324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1
2269. As step in direction providing Laos with foreign military assistance in event aggression and for substantial psychological benefit foreseen, U.S. has suggested initiation joint Thai-Lao military staff planning. Such planning will be defensive in character with eventual aim permitting Thai forces by mutual consent to move if necessary into Lao territory to block Communist offensive. View scarcity Lao officers and fact Lao Army organized on French system, training in Thailand would be limited small number Lao technicians. While talks would at first be on bilateral basis, it logical expect resultant plans would later be coordinated into broad SEATO strategy.
U.S. role presently confined getting Thailand Laos together in project normally undertaken as matter of course by neighboring countries and which this instance heretofore delayed only by peculiar political evolution in area. Although U.S. may eventually be required provide logistic support, no commitment will be made unless justified after review Thai-Lao plans. We are sensitive possibility Lao Government may be encouraged by contingent planning with Thai initiate military action against Pathets at time or in manner prospects success unfavorable, but believe it could be made sufficiently clear to Lao by Thais that Thai military support such circumstances not automatic but directed toward countering aggression.
Bangkok and Vientiane have ascertained respective Governments both receptive joint planning project. Lao have communicated formal request Thai Minister Vientiane and Phibun has requested Foreign Office views. Thai Foreign Office believes necessary first obtain SEATO approval in principle in order avoid possible resentment other members and anticipates some may consider combined planning breach Geneva Agreement or new irritant to Indians. Embassy Bangkok views these Thai reservations as at least partly motivated by desire involve U.S. directly in military planning.
[Page 707]Yost has informed French in Vientiane in order obtain support for planning which French military could hamstring if they so desired. French Political Counselor welcomed project but high-ranking Military Mission official chary, fearing contravention Geneva.2
Above for background Embassy Paris use if French raise.
For Bangkok: Suggest you tell Thais if you have not already done so that we informing French of project, explaining French assistance may be necessary in preparation certain aspects plans owing their continued backstopping Lao Army.
For Bangkok and Vientiane: We are repeating CINCPAC 222345Z November.3 Concur views therein with exception recommended presence CINCPAC representative during Thai-Lao discussions. We consider such proposal would probably be rejected for political reasons by two sovereign states. Moreover might unnecessarily involve U.S. and imply greater direct support than we now willing give. We therefore propose MAAG/Thailand and USARMA/Vientiane attempt keep U.S. informed through normal contacts. Copies any resultant Thai-Lao plans would be transmitted CINCPAC. Defense informed and requests CINCPAC’s views. Department also desires comments Bangkok Vientiane.
Re Bangkok 16204 and 16535 repeated Vientiane 314 and 318. Do not see any advantage but rather disadvantage informing SEATO this juncture proposed Thai-Lao contingent planning. Combined talks will get farther faster if not entangled at this time in SEATO political problems. Seems to us time consult SEATO would be when and if significant plans produced. Secretary has spoken along similar lines to Prince Wan.6
Request Bangkok inform Thais combined military planning clearly not violation either cease-fire agreement or Lao unilateral declaration at Geneva since would involve neither introduction foreign military personnel nor establishment bases Lao territory and would [Page 708] be purely defensive in nature. With respect Indian angle, Thais will recognize Indians, who strongly oppose SEATO, will be somewhat less annoyed if project presently confined bilateral basis than if it has SEATO blessing. We believe combined planning of great value and assume Thais share our view. On this assumption seems desirable Thailand avoid delay inevitably involved in obtaining SEATO prior approval and instead proceed soonest respond Lao request. Thai informing member Governments individually as proposed Bangkok 1653 would cover Thai rear but should be delayed until project clearly fait accompli. Resultant plans could be submitted military advisers and reference might also be made in Thai country report for March SEATO meeting. Imminence this meeting further counsels speed.
Suggest future telegrams this subject be repeated Paris if appropriate.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/12–1355. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by PSA, FE, and in draft by the Department of Defense; and approved by Robertson. Also sent to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.↩
- Reported in telegram 713 from Vientiane, December 8. (Ibid., 751J.5/12–855)↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 1620, December 8, the Embassy in Bangkok reported that Thai Under Secretary of State Dilokrit suggested that Thailand should inform SEATO of the proposed Thai-Lao contingency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/12–855)↩
- In telegram 1653, December 10, Dilokrit again raised the question of informing SEATO of Thai-Lao planning and suggested that other SEATO members would resent Thai failure to inform them of a “project such obvious concern to SEATO.” Dilokrit also pointed out that Great Britain and France might well regard the planning as in contravention of the Geneva Agreement and that a leak would provide a propaganda bonus or a pretext for aggression for the Communists. The Embassy believed that, although these Thai concerns might be sincere, Thais were motivated in their desire to involve SEATO by a wish to involve the United States in the proposed contingency planning. (Ibid., 751J.5/12–1055)↩
- See vol. XXII, p. 842.↩