Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

274. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 14, 1955—8 p.m.

343. Reference: Legation’s telegram 342 repeated Bangkok 103.² Following my comments possible change in government suggested by Crown Prince.

There is no doubt Katay has proven unsatisfactory Prime Minister. He has misconceived true character of Pathet Lao and has prolonged negotiations with them beyond point of diminishing returns.

It is true he has been encouraged in this course by both ICC and Thais. He has not kept Crown Prince or his ministerial colleagues informed of his intentions and has intrigued shamelessly against his Foreign Minister. He has rather crudely endeavored to outsmart all with whom he has dealt, including ourselves. Finally he has totally failed to show expected energy and imagination in coping politically and administratively with problem facing Laos and in popularizing government with Lao people

Before determining whether his downfall would be advantageous, however, alternatives should be scrutinized. There would appear actually to be no feasible alternative except return in effect to old government which resigned last October, leader of which might be Souvanna, Phoui, or Prince Bon Oum, with Prince Savang exercising considerably greater influence than at present. Such government would be politically safer and administratively much more effective than present one and would work more honestly with US and France. This government would presumably be based to considerable extent on army which Souvanna appears to have well in hand.

Such a government would, however, have certain serious disabilities. It would be tagged with labels “old guard” and “pro-French” and might be unable to obtain or keep two-thirds majority in Assembly. We saw how bitterly it was attacked in debates last autumn. It would encounter same disabilities in election campaign. (…Pathet detest Katay and are indifferent to Souvanna, presumably because they consider former more dangerous rival.) Moreover, it cannot be predicted to what length Katay and his friends might go if they were kicked out of power. They certainly would cause all the trouble they could. Finally, rapprochement with Thais might be checked by change in government, which they would doubtless lay to French machinations. (Breal, who is normally most frank and cooperative, has been singularly reticent last few days. This may mean he is up to something or may merely reflect Franco-American difficulties outside Laos.)

On the whole I am inclined to advise one more effort to keep this government together and to help it function. I expect to have serious talk along these lines with Katay tomorrow. If Department and Ambassador Peurifoy see no objection, I believe it would be very helpful if latter might suggest to Marshal Pibul and General Phao they do likewise during Katay’s visit to Bangkok.³ It might be pointed out to them that we and they have been supporting Katay government as that best fitted to keep Communism out of Laos but that it is falling down on the job and, if it does not rapidly improve, will be and should be thrown out. If Thais ask what steps Katay should be advised to take they might be told: (1) insist Pathets permit prompt restoration Royal authority in two northern provinces and, if they will not, appeal to ICC and break off negotiations; (2) reestablish unity in his government by taking colleagues into his confidence and ceasing intrigues against them; and (3) get himself and his Ministers out of Vientiane into the country to tell and show the people what the government can and will do for them.

We would hope our expression of waning confidence in Katay would not induce Thais to go back to Petsarath, who seems to share Katay’s more serious failings and to compound them.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1455. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
2. Supra.
3. Katay visited Thailand February 20–22. A report of his visit and discussions is in telegram 383 from Vientiane, February 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2655)