Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

454. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 28, 1957.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Implications of Lao Cabinet Crisis

Although the situation in Laos does not require any immediate U.S. decisions, I believe developments there to be so important that I am informing you of them beforehand in preparation for action which may soon have to be taken.

To the problem of the Pathet Lao has been added a Cabinet crisis in which Lao Government policy toward the Pathet Lao is a highly important issue. This complicated political situation presents the following policy problems for the United States:

1. Need of a strong, effective government: Of the two principal problems confronting Laos (a political settlement with the Pathet Lao and economic and social development), the Royal Government has always seemed to expend a disproportionate amount of energy on the Pathet Lao issue almost to the exclusion of the advancement of the ten provinces presently under Government control. The problem is to find a man who could handle negotiations with the Pathet Lao without making dangerous concessions and at the same time provide leadership for civic action, the efficacious utilization of American aid (about which there is increasing criticism in Laos), monetary reform, and other internal ills besetting Laos. If such a man does not soon come to power, Laos will drift toward pro-Communist neutralism under a weak leader, or will be steered that way by a “strong man” such as Prince Petsarath, who possesses drive and leadership but whose advocacy of accommodation to Laos’ Communist neighbors is decidedly dangerous.

2. Whom to support: Despite our desire in principle not to play personal politics, it has become necessary to support in discreet fashion an anti-Communist leader in Laos. We had backed Katay, since he is pro-American, anti-Communist, and one of the strongest personalities in Laos. He knows the political value of bringing tangible benefits to the Lao masses, and could be expected to utilize American aid more effectively.

Katay’s failure to form a government has thrown the question open once again. The only other promising candidate from our point of view is Phoui, leader of the second largest party and Katay’s temporary ally. We hope some arrangement under which either Katay or Phoui becomes Prime Minister can be worked out. We must in any event do what we can to keep out pro-Communist Bong (who is currently trying to form a government but who is expected to fail), Prince Petsarath, and outgoing Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma (not pro-Communist but a push-over for the Pathet Lao).

If a pro-Western candidate comes to power, the U.S. should get behind him by putting all programs in Laos on a “crash” basis.

3. Coalition government including the Communists: You will recall that in our letter of November 13, 1956 to Prime Minister Souvanna we stated we might be obliged to reappraise our political and economic policies in Laos if the Lao Government took certain steps, and cited Pathet Lao participation in a coalition government as one example of such steps. Since then the Lao Assembly has approved Royal Government-Pathet Lao agreements on, among other things, eventual Pathet Lao entry into the Cabinet. It seems likely that any Prime Minister will have to include this eventuality in his program.

We may thus soon be faced once again with the necessity to take a position on coalition. We need not now decide publicly on our stand in a completely hypothetical situation, but we should privately be prepared to be flexible if a strong anti-Communist becomes Prime Minister. Ambassador Parsons shares this view. We may wish at some future time tacitly to accept coalition (that is, we would not reduce or withdraw our aid) if 1) the Pathet Lao were integrated into the National Army under an adequate control system, 2) the Government’s administration were actually restored in the two provinces, and 3) the Government was in such command of the situation that Pathet Lao entry into the Cabinet did not represent a material increase in Communist subversive potential because their ability to maneuver under the foregoing conditions would be so thoroughly circumscribed. We would not, however, openly shift our policy on coalition, if at all, until the Pathet Lao had fulfilled the foregoing conditions. We have succeeded in preventing disastrous developments under Souvanna by standing firm against coalition and do not wish to lose ground by a premature or unnecessary change.

4. U.S. aid in FY 1958: In order to stave off dangerous concessions to the Pathet Lao under Souvanna, we have repeatedly stated that we might be obliged to reappraise our political and economic policies toward Laos if, for example, the Pathet Lao were included in the Government. Fear of a cut in American aid has been an effective deterrent on otherwise foolhardy Lao leaders, and they have not taken the dangerous steps we have so diligently tried to prevent. (Ambassador Parsons and his staff in Vientiane have done an excellent job of pointing out to the right people at the right time the dangers of coalition to Lao independence and U.S. support.)

This means that if Katay or another anti-Communist comes to power we must maintain the FY 1958 aid level to the greatest extent possible within the overall MSP funds available. A cut, even though the result of the Congress’s economy drive, would be interpreted by the Lao as politically motivated. If we reduce our aid to Laos when they have not yielded to Pathet Lao pressures, we deprive ourselves of our major weapon in the coming battles to keep up Lao resistance against Communist enticements.

5. Pathet Lao hostilities: To influence the Lao Government to accept a settlement on Communist terms, the Pathet Lao have for the past two months stepped up isolated military incidents in the two provinces, and their delegation in Vientiane uses the threat of military action to intimidate Lao Assembly delegates. If a strongly anti-Pathet Lao Prime Minister comes to power, this form of military pressure may be expected to increase. We believe the Communists do not intend to launch a major offensive. Nevertheless, military incidents even of a relatively modest scale might lead to the possibility of a Lao Government appeal to some international body for support.

6. Appeal to the United Nations: In recent months responsible Lao leaders have increasingly referred to a resort to the United Nations to settle the Pathet Lao problem if bilateral negotiations became stalemated and the Geneva machinery yielded no results. The King’s Council communiqué of June 4² and Katay’s declaration in his investiture attempt [speech]³ made official mention of the possibility. We do not know what mechanism the Lao Government would use, but consider that at best the Lao Government would gain merely a propaganda victory for its position. If the Lao do indeed call upon the United Nations, they will undoubtedly expect support from us.

As the foregoing indicates, we are in an extremely fluid and unsatisfactory situation, but if a tough, anti-Communist leader becomes Prime Minister we may be given the first real opening in over a year to move ahead to assist the Lao Government in undertaking a broad-scale political and economic action program. If such a leader does not appear, the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Laos will be more difficult.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2857. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and cleared by Kocher, Young (in draft), and Jones. A marginal note on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw this memorandum.
2. A summary is in telegram 2065 from Vientiane, June 5, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–557)
3. See footnote 2, Document 450.