319. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
574. Reference: Bangkok 1275 to Department2 and our 552 repeated Bangkok 385.3 Re two problems mentioned our reference telegram:
- 1.
- We consider French would have to be informed of these plans immediately after they had been raised with Lao Government and latter had concurred. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for planning of this kind to be carried on by Lao General Staff without French being aware and, if not in agreement, creating difficulties. On other hand, if they are informed and are convinced through merely contingent planning to provide help in case of Viet-Pathet aggression, we believe they will agree and will cooperate. It is probable British should also be informed to forestall misunderstanding.
- 2.
- As Department is aware, there are, in connection with military situation two northern provinces, two closely related problems we must face: (1) How to aid and prepare RG to meet probable increase Viet-Pathet military pressure, aimed first at clearing ANL out of two provinces and perhaps later at infiltrating farther south; and (2) How to ensure that our aid does not encourage RG itself to initiate military action which we would consider rash or ill-advised. As to (1) two most important immediate steps we can take are contemplated provision additional air transport and facilitation Lao-Thai military [Page 699] planning and cooperation. As to (2), as we have reported, RG is already seriously contemplating military action to suppress Pathets in January or February. It would probably, though not certainly, be possible to forestall this action through concerted pressure principal SEATO powers, which British and French are very likely to exert in any case. Very serious question arises, however, whether, if all means of pacific settlement have failed, and pertinent provision of Geneva Agreements thus complied with, RG should be restrained from reasserting its rightful authority within its own territory by only means available, i.e., force of arms. To prevent it from doing so would be to undermine its faith in efficacy of SEATO and to weaken its morale and will to resist Communism, as well as to perpetuate serious security threat to SEA of course highly pertinent questions are (a) whether ANL capable of suppressing Pathets (b) whether, if attempts to do so were made, Vietnamese would intervene in force. These questions should be very carefully studied during next few weeks, and our policy coordinated with British and French to prevent conflicting advice be offered RG as occurred last March.
However, we believe these considerations should not prevent or delay Lao-Thai military planning. Our first responsibility, and that of SEATO, is to prepare to cope successfully with increased Viet-Pathets pressure in Laos which is all too likely. While such preparations will inevitably and rightly give Laotians increased confidence, they will also provide us with increased leverage for insisting on and enforcing caution on Lao part, if we deem caution to be necessary.