356. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

1236. Vientiane’s 1529 repeated New Delhi 158 Bangkok 759 Saigon 346 Phnom Penh 128.2 We fear during Lao visit Peiping Chinese Communists may cleverly not demand concessions (such as pledge reduce U.S. influence i.e. aid) of which Lao would be wary. They may as in case Cambodia3 omit all mention American assistance and simply seek recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives, perhaps offering economic aid, thus luring Laos into Communist orbit in return for totally unenforceable promise nonintervention internal affairs Laos and good offices settlement dispute with Pathets.

We therefore would hope prevent or measurably delay Souvanna visit Peiping. To that end request you make strong statement to Lao officials urging in replying ChiCom invitation they take position internal Lao problems should be settled before state visits neighboring countries; could ChiComs in view their influence with Viet Minh help resolve dispute with Pathets?

Lao may respond this suggestion with assertion best means settling Pathet problem is talk directly with largest state in area possessing power direct Viet Minh and Pathets come to terms. In this event recommend you use arguments set forth Department’s 917 to Vientiane repeated New Delhi 2167 pouched other addressees,4 particularly imperative necessity 1) RLG lay down three conditions earlier recommended by Embassy Vientiane for settlement Pathet problem5 [Page 768] and 2) Communists present satisfactory terms settlement for discussion before Lao Prime Minister travels Peiping or other Communists held territory. Suggest you also counsel Lao no necessity make new commitments to Communists, especially on matters already covered in Geneva Accords.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/5–2956. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared in PSA and by Yost in draft, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to New Delhi, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, Paris, and London.
  2. Document 354.
  3. Regarding Prince Sihanouk’s visit to Peking, February 1956, see Document 225.
  4. The gist of these arguments set forth in telegram 917, March 2, was that Lao officials should not visit Peking at all, but if they insisted, they should not do so until the Pathet Lao presented satisfactory terms for a political settlement in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 651J.93/2–2856)
  5. The three conditions, according to telegram 1099 from Vientiane, February 29, were immediate restoration of Royal administration in the two northern provinces, reintegration of the Pathet Lao into the national community on the Royal Government’s terms, and the right of the Royal Government to continue to solicit foreign aid for the defense and welfare of Laos. (Ibid., 651J.93/2–2856)