Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, November 18, 1955—10:09 a.m.

1593. Bangkok 1275 repeated Vientiane 244 CINCPAC unnumbered;² Vientiane 574 repeated Bangkok 397 CINCPAC unnumbered.³ We fully agree desirability beginning joint Thai-Lao military staff planning soonest, chiefly for substantial psychological benefit two countries directly involved. Defense planning patently cannot effectively be undertaken in single units; Thai-Lao coordination would encourage feeling solidarity and later fit into broader SEATO strategy.

We therefore concur 1) Embassy Bangkok and JUSMAG first discuss general idea with Thai Government, to be followed by Vientiane approach to Lao Government; 2) small-scale training Lao technicians in Thailand; 3) informing French as soon as Lao Government has agreed to project.

In response almost inevitable Thai use SEATO gambit obtain U.S. commitment on forces, we believe to your argument urgency Lao problem might be added fact Thai-Lao planning and SEATO planning not mutually exclusive and it highly probable bilateral product would eventually be integrated into over-all Southeast Asia strategy.

We cannot at this time make commitment to Thais on U.S. logistic support and military advice in forward strategy planning. Defense does not wish take decision before receipt CINCPAC comments. We do not however see that absence CINCPAC views and possible subsequent JCS consideration need delay initiation Thai-Lao planning. If Thai raise matter logistic support, you might reiterate U.S. unable give blanket commitment logistic support before knowing feasibility plans and magnitude program and that requirements rising from Thai-Lao planning must be considered in light worldwide demands and level appropriations from Congress. Nonetheless U.S. membership SEATO presupposes strong concern in defense of area.

It appears to us advantages planning to both Thai and Lao military for getting project under way even without answers all possible questions. While both parties have natural desire know exact extent U.S. protection, neither has right put price on joint planning designed for their own good.

With respect possible Lao National Army action suppress Pathets (Vientiane 574), we recognize harmful effects on morale of constant restraint Army when Lao have clearly just case. Nevertheless we continue agree your estimate Army could not clean out provinces alone and would undoubtedly provoke Viet Minh infiltration if attempted do so. General reluctance most Manila Pact members commit ground forces Indochina will make it exceedingly difficult obtain their concrete support in event any hostilities Laos, but if such hostilities result from Royal Government initiative foreign support virtually impossible. In these circumstances failure Lao Government restrain Army would be dangerous Laos and free world. Since we cannot encourage and do not wish unnecessarily discourage Lao Government, we should perhaps remain silent this score for present.

Defense concurs without prejudice subsequent CINCPAC and/or JCS views.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11–455. Top Secret. Drafted by Byrne and cleared in PSA, FE, and with the Department of Defense in draft. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Document 318.
3. Supra.