276. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
Vientiane, February 16,
1955—5 p.m..
352. Following is examination of possible alternatives for bringing about restoration two northern provinces to Royal authority:
- 1.
- First method advocated by ICC and pursued by government has been negotiations with Pathet Lao. There seems very little likelihood these will succeed. It is clear Pathets are controlled by Viets and there seems no valid reason to expect Viets to abandon useful power position, except in exchanges or sweeping concessions to Pathets in Laos as a whole which Royal Government is not prepared to grant. Even Katay no longer has faith in this method.
- 2.
- The second alternative is to bring about gradual erosion Pathet position through defection some major leaders and most rank and file, who he thinks would be happy to escape if they could. He and Chairman ICC believe this process will be facilitated by dissolution Mixed Commission. Once again, while not inconceivable, we see little likelihood this method succeeding. We have seen no evidence that Pathet’s leaders wish or dare to revolt. While trickle of rank and file have come across, we suspect majority can be intimidated if not indoctrinated. Moreover we anticipate continued infiltration of Viets to stiffen them.
- 3.
- Third alternative might be concerted heavy pressure on Viets and Chinese exerted by ICC, Geneva signatories, Nehru, Manila Pact powers. This method, while probably that favored by UK and France (judging by attitude their representatives here), also has serious limitation. It is doubtful whether ICC, that is, Indian Chairman, will ever take strong stand which might “increase tension;” even more doubtful Geneva signatories would. We question whether Nehru would go beyond equivocal moral approach Viets and Chinese, since to do so would run counter to his whole policy and issue must seem to him relatively small. While we continue to feel strongly that Manila Pact powers should act on this issue at Bangkok, we are less and [less?] sanguine of results than before recent change in Kremlin and exacerbation Formosa question. We suspect Communist high command may now be less concerned at effect on West and prefer to keep two Lao provinces as additional pawns and means of pressure. They can use failure to reach “political settlement” as excuse to ICC and Nehru, and “domination” Laos by US and French “imperialists” as propaganda justification.
- 4.
- If these three means fail, only alternative likely to succeed in foreseeable future would be exercise of force by Lao Government and army. As previously reported, Crown Prince and increasing numbers of political and military leaders are inclining to this solution, and believe it could be easily accomplished if Viets did not invade in force. They would count upon existing or strengthened Manila Pact guarantee to prevent such invasion. We would be inclined to agree with their appraisal but obviously this is question fraught with uncertainty. If government does undertake to reoccupy provinces by arms, Indians and ICC will consider themselves flouted, some of our allies will be horrified, and Viets may counter-attack in force.
- 5.
- On other hand, consequences of letting provinces go by default
must be considered.
- (a)
- Precisely at inauguration of Manila Pact, new demonstration of inability of West to defend Southeast Asian area would sap courage and morale in area as whole.
- (b)
- Ultimately a new “peoples democracy” would probably emerge and Laos be definitely partitioned.
- (c)
- Lao Government would be discredited and likelihood of its holding balance of country seriously reduced.
- (d)
- Consequences of loss on Laos’ other neighbors is apparent.
- 6.
- Under these circumstances we would have to consider very carefully before advising Lao Government against taking action, along lines alternative four above, which it might consider necessary to restore its territorial integrity. Such action would have to be commenced by April 1 at latest in order to be sure of achieving its objective before rainy season. This factor allows relatively little time to exhaust possibilities of satisfactory settlement by other means.
- 7.
- It is for this reason that I particularly urge issuance by Bangkok conference of grave declaration of concern and warning,2 which might contribute to inducing Viets to observe their pledges concerning territorial integrity of Laos.
Yost