Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

475. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 7, 1957, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, October 7, 1957, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Pathet Lao Problem in Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Phoui Sananikone, Foreign Minister of Laos
• His Excellency Ourot R. Souvannavong, Ambassador of Laos
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• J. Graham Parsons, American Ambassador to Laos
• Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
• Eric Kocher, Deputy Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
• Patricia M. Byrne, FE/SEA

His Excellency Phoui Sananikone, Foreign Minister of Laos, called on Mr. Robertson at 3:30 p.m. at his own request. The Minister had came to the United States to head the Lao delegation to the twelfth United Nations General Assembly.

Replying to Mr. Robertson’s welcome, Phoui said he had most pleasant memories of Mr. Robertson at the 1954 Geneva Conference. That conference had at times seemed long and the Chinese Communists had caused many difficulties. Nevertheless, it had produced excellent results.

Mr. Robertson said it had achieved a bad result for Viet-Nam, but it might have been favorable for Laos if the Communists had adhered to the terms of the agreements reached there. The Foreign Minister agreed.

Continuing, Mr. Robertson said we had admired Phoui’s insistence in Laos that the Communists execute the Geneva Accords. In 1954 the Communists had agreed that Pathet Lao troops would be disbanded and the Royal Government’s civil and military authority over the two provinces restored; in return there would be no discrimination against the Pathet Lao in the then forthcoming elections. Three years later this same group continued to pay no attention to the 1954 agreements, demanded coalition government as if it were on a par with the Lao Government, and was trading the same old concessions all over again. Mr. Robertson wished to re-emphasize our admiration for Phoui’s strong position in this situation.

We particularly admired his stand, said Mr. Robertson, because we were fearful of coalition governments. The Foreign Minister would remember the example of Czechoslovakia: The Czechs had thought they could take the Communists into the government and still control them. But the result had been a Communist take-over and Masaryk’s suicide.

Phoui said that the Royal Government’s faith in the Pathet Lao had been betrayed. At Geneva they had thought the Pathet Lao would participate in the elections, the situation would return to normal, and the International Control Commission withdrawn. The Lao delegation at the Geneva Conference had been instructed to make clear that the Pathet Lao posed a local, not an international, problem. That was why the Geneva Conference had not solved the matter; there it had been agreed that the Pathet Lao would regroup pending a settlement to be achieved “within the family”. The Lao Government had believed that true nationalists could reach an understanding.

Three years’ experience had shown, to all but those who did not wish to understand, that the Pathet Lao were not nationalists but had extemely close relations with the Communists.

The Royal Government had been deceived again in the agreement of December 28, 1956 negotiated by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Under the terms of that agreement, after Pathet Lao entry into a coalition government the movement was to be dissolved, the Government’s administration restored, and the conditions for the reintegration of Pathet Lao civilian and military personnel freely fixed by the Lao Government.

Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong had then, however, gone to Sam Neua—some said even to Hanoi—and had come back with a changed position. He had demanded the Lao Government accept Chinese Communist aid, which was, said Phoui, irrefutable proof of the Pathet Lao’s close ties with the Communist Bloc. This new Pathet Lao condition had put an end to that phase of negotiations.

But while the Government could complain of continued Pathet Lao deception and bad faith, it could at the same time congratulate itself that these frequent changes in the Pathet Lao attitude had exposed their perfidy. Many who had not been willing to think the Pathet Lao were tied to the Communist Bloc were now convinced that they were.

Negotiations had been resumed, said the Foreign Minister. He had little detailed information, but he himself thought the conversations unlikely soon to come to any real conclusion. Laos was therefore still far from having coalition government.

Mr. Robertson said we had been informed of a draft law produced in the working group which would grant amnesty to the Pathet Lao “until the day of coalition”.² This appeared to us to give the Pathet Lao an excellent opportunity to engage in subversion and terrorism with immunity from punishment. The Foreign Minister might wish to obtain better language for this law.

After ascertaining that the draft emanated from the mixed political commission and not the Assembly Deputies, Phoui said he would look into the matter, and that if we thought this draft could compromise Laos in the immediate future, he would cable Katay to stop all action and prevent presentation of the law to the National Assembly until Phoui’s return to Vientiane. Mr. Parsons responded that this would be useful. Mr. Robertson added that, if such a law were necessary, it should at least be drawn up so as to constitute a victory for the Government and not, like the present draft, a triumph for the Pathet Lao.

The Foreign Minister then said he would like to ask Mr. Robertson’s advice. He would set forth the Royal Government position recently agreed upon in the Cabinet Council. If we were not in accord with it, he would appreciate our suggestions.

The present Government, in contrast to its predecessor, wished to settle the Pathet Lao problem through the following measures: The Government would require of the Pathet Lao 1) the dissolution, both theoretical and practical, of the Pathet Lao movement before coalition; 2) a written agreement that the Royal Government was free to reestablish its authority in the two provinces and send in anyone it chose to administer them; 3) an agreement that the reintegration of Pathet Lao civilian and military personnel would be accomplished in accordance with conditions fixed by the Royal Government.

If the Government were satisfied on these three points, it could then proceed to form a coalition cabinet. Supplementary elections would follow soon thereafter, and then a new government reflecting the results of the elections would be set up. Knowing the American interest in the future of this country, the Foreign Minister said, he would like to know whether this scheme could present difficulties, and if so, how the plan could be modified to avoid them.

In reply, Mr. Robertson said that the primary responsibility for a settlement and for the decision as to what was wise must rest with the Royal Government. There were many complicating factors on which we were not qualified to pass. We were strongly concerned, however, from the standpoint of a friendly outsider, to see Laos’ national independence maintained. The terms under which the Pathet Lao were taken into the national community were therefore highly important.

The Minister had mentioned the integration of Pathet Lao troops. By what formula would this be accomplished? Would the troops be screened? Would any who wished be admitted or would they be limited to a percentage of the National Army? The great danger was that the integration of large numbers of unscreened troops might build in cells for infiltration and subversion of the Army. We knew and the Minister knew that the negotiations were directed by international Communism, which would make a strenuous effort to achieve a settlement permitting their entrenchment for future activity.

Ambassador Parsons then stated that he was entirely in accord with Mr. Robertson’s thinking, which was the view that any American would take after studying the situation in Laos. We knew that the Lao strongly desired the reunification of the country; we also knew how adept the Communists were at exploiting this desire. If we sometimes found ourselves not in agreement with the Lao Government, it was because we had had experience with the Communists elsewhere in the world. Our concern was only for the future of Laos; we had no other motive. We consequently feared arrangements which it seemed to us might jeopardize that future.

Turning to the specific points mentioned by Phoui, Mr. Parsons said that the Lao Government had wisely initiated such measures as civic action under Colonel Sananikone³ and other programs which in a few months should give the Government control of outlying areas. This was a field to which the Lao Government had perhaps not been able to give as much attention as it would like. With increased control of these outlying areas, the Government could better handle Pathet Lao reintegration.

Before a thoroughly considered reply could be given the Foreign Minister, Mr. Parsons said, we should have to know such things as which Pathet Lao would be given posts in a coalition cabinet, which portfolios they would hold, and how the Government intended to protect its archives, which were always of great benefit to the Communists.

Mr. Robertson said he had at least three questions on the planned Lao course of action: 1) Would the Pathet Lao be required to meet the Government’s conditions before they were given positions in the Government? 2) what portfolios would the Pathet Lao be given? and 3) what was the Government’s assessment of its capabilities to prevent Communist infiltration if the plan were put into effect?

Mr. Parsons then mentioned that the Foreign Minister might perhaps not be aware that, in response to a request from the Royal Lao Government, the United States had in an aide-mémoire of November 6, 1956⁴ set forth its position on financing the integration of some Pathet Lao military effectives. This aide-mémoire also stated that the U.S. must consider any agreement on Pathet Lao integration in the light of the over-all settlement achieved by the Lao Government.

Phoui said it was true that any arrangement to obtain Pathet Lao reintegration presented a danger for the future of Laos, but an arrangement by definition included some elements of compromise. If agreement were reached on the three aforementioned conditions, the modalities for their execution would be determined in each case and examined with the greatest prudence. The Cabinet’s proposed position concerned principles, not details. He wished to repeat that he recognized that an accord with the Pathet Lao presented ipso facto a danger. But suppose the Lao Government could not reach an agreement with the Pathet Lao for fear of the ensuing contamination: What should Laos do? Should it permit the continuation of the status quo, that is, leave the two provinces under Pathet Lao control, and if so, how long could this situation be allowed to endure? Or should the Geneva Co-Chairmen be brought in, or the United Nations seized of the problem? The Lao people did not want to leave this problem unsolved for too long. They insisted absolutely on reunification.

Mr. Robertson stated that the Foreign Minister’s remarks were a realistic presentation of a practical problem. He wished to point out, however, that it was essential to decide upon the details of a settlement because they were just as important as the general principle. For example, would the Pathet Lao perform certain actions as an earnest of their good faith before coalition, or would coalition come first? Not only the two provinces were at stake; a bad agreement would result in the loss of the whole country. In the effort to regain two provinces, one should not lose all 12. That was why the conditions of settlement were so important.

Mr. Robertson, after voicing his hesitation to comment on the Foreign Minister’s questions, said he did not place too much reliance on the Geneva Co-Chairmen. They had reached an agreement at Geneva but there had since been no effort to enforce it on its original terms. If the Co-Chairmen were brought in, then they should use all their influence to force the Pathet Lao to carry out the terms already agreed to. They should not be brought in to negotiate anew.

We thought, Mr. Robertson went on, that the Pathet Lao were most anxious to make an agreement. They would drive a hard bargain, for they would obviously prefer to have the entire country rather than only the two provinces. In this situation the Lao Government would gain more by a tough attitude than by a soft one. We were sympathetic to the Lao desire for reunification, but the Royal Government must assess the cost of a “paper” agreement.

Phoui responded that the Lao Government was really greatly distressed that the Pathet Lao had not respected the Accords. The Communists had been co-authors of an agreement which stated that Laos was indivisible; the two provinces were to remain as always under Royal Government authority. Full Lao Government sovereignty over the area had been recognized at Geneva, by the International Control Commission, and even by Prince Souphannouvong. But although all had recognized the Government’s right, the Pathet Lao had not obeyed the ICC recommendation that the Lao Government be permitted to restore its administration. Negotiations were continuing but the Foreign Minister did not have the impression that they would come to any conclusion in the near future. Therefore, what was the U.S. position on means to make the Pathet Lao execute the Geneva Accords?

Mr. Robertson replied that he knew the way not to: The Lao Government should not think it could force the Pathet Lao to carry out an agreement already made by taking their word on a new agreement. The Government should require Pathet Lao performance before giving them positions in the government, and not give them Cabinet posts merely in return for their word. Since recognizing the USSR, the United States had concluded 25 major agreements with that country, and all had been broken. We had entered into an armistice agreement with the Chinese Communists on Korea; of its four provisions, all but one, that concerning the ceasefire, had been violated. And so it went with the Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam and on Laos. No problem was settled with the Communists by making new agreements with them.

Mr. Robertson told the Foreign Minister that we had the deepest interest in the Pathet Lao issue because the independence of Laos, in the maintenance of which we were greatly interested, was at stake. The Lao Government would have our support for any fair settlement that protected Laos’ independence and did not in fact involve an eventual Communist take-over.

This problem required further discussion, but time was running short, said Mr. Robertson. Before the meeting ended, he wished to take up two other matters. First, the Secretary had the day before expressed to the Foreign Minister his concern over the abuses in the Lao aid program, the irregular issuances of licenses without regard to Lao agreements with us, and the unrealistic exchange rate which fostered these irregularities. We would shortly be talking with the Royal Government to achieve joint measures concerning the exchange rate in order to eliminate the abuses and bring about a more effective utilization of American aid funds. This was important to his country and to us, if Congressional appropriations for the foreign aid program were to continue.

Second, Mr. Robertson understood that the Lao Government was interested in a program to establish reception centers for refugees and defectors from the Pathet Lao and other contaminated areas. We thought this was a good project and could give the Foreign Minister our approval in principle. We were prepared to discuss in detail our sharing part of the program’s cost.

The Foreign Minister thanked Mr. Robertson for outlining U.S. views on the Pathet Lao problem, and assured him that he would do all possible to prevent a solution contrary to our interest. He also wished to assure Mr. Robertson that close liaison would be maintained with Embassy Vientiane in order to keep U.S. representatives informed of the evolution of negotiations. Nothing opposed to our joint policy would be done, concluded the Foreign Minister.

The conversation ended at 5:00 p.m.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–757. Secret. Drafted by Byrne on October 10 and cleared by Young, Jones, and Robertson. Briefing material for Robertson in preparation for the meeting is in a memorandum from Young to Robertson, October 7, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.13/10–757)
2. In telegram 476 from Vientiane, September 27, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2757)
3. A report of the civic action program in Laos is in despatch 56 from Vientiane, September 24, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2457)
4. See Documents 386 and 391.
5. Phoui also met with Under Secretary Herter and Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. Memoranda of conversation by Byrne, October 7 and 9, are in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–757 and 751J.00/10–957, respectively.