317. Letter From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Laos (Yost)1
Dear Charlie: …
The decision not to take up other matters with the Russians in Geneva probably came to you as quite a disappointment. The Secretary’s view was not based on the relative merits of any particular problem such as Laos or the Near East but on the sheer strain and difficulty of dealing adequately with non-agenda items during an international conference. However, we have prepared briefing papers which Doug MacArthur has in case the subject comes up with the British and French Foreign Ministers.
We are trying to do some long-range thinking here on what our policies should be with respect to the two principal problems: (1) recapturing control of the two northern provinces; and (2) maintaining the government’s control of the other ten provinces. Our first priority should be on the latter in case of doubt. I suppose this is much the same as Communist reaction; that is, preserve what you have and do not risk it in trying to get something you don’t have. As to the two northern provinces, I see no other choice but maintaining diplomatic pressure on the Communists to implement the Geneva agreement. So far as I am concerned the ICC approach has not only failed but has done a grave disservice in restraining and inhibiting a more forthright diplomatic and propaganda approach. I would very much appreciate your views and recommendations on a long-term policy for Laos.
On the economic side, it is gratifying that the railroad and ferry system between Laos and Thailand has been completed. We all hope this will reduce inflation and costs. As you know, there will be considerable pressure from Capitol Hill to cut back the aid programs, but we are confident we can maintain the level necessary for the attainment of U.S. objectives. With very best regards,
Sincerely,