The Australian Minister stated that his Government would be most willing to help in any way it could in bringing about the desired result in Vietnam. He said that the Vietnamese regarded the Australians as friendly, perhaps more so than the great powers.

After discussion concerning the increased military strength of Vietminh in the area, there was brief reference to the situation in Thailand. Mr. Casey inquired concerning General Pao’s visit to the United States and his present position. Mr. Robertson explained that nothing had come of the General’s visit as he had been shorn of his power and influence by Prime Minister Phibun by the time he arrived in the U.S. In response to a question by Mr. Casey, Admiral Stump stated there had been no great build up of air fields in Thailand, that only the field at Bangkok would take jet planes. Some roads were being planned but no military highways had been built.

When Mr. Casey again mentioned that he would be glad to put forward, in his visits in S.E. Asia, any ideas which the U.S. considered useful, Admiral Stump mentioned that there was a general unawareness of the very real accomplishments that had been made in the military planning field of SEACDT. He stated that if other countries agreed, he hoped to give considerable publicity to the November 1 meeting of the SEACDT Staff Planners, as this meeting would be the culmination of many previous military consultations and much planning and would provide a fitting occasion for retailing the accomplishments in this field. He hoped that he would secure the agreements of the governments concerned for the publicity he had in mind.

The Secretary and the Australian and New Zealand Ministers agreed that this would be an excellent idea. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that it would be most helpful if the military accomplishments of SEACDT were given extensive and favorable press coverage throughout the Asian countries. It was generally agreed that so far the Manila Pact had had a poor press and that steps should be taken to improve this situation.

Mr. Casey then inquired concerning the position of Quemoy and Matsu. The Secretary replied that any significant military developments could be mentioned by Admiral Stump. For his own part, he wished to emphasize the political aspect. The U.S. was trying to avoid a situation in which the question of off-shore islands would have to be resolved by force. There was a time last winter, the Secretary said, when it appeared that the U.S. might be confronted by the choice of either accepting a serious Nationalist defeat and considerable Communist victory, or of participating in a war of unpredictable magnitude. The Secretary explained that the U.S. was trying to avoid this dilemma by spreading the doctrine of the avoidance of the use of force and endeavoring to bind the Communists to this doctrine. This thesis had been put forward by friends at the Bandung conference and had been elaborated on in subsequent statements of the Secretary. The U.S. was now engaging the Communists in talks feeling that while the Communists were talking they were not likely to undertake any military ventures. In sum, the U.S. was trying to create world opinion against the use of force by the Communists in this area and a realization by the Communists that it would be the better part of wisdom to accept the status quo. The Secretary pointed out that, for our part, we were doing our very best to prevent the use of force to settle what might be termed similar questions. Chancellor Adenauer and the Free World had agreed that force should not be used to reunite Germany. The U.S. had been forced to use great pressure in Korea to prevent attempts to bring about unification of that country by force. We saw no reason why an exception should be made for Communist China. So far this doctrine has been successful. It would be helpful if Mr. Casey, during his visit to S.E. Asia, could spread this doctrine, which might be applied to Kashmir and Goa as well. The Secretary mentioned that Nehru, he felt, was exercising considerable restraint with regard to the Goa situation.

Mr. Casey then asked if the U.S. considered it was possible for the Nationalist Chinese to maintain their regime and morale for, say, five years hence if nothing catastrophic intervened.

Mr. Robertson replied that the U.S. did consider it possible, unless the Chinese Nationalists should lose the support of large sections of the Free World. He pointed out that within five years there might be events on the Chinese mainland which would be of considerable encouragement to the Chinese Nationalists while world-wide acceptance of Red China would raise serious questions not only for Chinese Nationalists on Formosa but for the overseas Chinese and those on the mainland now in the Communist grip.

In reply to Mr. Casey’s question concerning developments in Indonesia Mr. Robertson stated that we had been very encouraged by the pro-western attitude of the present caretaker government and hoped that the elements of the present regime would be successful in the forthcoming elections. He also mentioned Indonesia’s desire to improve relations with Australia.

Mr. Casey then raised the question of Antarctica. He said that since his talk with the Acting Secretary on September 14 there had been new developments. The Russians had exposed their plans for future activities in Antarctica. These plans envisaged regular flights of aircraft to Antarctica, probably as many as five or six a year. This increased Russian interest seemed to the Australians more menacing than any previous Soviet concern in the area. Mr. Casey said that the Australians hoped that the U.S., U.K., New Zealand and Australia could get together to concert their positions with regard to Antarctica.

Ambassador Spender stated that the Australian idea is primarily directed to counteract Soviet expansion in the area. He felt that any internationalization of Antarctica would only benefit the U.S.S.R. Australia felt that there should be the fullest talks before any other new developments occur.

Mr. Hoover explained the U.S. position prior to U.S.S.R. interest in the area. He stated that the Soviet threat required a complete reevaluation of our position. The U.S. was now gathering material for a re-assessment of its policy but was not yet in a position to discuss the matter authoritatively.

The meeting terminated with examination of a draft communiqué. Minor revisions were made.⁶ The Council rose at one o’clock.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 552. Secret. No drafting officer is indicated on the source text.
2. Robert G. Miner, Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs.
3. Reference is presumably to Document 69.
4. The SEATO Military Staff Planners met at Honolulu November 1–16. A copy of their report was forwarded to the Department under cover of a letter dated December 30, 1955, from Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Operations, Department of Defense, to Walter Robertson, but was not forwarded to the Department’s central files with the letter. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/12–3055)
5. For a summary of the ANZUS Staff Planners meeting held in Honolulu October 24–28, see Document 74.
6. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1955, p.534.