358. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1560. In interview June 4 I gave Crown Prince U.S. Government views on discussed Pekin invitation.
Savang said at outset his dearest personal wish would be turn down invitation flat but he did not see how this could be. I agreed and reminded him, when possibility of invitation discussed in recent [Page 770] past, our counsel had been that internal Lao problem should be settled before making State visit to Communist neighbors. Prime Minister moreover had not long ago stated his position that Pathet Lao matter was internal and must be solved without external intervention; once that settled, Lao might visit neighbors to discuss matters proper to neighbors (Embtel 14002). In my government’s views this was still only proper course, and we urged that in its reply to Pekin, RLG take such position: that RLG was sensible [?] to invitation but was occupied with internal problems which must be solved first. I added RLG might consider asking ChiCom help solve PL dispute through influence Hanoi.
Prince agreed this was proper approach, though RLG could not word it so concretely as to mention PL by name, let alone suggest Chinese help with solution. Chou En-lai letter had been courteous and general and spoke of nothing specific. I agreed allusion to internal problems would be clear and should suffice: important thing was to delay long as possible, in order obtain PL solution at least in principle before going Pekin. We felt matter of timing most important: that other side offer satisfactory terms of settlement before visit undertaken. If RLG went without this it would be trip to Canossa, and even if ChiCom did arrange solution Lao would be obligated and Chinese Communists would have foot in door. If on other hand RLG held out for satisfactory PL offer before going, it would go as equal to discuss matters proper to sovereign neighbors. As for what were satisfactory terms, these were three conditions agreed between Prince and Yost (Embtel 10993). Savang recalled these well.
Prince agreed it would be fine be able go to Pekin so fortified but saw no prospect of PL solution without assist from chairmen which unlikely. RLG must stick to Jan 7 principles, and PL ignored these not only when came from ICC but in both Souphannavong letters to Souvanna. I said nevertheless PL were on defensive and apparently wanted come to terms; RLG policy of firmness was paying off. I argued if ChiCom wanted Laos come to Peking they would instruct PL come to terms. Prince did not buy this, thought on contrary ChiCom would hold up solution so they could take credit; this was doubtless why Communists had stalled London decision. I mentioned in passing we heard there was still hope of something not unfavorable from co-chairmen. Prince interested but skeptical; in any case RLG had agreed to British request make no move till word from co-chairmen received.
Prince saw nothing to be gained from Souvanna-Souphannavong meeting but was not opposing it. I launched into arguments against [Page 771] Sam Neua as locus but had no need go far. Prince agreed and said he had vetoed that.
Comment: Wherever pertinent during interview I advised strongly against precipitous action, not only in planning departure but in making reply to Chou. In my view latter may possibly be deferred till return from Singapore and closure assembly (June 15) but not much longer. Travel plans are as yet vague but Prince like Souvanna speaks of late August or September: in each case my rejoinder has been “or even later.” I doubt however we can count on indefinite deferment. Pegging departure to PL solution is stopgap at best, as prospects for quick solution appear slim and Lao are afraid to hold off ChiCom indefinitely. We shall however continue press this position as strongly and as long as possible.
Crown Prince is under no illusions re true nature and implications of invitation. He himself brought up dangers of Communist promises which are only promises, made with aim eventually drawing Laos into neutrality and what goes with it.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/6–556. Secret. Repeated to London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩
- Dated April 30, not printed. (Bid., 751J.00/4-3056)↩
- See footnote 5, Document 356.↩