Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 18, 1957—3:44 p.m.

403. Vientiane 586.² There clearly no need of another communiqué on political settlement and Souvanna has once more easily acquiesced in Souphannouvong proposal. Although language vague, probably deliberately so, and despite enumeration more than usual number points, communiqué appears basically same “solution” put forth earlier by Souvanna. We assume Cabinet will adhere intention prevent Souvanna from continuing act unilaterally.

We have impression “official transfer” two provinces to RLG control same day coalition government formed would be merely paper transfer administration, details to be subsequently worked out in mixed commissions. On details PL would just as in December 28 communiqué be negotiating from both sides of table, as members government and as opposing party. This interpretation seems borne out by physical impossibility regaining effective control administration in single day, by imminence deadline originally proposed by Souvanna, and by lack provision for prior screening and integration PL troops, who would presumably remain in being to frustrate RLG take-over. PL aims manifest in Souphannouvong’s refusal include sentence concerning prosecution as rebels those who continue oppose RLG authority. In acceding Souphannouvong’s stand, Souvanna has given up key point in any settlement with PL.

We have following additional specific comments: Numbered paragraph 1: Basis for settlement should be Geneva Agreements and not December 28 communiqué, which goes far beyond Geneva terms and grants PL privileges never envisaged 1954 Accords.

Numbered paragraph 3: Sentence on military alliances and bases forfeits RLG right call in foreign assistance if security threatened and dangerously limits RLG action this field which already defined RLG unilateral declaration Geneva.

Numbered paragraph 5: Civil rights already guaranteed Constitution. Would this law include amnesty and if so would language be substituted to restrict immunity to period preceding day of promulgation (Vientiane 504³)?

Numbered paragraph 7: Despite budgetary limitation and meaninglessness reserve status, we fear RLG will get short end stick if provision concerning total PL integration maintained. Our position on 5 percent ceiling properly screened reindoctrinated troops still stands.

Numbered paragraphs 8 and 9 are good.

In discussions with Phoui and Katay you should draw on foregoing. To Phoui you might also refer to RLG position decided in Cabinet Council which he described to Robertson (Department’s 377 to Vientiane⁴). Our reaction three conditions generally as follows: 1) condition concerning dissolution PL movement not clear but should be closely tied to effective execution conditions on reestablishment authority two provinces and reintegration PL civilian military personnel. As presented by Phoui, conditions on restoration administration and integration require PL pledge not performance, and PL pledges have for three years been shown to be worthless. RLG should insist on actual restoration its authority and actual integration PL personnel after appropriate screening before making any concessions.

You should tell Phoui we believe Cabinet Council position should be further safeguarded, but that Souvanna appears have differently interpreted even present provisions. For example, Cabinet position stated PL movement would be dissolved before coalition whereas numbered paragraph 6 communiqué seems reverse order. Also, Cabinet said reintegration to be accomplished in accordance conditions fixed by RLG, but communiqué leaves modalities to mixed commissions in which PL have voice.

You might add that, as Robertson said Washington, way to obtain Communist compliance their agreements is not by concluding still more agreements with them, for their record reveals only continuing violation. Bad agreement with PL might give appearance two provinces regained but could in reality result loss entire country. In face PL desire reach settlement RLG will profit by standing firm and maintaining tough attitude. Vientiane 598⁵ just received. Does Souvanna mean effective restoration authority two provinces and integration PL will in fact be completed before coalition and if so has Souphannouvong agreed?

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1157. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by Kocher, Young, and Jones; and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Paris, and London.
2. Document 476.
3. Dated October 2, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–257)
4. Dated October 12, not printed. (Ibid., 033.51J1/10–1257) This telegram summarized the discussions with Phoui and Department officials. See Documents 474 and 475.
5. Supra.