Office of the Historian

359. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State1

Washington, June 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Personal Message to Crown Prince Savang of Laos

Discussion

1.
For some time we have anticipated a ChiCom effort to have Lao leaders visit Peiping following the example set by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. The Embassy at Vientiane has repeatedly warned Prince Souvanna Phouma, Katay, and the Crown Prince of the dangers and pitfalls of such a trip.2 Chou En-lai has now come through with a formal invitation to Prince Souvanna Phouma who seems inclined to accept. No serious opposition to such a trip seems likely to [Page 772] arise within the Lao Government. It would be difficult if not impossible to prevent this trip from coming off. Meanwhile, Prince Souvanna Phouma seems disposed to accept a second invitation to meet with his half brother Souphanouvong, the Lao leader in Communist Pathet Lao territory. The recent activities of Australian Communist Burchett in Vientiane indicate that some degree of covert contact has already been established between the Royal Government on the one hand and the Pathet Lao, the Viet Minh, and perhaps the Chinese Communists on the other.
2.
In discussing the Peiping invitation with our Chargé at Vientiane on July 5,3 Crown Prince Savang brought up the question of the lack of concrete assurances of Western aid in case of emergency need and bluntly stated Laos had nothing but American “moral promises”. He declared the Royal Government without real assurances of backstopping lacked the confidence needed to pursue a line of continued pressure against the Pathet Lao. He added this same lack of confidence would be a telling factor in any Lao visit to Peiping. He spoke of additional assurances in the form of a “defensive agreement with Thailand guaranteed by the United States” and said he planned to broach the matter with Phibun shortly.
3.
We are exploring several courses of action with other Government agencies in Washington. These include the possibility of intensifying Thai-Lao military planning with the possibility of U.S. participation; possibility of establishing a SEATO watchdog committee for Laos or for arranging a visit to Laos by representatives of SEATO powers to plan with Lao officials defense against sudden attack; examination with ICA the formulation (but not financing) of aid projects on a two, three, or four-year basis in order to convince the Lao of our intention to continue to support them; taking advantage of the Katay visit to convince him of the effectiveness of U.S. assurances and to strengthen his will to resist ChiCom and Pathet Lao overtures; the possibility of having Senator Mansfield initiate a congressional expression of interest in the defense of Laos and of reaffirmation of the importance of American aid to Laos on a continuing basis.
4.
A personal message from you to the Crown Prince reaffirming assurances which you gave him in your conversation of February 27, 1955,4 and in your personal message of March 15, 1956,5 would be [Page 773] very useful in view of the uneasiness which Savang has just expressed to our Chargé at Vientiane.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached telegram.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/6-756. Secret. Drafted by Corcoran and cleared in SEA and by MacArthur.↩
  2. See telegram 1560 from Vientiane, supra. A report of Blancké’s discussion with Katay on June 4 concerning the dangers of the Peking invitation is in telegram 1562 from Vientiane, June 6; a similar conversation with Souvanna Phouma on June 5 reported in telegram 1564 from Vientiane, also June 6, neither printed. (Ibid., 033.51J93/6-656 and 751J.00/6-656, respectively)↩
  3. Reported in Document 357. The meeting with Savang took place on June 4, not July 5.↩
  4. See Document 277.↩
  5. See Document 346.↩
  6. Sent as telegram 1260 to Vientiane, Document 361.↩