Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

453. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, June 26, 1957—4 p.m.

6628. Re Deptel 5186.²

1. We met with UK and French representatives at Quai d’Orsay afternoon June 24 for informal exchange of views concerning Laos.

2. Lebel opened discussion by stressing informal and unofficial nature of meeting. French then developed thesis:

(a) Present policy of US–UK–France in opposition to coalition is negative one and appears to Lao to run at cross purposes to universal Lao desire for peace and reunification.

(b) Continuing to stand pat and emphasized dangers of coalition may result in build up public pressures to point where Lao, in reaction, may eventually go too far in accommodation with PL.

(c) Time no longer working for us but for PL.

(d) While attention RLG and Army concentrated on two northern provinces, Pathet Lao is making quiet progress in remaining ten,

3. UK … spoke along following lines:

(a) UK Ambassador in recent trip had noted “malaise” in loyal provinces, but idea that Pathet Lao making gains was “news” to British.

(b) UK agrees with French time no longer on our side but working in favor of PL.

(c) UK believes “something like coalition” inevitable eventually. Problem is to concentrate on obtaining necessary safeguards. Should prior conditions be met, three powers would have no grounds for objection. UK doubts Lao willing face division indefinitely.

(d) Three powers must preserve common front in Laos. However, our public attitudes should clearly be in favor of reunification.

4. US representatives pointed out Lao situation currently very fluid and we see no present grounds for change in western policy. We are limiting ourselves at this time vis-à-vis Laotians to urging strong government committed to maintaining security and independence of Laos. It is true there is predominant sentiment in Laos in favor of reunification and probably growing weariness with warfare in north. However, we believe there is still strong feeling among politically articulate Laotians against accepting reunification on PL terms and against coalition at least until certain conditions are met. We believe western powers should continue to use their influence to support this feeling. To condone coalition lest PL otherwise extend influence in ten provinces would be unreasonable since coalition would merely facilitate their doing exactly this. We do not believe coalition is by any means inevitable. We have seen no evidence PL will accept any terms which will not threaten security of Laos and we still hope Lao Government can be formed which will not accept such terms. Continued separation of two provinces is certainly preferable to Communist control of all Laos. We believe RLG, while continuing to seek reunification, should concentrate main energies on developing and securing ten provinces through effective economy, information and police programs.

5.… requesting that his words not be repeated back to him as “UK proposal”—which it was not—raised question whether “neutralization” of Laos might persuade Chinese and Soviet Communists relinquish Communist control of northern provinces. Both French and US took dim view of this line, which was dropped.

6. It was agreed by all three that Petsarath, who was leaning toward PL before his return to Laos, is leaning further now, was impressed by PL achievements in two provinces, and would be dangerous Prime Minister.

7. Meeting concluded with plea …, echoed by all, that three powers maintain close and friendly cooperation Laos and not permit any appearance of difference among them.

Comment: It was obvious that French and British are inclined to push for “more flexible” policy and particularly to prepare us for “inevitability” of coalition. We were surprised British went so far in this direction. While they did not seriously contest our arguments, we doubt that they were convinced, except of fact that we are not yet prepared to shift our position. Common view on Petsarath and particularly on necessity of maintaining solid tripartite front vis-à-vis Laotians were positive factors. Nevertheless French and British positions are obviously softening and we should recommend, if we wish to hold them in line, continued vigorous US missionary work in Vientiane, Washington, London and Paris. In order to convince French and British it may be necessary to give more emphasis to “positive” elements our program, such as intention to proceed more rapidly with economic development.

Houghton

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, priority to Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. In telegram 5186 to Paris, June 22, the Department reversed its opposition to Yost’s participation in tripartite talks on Laos as described in telegram 6628. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–2257)