Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

455. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, July 5, 1957—4 p.m.

29. Reference: Paris telegram 6628 to Department.² Following comments on UK, French policy Laos as seen from here:

1. UK. It apparent for some time Foreign Office and Holliday have been searching for some more positive line of action than one which they willingly followed with us to prevent disastrous accommodation to PL. Search stepped up after Souvanna fell May 29 as indicated by British approaches to US London, Washington and here on degree our future flexibility re coalition etc. On at least one occasion Holliday has said that almost all Lao will in end prefer measure of coalition to divided country; key questions are safeguards and order of events in realizing reunification.… (I interjected goal was broader, defense of country’s vital interests which opposite of Communists objectives if they entered government.) It was clear to both of us I think that such difference top priorities could under a new stauncher government lead to some divergence in our local attitudes. A difference in our current assessment also leads to same possibility.

Holliday feels … that time is on side PL. I contested this on both broad and specific grounds. I recalled he had found much uneasiness in south Laos. However, Communists had been at work for quite a while whereas, positive efforts on our side activated only lately (although plans initiated year ago). One could hope for considerable impact from:

(a) Civic action whose first teams now in field,

(b) Operation Brotherhood which treats 50,000 patients a month (many repeaters),

(c) Campaign identify ANL with peoples,

(d) Growing effectiveness of certain security agencies.

In addition to this in past few months US aid had become visible and tangible and no doubt Holliday had noticed we had lost no opportunity draw attention to this through ceremonies which got publicity, pamphlets, etc. Holliday agreed this latter effort had had impact.

In light foregoing while I agree with Paris telegram view that British seeking more flexibility and will urge it on us, I do think any serious divergence in action here is likely in near future; if we get another weak government divergence is unlikely. On Petsarath, Holliday fully agrees with us. … I should add that I refrained from telling Holliday about our four step statement (Embtel 2077³) on terms for ultimate acquiescence in limited former PL participation in RLG. Instead I reiterated that having contributed to defeat coalition under Souvanna we were not going make policy commitment prematurely and run risk of abetting revival such policy under him or anyone else and so would await developments which we would examine on their merits. Finally I said we did not and would not acquiesce in idea of divided Laos but it obviously dangerous to hurry too much in dealing with Communists. I said we must combat notion which may have been deliberately disseminated by others than Communists that US views permanent division of Laos with equanimity.

2. France. As Embtel 2213⁴ indicated French policy in action here quite different from UK and also apparently from that which Quai d’Orsay thinks it is (not for first time either). French here have tendency to choose and support individual. Family influence and ties render junior branch Royal family especially attractive to them in view (a) Souvanna’s half-French wife and extensive connections and commitments in France, (b) Petsarath’s French son-in-law (Parizot). As they rationalize situation, it is worth taking some chances in order to remain on inside in position of influence which will also facilitate retention certain special status for French here. More important, French do not fear admitting PL as much as we do. They do not contest Souvanna line (and may have in some measure inspired it) that once PL brought under RLG sovereignty RLG can do what it will with them. Hence easier rather than more difficult prevent subversion after coalition for which they too want some safeguard.

Lebel’s thesis that standing pat likely build pressures for extreme accommodation to PL is new to us. Despite irritation with merit our firmness engenders, it is in my view more likely stimulate caution and search for middle ground than recklessness. French emphasize far more than we ability leader like Petsarath bring order out of chaos and dominate populace. If PL were ordinary rebel I might agree but French seem overlook or discount their status as arm albeit not most efficient arm of international Communist movement which will not be dissuaded from goal by any individual, particularly on [by?] one who was taken in to degree Petsarath apparently was in visiting Sam Neua. This is not to say we, and French, should not continue try educate Petsarath.

I agree with final paragraph reference telegram in its emphasis on need stress “positive” elements our program. Economic development and at grass roots as emphasized by French too is an urgent must. A constructive position on currency problem would be major contribution to this end although we can probably expect rough going from some of leaders who now profit from situation and would again after a devaluation in precisely same manner.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–557. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. Document 453.
3. Document 447.
4. Dated June 27, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2757)