476. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

586. Pass to DEPTAR for Schow.2 Embassy just received word that Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong have agreed on text joint communiqué3 which will be published shortly. French adviser told Embassy officer evening 15 that two princes have been working in great secrecy over last few days on such joint communiqué and that text has already been submitted by Souvanna for approval to those members of Cabinet presently Vientiane. However publication expected to be held up until Katay now Saigon and Phoui whose return expected in day or two have had opportunity voice their views on communiqué.

Presently planned communiqué has gone through three drafts, which French adviser showed Embassy officer. First draft submitted by Souphanouvong makes well-known PL demands. Second draft was Souvanna’s counter proposal which served as basis present text. Some differences between Souphanouvong’s proposal, Souvanna’s counter proposal and present wording discussed below.

3-page communiqué can be summarized in eleven points:

(1)
First para communiqué refers to all previous agreements signed between two parties, including December 28 communiqué, which remain basis for settlement.
(2)
Two leaders agree to “PL representation” in government of national union. Such coalition must be “preceded same day” by official transfer two PL provinces to RLG control. This awkward wording is compromise but nevertheless clearly states transfer authority two PL held provinces to RLG must precede coalition government. In Souphanouvong’s draft coalition came first. Communiqué continues that after transfer two provinces to RLG control, coalition government must obtain Assembly approval.
(3)
PL approve Souvanna Phouma’s investiture declaration of August 9. In addition two parties agree Laos must not contract military alliances and not permit establishment new military bases on Lao territory.
(4)
Neo Lao Hak Xat Party allowed to function like all other political parties in Laos but enjoys no special status. Souphanouvong’s draft requested privileged position for Neo Lao Hak Xat to support policy of neutrality and peace. In addition communiqué continues Neo Lao Hak Xat can only begin to function after coalition has been formed and after RLG has approved party statutes. (Recall that attempt to incorporate Neo Lao Hak Xat as political party last May [Page 988] was turned down by Minister Interior because statutes did not comply with RLG legislation on this subject.)
(5)
RLG agrees to present civil rights law to National Assembly.
(6)
Details on extension RLG authority over two PL provinces and integration PL civil and military officials into RLG administration and ANL to be worked out by two joint political and military commissions established August 1956. Once RLG authority reestablished over two provinces and PL integrated, text emphasizes “the de facto and de jure” disappearance of PL movement. Additional sentence proposed by Souvanna that those who continue oppose RLG authority will be treated as rebels was deleted by Souphanouvong. Recall this phrase also included in RLG military proposal (Embtel 5584).
(7)
Two parties agree incorporate all PL military in some form into RLG military organization. This sweeping provision considerably curtailed however by following statement that only PL volunteers will be integrated into ANL and that number to be taken depends on “availability funds”. Those PL military who do not want to serve actively in ANL will be transferred to army reserve. (French adviser explained that budgetary limitation gives RLG leeway in selecting number of PL to be incorporated into ANL. Transfer of remaining PL to reserve status is meaningless since there is no organized military reserve in Laos.)
(8)
PL solemnly agree turn over all military equipment and ammunition to ANL. This provision was not included in Souphanouvong’s original draft.
(9)
Integration of PL civil functionaries depends on qualifications individual candidates. To be integrated, every candidate must comply with RLG standards such as possession recognized school diploma or previous experience RLG administration et cetera. This, as adviser claims, limits considerably number of civil functionaries who could qualify for integration.
(10)
Two parties agree that October 31, 1956 cease-fire agreement has already served its purpose but now needs to be strengthened by increasing number of joint mobile teams policing two PL provinces. Reference to creating no man’s land which was part of Souvanna’s proposal (Embtel 558) turned down by Souphanouvong.
(11)
Two parties agree that joint military and political commissions should discuss details to implement agreement “in shortest possible delay”. Souvanna had proposed in his draft that implementation itself be carried out “before end of October”. This deadline turned down by Souphanouvong.

Comment: French adviser opined this document like similar previous ones will probably remain deadletter. Nevertheless I feel we should have our views made known to Phoui and probably Katay before document is published thereby becoming another milestone in RLGPL negotiations. Understand from French adviser Souvanna willing to change text if Cabinet members so desire.

[Page 989]

Phoui reported to have arrived Hong Kong but Foreign Office unable give ETA Vientiane. Will see him at first opportunity. In view source information, I am at present limited in what I can tell him but would appreciate Department’s views, if possible, in time for meeting.

Bacon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1657. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
  2. Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.
  3. A translation of the proposed communiqué is contained in telegram 614 from Vientiane, October 20, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–2057)
  4. This phrase was included in telegram 523 from Vientiane, October 4, to which telegram 558 from Vientiane, October 10 referred. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–457 and 751J.00/10–1057, respectively)