Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Washington, November 27, 1955—8 a.m.

647. Reference: Deptels 442² and 462.³

1. Defense Minister assured me again this morning that RG and ANL have no plan or intention to take any military action except in response to Pathet-Viet initiative. He maintains PL are preparing offensive which he believes might occur either shortly before elections or in January. He continues express confidence that, if attacked, ANL could reoccupy large part of two provinces, if Viets do not intervene in force. He claims however time working in RG favor since auto-defense organization in two provinces constantly improving and PL morale declining. He therefore does not wish to precipitate events.

I did not refer specifically to operation suggested by USARMA since I did not wish to indicate further US interest in it at this time. I believe it can be stated definitely however that no operation of this kind will be undertaken at least until after elections. This judgment is based not only on Minister Defense’s assurance but on fact Katay and Crown Prince not expected to return to Vientiane before December 25 and operation this magnitude and significance would not be launched without their joint consideration and approval. Nevertheless I shall ask Gordon, upon his return from Bangkok tomorrow, to make clear to Sounthone his suggestion was purely personal and does not have Embassy concurrence at this time.

2. I hope that in light of these precautions Department will see fit to authorize CAT contract as recommended Embtel 644.⁴ If PL should launch sudden offensive, absence of adequate airlift could have disastrous results. Moreover I believe dependence of RG on CAT support will give us increased leverage to block any large-scale operation of which we disapprove.

3. Defense Minister today confirmed my surmise that, while RG is continuing military negotiations with PL at ICC behest, it has no intention of accepting fixed demarcation line or neutral zone unless and until there appears to be real prospect of acceptable political settlement.

4. As to ANL capabilities, USARMA has for some time believed that their build up in two provinces, plus development auto-defense, gives them substantial edge over present PL forces and supports firm RG judgment they could, if adequate airlift available, reoccupy major centers in two provinces within thirty days. As previously reported, General O’Daniel was convinced ANL could take Sam Neua town and that possession airstrip there would greatly increase its capability to occupy remainder of province. USARMA will report more fully on these matters.⁵

5. Re likelihood Viet intervention, we do not consider situation has changed essentially since Secretary’s visit Vientiane last February. Particularly if RG is careful not to initiate military action but merely to respond vigorously to PL attacks, we doubt that Viets would intervene overtly or on large-scale. Increased infiltration would certainly occur but, if ANL advance took place as rapidly as expected, it could occupy provincial centers before additional Viet strength could make itself felt. (This assumes such strength not already in state of preparedness in conjunction with possible PL offensive, of which however we have no evidence.) Present situation in two provinces would then be reversed with ANL holding major part and PL fringes. Even if Viets should intervene in sufficient force to throw back ANL, we doubt very much they would pursue beyond limits two provinces. Most unfavorable result would thus be total loss two provinces, which almost certain in any case if no action is taken. Moreover Viets would have been obliged to drop veil and openly take over two provinces, which would substantially weaken their credit with other Asians. Actually, as morale PL rank and file declines and more defections occur, Viets will in any case be obliged increase their forces in Laos if two provinces are to be held.

6. On other hand, we must recognize Indians, Canadians, British and French all strongly opposed to military action by RG and suspicious of its intentions. They will continue to advise RG refrain from military action unless attacked even if this means loss of two provinces, and are likely, as they did last March, to make very strong representations if hostilities seem imminent.

7. It seems to us, particularly in light Soviet behavior at latest Geneva conference and ChiCom line re Laos reported Hong Kong’s 1072 to Department,⁶ any prospect of satisfactory political settlement ruled out for foreseeable future. Only slim hope would be strong Indian démarche to Peking, which also seems practically out of question. It would therefore appear only possibility of recovering two provinces and eliminating PL territorial base would be by military action. Otherwise we are almost certain to be confronted, as Pearson says, with “five Indochinese states.” Unfortunately our allies seem increasingly reconciled to this situation.

8. Despite difficulties and risks, we believe there is reasonable prospect partition of Laos can be avoided by prompt resolute action and security whole of Southeast Asia thereby reinforced. At present situation is not analogous to Germany, Korea, and Vietnam though in course of time, if let slide, it is almost certain to become so. We therefore recommend: (a) Continuing to advise RG not to initiate military action in such way as to put itself in the wrong, (b) Not discouraging RG from its present intention after the elections, if no political settlement is in prospect, to respond to PL attacks by taking the offensive, (c) Very discreetly to assist RG to prepare for such action, and (d) To take line with British, French, Canadians, etc., that we are urging RG not to take military offensive but would not feel justified in advising them not to resist with all means at their disposal if attacked. In last connection it could be pointed out the better RG is able to resist attacks the less likely SEATO would have to become involved.

9. In line this proposed policy I should reluctantly have to discourage, at least at this time, operation suggested by USARMA. I should, however, welcome brief detail to his staff of CINCPAC officer who could assist in assessing ANL capabilities and in advising us and them re conduct any operations which they may contemplated and we may favor. “USARMA will shortly make more specific recommendation this respect.”⁷

10. Also I should urge promptly proceeding with CAT arrangements proposed Embtel 644. It seems in any case absolutely essential to enable ANL to meet likely PL offensive, whether or not we desire counter-offensive to take place.

11. We leave to Department’s judgment repetition this message wherever seems appropriate.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11–2755. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the end of the source text indicates this telegram was repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.
2. Printed as telegram 1593 to Bangkok, Document 320.
3. Supra.
4. In telegram 644, November 26, the Embassy suggested that the Royal Government of Laos negotiate a standby contract with CAT. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11–2655)
5. Apparent reference to ARMA MC 99–55, November 26, in which the Attaché in Vientiane reported that Pathet Lao battalions were encountering difficulties in maintaining strength above 75 percent in the face of a constant trickle of deserters and defectors and that 25 percent of their forces was required for transport and guard duty given increasing local resistance. In general, the attaché believed Pathet Lao morale to be at its lowest since July and Lao National Army morale to be good. The only problem the Attaché foresaw was the Lao Army’s total dependence on air resupply by the French. With assured airlift, concentration, and noninterference by the Viet Minh in North Vietnam, the attaché believed that the Lao National Army could drive out or destroy the Pathet Lao. (Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 266, Army–Navy Messages, 1955)
6. In telegram 1072, November 24, the Consulate at Hong Kong summarized strident commentary in the Chinese People’s Daily of November 22 in which the commentator attacked the United States for instigating the Royal Lao Government to contravene the Geneva Accords on Laos. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–2455)
7. In telegram MC 101–55 from Vientiane, November 28, Gordon recommended with Yost’s concurrence that the possibility of an airborne raid on Pathet Lao munition depots should be studied by a qualified airborne officer because it provided the only real opportunity of destroying Pathet Lao military forces in northern Laos without engaging in painful, lengthy, and expensive jungle warfare. (Ibid., 751J.5/11–2855)