479. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

615. Department pass CINCPAC POLAD for information. Following is round up conversations re joint communiqué staff and I had evening 19th:

1.

Katay approves. At second meeting between Katay and Embassy officer, 19 October,2 latter set forth Department’s official reaction to terms joint communiqué. To question whether he in fact approved joint communiqué, Katay answered in emphatic affirmative. According to Katay, communiqué is no simple reflection Prime Minister’s thinking, but is in accordance with desires of Cabinet. However, he asserted joint communiqué is merely enunciation general principles, leaving application to be dealt with in mixed committees where guts of settlement must be negotiated. Furthermore, communiqué would not materially affect course of negotiations in committees.

Explaining purpose of publishing communiqué, Katay pointed out that two brothers, after months of inconclusive haggling, had no choice but to come up with some tangible manifestation of accord and joint communiqué, bearing some semblance of an agreed position, would go long ways toward stilling clamor both in the Assembly and in the provinces for a show of results. Katay at least felt confident that it would accomplish just that. Conversely, Katay pointed out public would not fail to react to any flagrant attempts on part of PL to disassociate themselves from practical consequences of general principles to which they had subscribed, thus giving RLG a distinct psychological advantage in pinning on PL responsibility for breakdown of negotiations. In view of drastic change in Katay’s views, Embassy officer asked him frankly whether he considers himself fully in control of situation. Katay replied affirmatively, adding that in his opinion there was absolutely no reason for concern.

After expressing hope that Katay would not consider this demarche as American attempt interfere in Lao internal affairs, but rather as reflection US desire to see Laos avoid pitfalls in communiqué, Embassy officer stated Prime Minister should delay issuance joint communiqué until Ambassador has returned to give him opportunity to bring up a number of precise issues in which clarification had to be sought. To this end, Embassy officer stated he hoped to enlist Katay’s intercession with Prime Minister. Katay agreed that [Page 995] this was fair request, “considering aid your country has been giving us” and stated he would pass on our request to Prime Minister Sunday afternoon (20 October).

2.
ICC reactions. At Polish reception I had opportunity to discuss status negotiations with Polish and Canadian commissioners. Pole appeared confident that final settlement was very close which would permit ICC to close shop and go home. …
3.
PL exude optimism.

Souphanouvong who cornered Embassy officer at same Polish reception was all smiles and appeared confident settlement in sight. He asserted his brother is not negotiating as individual, as he did last winter, but appears to have entire Cabinet with him. PI leader satisfied with joint communiqué and appeared also to accept RLG civil integration project. On military agreement, he had reservations which he said are in process of being discussed in joint commission. To direct question by Embassy officer whether he would have to go back to Sam Neua before signing definitive agreement, he replied this not necessary this time.

Bacon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2057. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh
  2. The first meeting was reported in telegram 613 from Vientiane, October 19. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–1957)