Office of the Historian

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Laos1

Washington, February 12, 1955—1:20 p.m.

261. Vientiane 310 repeated Saigon 379 Paris 63 Phnom Penh Unnumbered;2 Department telegram 237 to Vientiane repeated Saigon 3224 Paris 2719 Phnom Penh 334.3 Department notes shortage arms equipment Lao forces not factor preventing reoccupation provinces.

Regarding additional February aid (Department telegram 2354) shortly expect FOA authorization $46 million for DFS Laos CY 1955.

Defense February 7 instructed CINCFE deliver seven helicopters, six light aircraft and spare parts for craft already Indochina. Delivery schedules not known. New arrivals mean eventual total eighteen helicopters of which ICC to get fourteen or fifteen; ICC Laos may be allocated three or four.

On political side Secretary plans include Laos in general area review Bangkok. Although final aid authorization, helicopter delivery and political action by Manila Pact powers are still to come, represent positive encouraging signs early external assistance Laos.

On other hand Department discouraged trend Lao attitude. Department recognizes stringent budget position but feels lack funds cannot honestly be advanced by Laos as justifying failure react to Pathet Viet Minh incursions. If U.S. delay approving total aid complicates planning nevertheless U.S. publicly committed support army.

You correct in following policy Department telegram 1165 which unchanged. No desire in Department telegram 237 give advice which might resume hostilities, but consider Laos and French have right take action counter Pathet attacks. Internal attacks may again presage overt Viet Minh aggression. Aware command positions in hands Laos but under impression pattern French advisor for each Lao officer in headquarters gave French significant power to influence. Reports confirmed by Buford French not wish get involved nor stir things up [Page 602] might even lead them discourage Lao initiative. Your clarification 310 most helpful.6

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–455. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hoey, cleared by PSA and WE, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Paris.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See footnote 2 supra.↩
  4. See footnote 4, supra.↩
  5. See footnote 6, supra.↩
  6. In telegram 349 from Vientiane, February 16, in response to this telegram, the Legation provided the following assessment of the difficulties facing the Royal Lao Government in reoccupying the two northern provinces:

    “We too have been discouraged at Lao attitude and behavior in northern provinces though we must recognize serious difficulties which policy of ICC has created. Government forces in Sam Neua and Phong Saly were very small at time of cease-fire. Pathet-Viets have taken position it would be violation Article 19 of cease-fire agreement to reinforce them, despite fact Pathets from all over Laos, not to mention Viets, were regrouped in these two provinces. ICC has, by failure to recognize right of Royal Forces to be in two provinces, so far condoned Viet-Pathet position. Reinforcement of government posts by parachute could hardly be concealed and covert reinforcement by foot is very difficult”. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–1555)

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