Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

310. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, September 23, 1955—4 p.m.

856. Reference: Vientiane’s 328, September 20, repeated Bangkok 251.² Embassy has for some time been concerned with problem implicit reference telegram: Under what circumstances should US encourage Thailand (1) provide direct armed assistance in Laos, (2) plan for such contingency.

At recent briefing on Laos situation given by Army Commander-in-Chief Sarit³ and staff it was painfully apparent Thais have no practical plan providing assistance to Laos. Sarit personally favors forward strategy for Thai forces emphasizing he does not consider Mekong as effective barrier invasion Thailand. Previously Sarit had made it clear Thai would take dim view strategic withdrawal (“another Pusan”) from Thailand by SEACDT forces and that Thai have no desire retreat to Kra Isthmus for purpose “protecting Malaya for British”.

Other important members government, particularly Prime Minister, would under appropriate circumstances probably favor forward strategy. …

Embassy not competent comment possible military advantages which would seem derive from forward strategy by Thai in Laos. However, from political point view we consider vitally important maintain impression in minds of Thai, as well as Lao, that US and SEACDT will take strong measures in effort prevent military conquest of Laos by Pathet Laos/Viet Minh (open participation Red China would create entirely different situation). Failure do so would stimulate latent neutralist tendencies in Thailand. Capabilities for effective defense Thailand itself might thereby be seriously if not critically reduced.

From military point view Laos probably most difficult spot in treaty area in which honor commitments implied in Manila pact. Although Communist tactics in Laos probably subordinate to overall strategy international communism, possibilities undermining morale non-Communist nations this area as result Communist military conquest of Laos might under certain circumstances be tempting to Communist leadership.

In last analysis only practical source prompt armed assistance for Laos would be Thailand, US assistance probably being limited largely to air and logistic support. Consequently we inclined believe by encouraging and assisting Thai to plan forward strategy US would:

(1) Insure maximum readily available support to Laos. Moreover, Thai participation might be more easily obtained in early phases conflict when military threat to Laos and potential threat Thailand would probably appear be of relatively manageable proportions.

(2) End create impression in mind Thai and Laotians of US intention provide substantial support in event armed attack.

(3) Involve Thai Government and Thai national prestige in manner which would make it more difficult to defer or reconsider decision actively to resist armed Communist aggression against Thailand rather than seek accommodations with Red China and its satellites.

If we encourage bilateral Thai-Lao talks, Thai may, in order test US intentions, suggest their SEACDT “obligations” require such plans be coordinated only under SEACDT. This indicates problem might be met (a) by pointing out bilateral talks would be only on contingent basis and without prejudice such plans SEACDT might evolve, and (b) by fact Thai might well be attracted by opportunity extend Thai influence in Laos.

As possible approach this problem Embassy submits for consideration Department and Embassy Vientiane following program:

a. Thailand invite Laotians use Thai military training facilities in Thailand and provide Thai field manuals and training materials which have been developed with JUSMAG assistance.

b. Thai inform Laotian Government Thailand would sympathetically consider request from Lao for intervention Thai forces and for certain logistic support from Thailand in event emergency.

c. Thai-Lao staff talks be initiated near future on contingent planning basis with view providing Thai participation and support in Laos under appropriate circumstances.

d. Thai be encouraged unilaterally develop contingent plans provide military support in Laos irrespective receptiveness Laos to Thai suggestions bilateral planning.

e. JUSMAG provide guidance Thai these matters.

f. If and when feasible these plans be coordinated with SEACDT.⁴

Despite inherent difficulties we consider it important US policy be developed cover situation and that JUSMAG receive guidance which would enable JUSMAG advise Thai on contingent planning basis recourse Thailand should follow in event emergency in Laos.

Anschuetz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/9–2355. Top Secret. Repeated to Vientiane.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.5/9–2055)
3. Sarit Thanarat, Commander in Chief of the Thai Army.
4. The Embassy in Vientiane endorsed the program proposed by the Embassy in Bangkok and noted that the best time for an approach to the Lao Government would be in October “if and when political negotiations with Pathets break down”. (Telegram 358 from Vientiane, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/9–1855)