Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

357. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 5, 1956—11 a.m.

1559. Reference Department telegram 1236.² Since existence Pekin invitation mentioned Lao Presse (Embassy telegram 1546³) bulk of reporting will be secret. Succeeding message 15604 refers. Following part of Crown Prince June⁴ interview touches on top secret subject.

During discussion Savang reverted to his first and foremost preoccupation, Laos lack of concrete assurances of western aid in case of emergency need. If PL refused meet RLG terms, answer was to continue guerrilla pressure, slowly but always forward. RLG however, without real assurance of backstopping, lacked confidence to pursue this line. This lack would be telling factor in Pekin visit. It was all very well for Mohammed Ali to go there; Pakistan was in SEATO, and strong in own right.⁵ But Laos would go defenseless, with nothing to fall back on and vulnerable to suasion toward neutrality. RLG had nothing but our “moral promises”. French had sold Laos down river at Geneva in question of defense, were themselves on downgrade and less and less interested in Laos.

I disputed this without much real effect. Again assured Prince our promise of support was valid, we were firmly behind Laos and had no intent on abandoning her. Moreover, French were now reenforcing Seno Base, which we considered key element for emergency outside aid. I asked what further assurances Prince had in mind. He considered briefly and said: Defensive agreement with Thailand, guaranteed by US. Such agreement, between neighbors, was “permissible”. He planned broach matter with Phibun during Bangkok stop on Singapore trip; it was for this he had asked King include stopover. I asked how we could be of further assistance. Prince said he would speak with Prime Minister and let me know.

Comment: Appears Crown Prince has put ball in our court. Impossible as it seems, especially in brief time available, to line up Thailand and find formula for US guarantee, a concrete gesture now might make all the difference. If we cannot prevent Lao going to Pekin there is at least possibility considerably stiffening them by strengthening their hand with confidence-giving hole card. Crown Prince does not necessarily speak for RLG but he and Souvanna between them can almost certainly bring Lao into line if given possibility of doing so.

Strongly urge Department and Embassy Bangkok make effort hit on simple basic formula to meet requirements of situation. As for Thailand, although they have lagged in matter of staff talks, implications of Pekin visit should help stimulate them.

While we must wait Prime Minister’s approach to know just what Savang and he have in mind, I understand Prince wants agreement signed before RLG goes to Pekin so it cannot be disavowed. Failing concrete agreement we should at least try give Lao something in writing from Secretary and Phibun.

Blancké

1. Source: Department of State, Central files, 033.51J93/6–656. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. Dated June 2, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/6–256)
4. Infra.
5. No record of a visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammed Ali to the People’s Republic of China prior to June 5 has been found. Ali’s successor, H.S. Suhrawardy, did make a State visit to Peking in October 1956.