Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 4, 1955—1 p.m.

1275. Reference: Deptel 1248, October 16, repeated Vientiane 283.² Discussions held November 1 and 2 by representatives JUSMAG, Embassies and Service Attachés Bangkok and Vientiane regarding proposed stimulation joint Thailand–Laos planning for Thailand forward military strategy. Following considerations and recommendations regarding method presentation submitted subject Ambassador Yost’s concurrence and/or comment:³

A. Timing and tactics in initial approach:

With Laos electoral campaign scheduled begin mid-November, and with break-off of RG–PL political negotiations anticipated at that time, it is politically and psychologically important that Laos Government be made aware as soon as possible of Thailand’s willingness to help (and U.S. support herefor) in case of developing trouble.

Discussion pointed up delicate problem whether Thailand or Laos Government should make first approach. Thailand initiative might be regarded with suspicion by Laos as indicative ambitions toward hegemony; on other Laos might be reluctant approach Thailand “hat in hand” for fear this would encourage Thailand place too high price on their cooperation. On balance, Laos approach to Thailand favored since Laos are most immediately menaced. However, we recognized that, if Laos should be reluctant break ice, procedure should be reversed and Embassy Bangkok would encourage Thailand Government to make first approach. In any event, it is important to ascertain Thailand receptivity before we discuss matter with Laos since Thailand rebuff, altho perhaps unlikely, would have unfortunate impact on Laos. Proposed procedure should also be explained to Thailand to ensure they do not make uncoordinated approach to Laos.

B. General assumptions regarding joint planning:

Planning cannot be predicated on any precise definition of military circumstances in which Thailand assistance would [be] requested. It can only be presumed that military situation would be getting out of hand, and that Laos would assert Geneva Agreements abrogated, thus opening door to Thailand assistance. However, desired objectives, both political and military, will not be achieved unless planning takes account of possible necessity substantial movement Thailand forces into Laos to counter large-scale Vietminh activity, which is chief concern Laos Government. Thailand Government should therefore be encouraged eventually to discuss problem with Laos in these terms as well as on basis modest assistance (e.g., one Regimental Combat Team), which may be initial disposition of Thailand.

Thailand will undoubtedly attempt draw U.S. into commitment provide forces, possibly by proposing matter be taken up initially or concurrently by SEACDT military advisors. We will, as instructed reftel, avoid giving and [any?] impression U.S. does or does not intend provide military forces. Appears our best counter to SEACDT gambit is argument matter in hand is urgent whereas SEACDT mechanism entails great delay; we not adverse to eventual consideration by SEACDT but urge joint Laos–Thailand contingent planning proceed without prejudice to such plans as SEACDT might develop.

While we hope be able persuade Thailand proceed without assurance of direct U.S. military support, question of U.S. logistical support will probably be unavoidable. Operation of substantial Thailand forces could not be undertaken effectively without U.S. logistic support and Thailand can be expected insist on indication our intentions in this regard before proceeding. Important therefore that we be in position inform Thailand, if necessary, that U.S. prepared give sympathetic consideration to question of logistic support for planning purposes in joint staff talks.

We recognize that planning on this basis runs risk of encouraging Laos, particularly irresponsible combat commanders, to trigger action against Pathet Laos. Vientiane may wish consider question of how such possibility can best be averted. However, we believe that, in approaching both Laos and Thailand, emphasis should be placed on importance getting joint staff planning underway and on contingent nature such plans; on appreciation fact that Thailand military aid to Laos (aside from training) and U.S. provision logistic support can be finally decided only at time emergency in light circumstances then obtaining.

We should also be able inform Thai that United States military advice in forward strategy planning can be made available. Assume that JUSMAG will receive directive through Defense channels to provide such advice if required, JUSMAG advice to be coordinated CINCPAC contingent planning.

C. Possibilities for training:

As long as Lao Army organized on French military system, Lao officers trained in Thailand would be unable transmit fruits of staff training to others, and could only gain general military background individually. View extreme scarcity Lao officers, such general training would not appear justified.

Relatively small-scale training by Thai of Lao technicians could however be offered, e.g., in ordnance and signal schools, particularly in use and maintenance United States equipment. Simple Thai training manuals for technicians could moreover be used in Laos. Thai Army could put on crash training program in technical fields for Lao trainees with JUSMAG assistance. This would have propaganda as well as practical advantages, and French should not be object to Thai training of individual technicians. Thai presumably would be happy to have Lao officers in Thailand for training, and there may have already been some discussion this matter with Lao (Vientiane’s 469 to Department⁴).

D. Position of French:

Question of French posture in general set-up was recognized as thorny, but one for consideration Washington and Embassy Vientiane. Since Lao unable go beyond first principles of military planning without French advisors, French would inevitably be involved. Although individual French advisors probably disposed be helpful, French Government reluctance become further involved in Indochina might motivate obstructionist tactics.

E. Recommendations:

We recommend that Department authorize Embassy Bangkok/JUSMAG and Vientiane proceed as follows:

1. Embassy Bangkok and JUSMAG to discuss general proposition with Thai Government to ensure Thai receptivity Lao approach.

(a) Explain that, if Thai agreeable, Embassy Vientiane prepared encourage Lao approach Thai Government, but that it may subsequently prove preferable reserve procedure.

(b) Inform Thai Government that United States military prepared assist Thai in planning forward strategy.

(c) Inform Thai Government, if necessary, that United States prepared give sympathetic consideration, in terms contingent planning, to Thai requirements for logistic support deployment and operation Thai forces in Laos.

(d) If Thai propose that planning be done by SEACDT rather than on bilateral basis, respond as indicated section B above.

2. If Thai receptivity established, Embassy Vientiane discuss matter with Lao Government with view to their approaching Thai to request staff talks re (a) what facilities Thai military establishment can now offer Lao and (b) development contingent plans for Thai military intervention and logistic support if requested by Lao Government. Inform Lao that Thai aware our proposals and are receptive; also that United States would give full support staff planning and training project.

F. Suggest Department repeat this message as well as reference telegram and Embassy telegram 856 to CINCPAC.⁵ Chief JUSMAG concurs.

Anschuetz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11–455. Top Secret. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
2. See Document 315.
3. According to telegram 552 from Vientiane, November 5, Yost concurred with the recommendations set forth in telegram 1275. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11–555)
4. In telegram 469, October 20, Yost reported that Souvanna Phouma informed him that the Royal Government intended to send a number of Lao officers to Thailand for training in the next year. (Ibid., 033.51J92/10–2055)
5. Document 310.